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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Euro Area growth 
prospects are weak  
– dampening effect of 
higher oil prices  … 
EUROFRAME - European Forecasting Network predicts that the Euro 
Area economic growth will remain weak relative to other major economies, 
with GDP projected to rise by just 1.2 per cent in 2005, compared to growth 
of 2.6 per cent in the OECD area. Private sector investment and trade growth 
were particularly disappointing in the first half of 2005 in the Euro Area, where 
our projections for GDP growth have been revised downwards by roughly 0.2-
0.3 percentage points per annum since the Spring Report. This revision may 
seem relatively modest given a rise in the oil price of roughly $20 per barrel 
over this period. While the oil price rise lifts inflationary pressures in the Euro 
Area, the negative impact on growth is largely offset by the combined effects 
of a fall in both real and nominal long-term interest rates and by a modest 
depreciation of the euro. These two developments should help stimulate 
investment growth and external demand, offsetting the downward pressure on 
consumer demand from higher prices. 
 
 
Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for Euro Area 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
     
Output Growth 0.9 0.7 1.8 1.2 1.8 2.0 
Inflation Rate 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.9 
Unemployment rate 8.2 8.7 8.9 8.6 8.4 8.3 
Govt. Balance as % 
of GDP 
-2.5 -3.0 -2.7 -2.8 -2.7 -2.4 
 * Inflation rate is the HICP measure and unemployment is the EUROSTAT standardised rate 
 
… offset by lower 
long-term interest 
rates and 
depreciating currency 
EUROFRAME-EFN forecasts for GDP growth in major regions show a 
modest downward revision for 2005 reflecting a weaker outlook for both 
North America and the Euro Area, while outside the OECD we also see 
weaker prospects in China. Our forecast for world growth is unchanged for 
2006, at 4.3 per cent but we do see a downward revision to prospects for the 
Euro Area, offset by slightly stronger prospects outside the OECD, primarily 
in oil exporting economies, which benefit from high revenues thanks to oil 
prices of over $60 per barrel. 
 
Three key developments over the last six months have influenced the revisions 
to our forecast since the Spring Report. The oil price has risen by roughly $20 
per barrel; long-run interest rates have come down by about 0.6 percentage 
points in the Euro Area; and the euro exchange rate has fallen by around 5 per 
cent against the dollar as well as a basket of currencies since March. Real oil 
prices facing Euro Area consumers are now higher than at any time since 1986, 
and have exceeded the levels seen in the 1970s. With real prices roughly triple 
their average value in the 1990s, this will inevitably impact on inflation and 
demand in the Euro Area. 
 
 
There exist a number of tentative explanations for the current low long-term 
interest rates. Low inflation expectations associated with pessimism about 
growth prospects or increased central bank credibility may be reducing interest 
rates in the euro area, as may the ending of a period of rapid US technical 
progress. In the shorter term, Asian central banks have been buying up more 
US Treasury bonds than ever before and hence US Treasury bond yields fallen, 
and this has affected the securities of other governments. In addition, there is 
the view that a significant increase in the global supply of savings helps to 
explain the relatively low real interest rates in the world today.  
 
Interest Rates to 
remain low… 
We expect that the ECB will keep interest rates constant for some time 
because the economic expansion will remain modest and the perspectives for 
inflation will probably not worsen in the near future. All in all, the actual 
interest rate will be fairly close to the Taylor rate. In our judgment, however, 
key interest rates will be raised in the medium term because they are lower than 
the “neutral” rate according to all calculations. We expect that the ECB will 
start to tighten policy at the end of next year. 
 
..fiscal policy to 
remain slightly 
contractionary 
Lower than expected growth for 2005 leads us to anticipate the Euro Area 
fiscal deficit will be higher by about 0.2 percentage points of GDP this year at 
2.8 per cent of GDP, or 3.1 excluding one-off measures, while the fiscal stance 
will be slightly contractionary. We expect fiscal policy to remain slightly 
contractionary until 2007 at the euro area level, reflecting somewhat 
contractionary measures in countries running higher than 3 per cent of GDP 
deficits, while fiscal policy will be neutral or slightly expansionary in the other 
countries. But the Euro area government deficits will remain at around 2.4 per 
cent in 2007, under the moderate expectations for growth. 
 
… oil prices to 
remain high but 
inflation and growth 
at moderate rates  
We expect oil prices to remain at around $60 until 2007, and the Euro Area 
effective exchange rate to remain almost unchanged, at a level more than 25% 
higher than in 2002. We expect the euro area to record inflation rates at or 
close to 2 per cent. GDP growth is expected to reach 1.8 in 2006 and 2.0 in 
2007, with the unemployment rate decreasing but still in the order of 8.3 per 
cent in 2007 
 
No major negative 
effects from Katrina 
.. 
The two largest economies in North America, the US and Canada, began 2005 
at a healthy pace. The slowdown in Mexico, where growth fell sharply from a 
solid rise of 4.9 per cent per annum in the final quarter of last year to just 
above 2.4 per cent in the first quarter of 2005, contributed to a relatively soft 
outcome for NAFTA growth in the opening quarter of this year, as compared 
to 2004. We expect growth in North America to decelerate by about ¾ 
percentage point from the rate recorded in 2004, to about 3¼ per cent per 
annum in 2005 and 2006.  Hurricane Katrina will have some minor negative 
effect on US output in the short term, but activities relating to reconstruction 
will boost output measures over the medium term. 
 
 
A significant risk to the EUROFRAME-EFN forecast is from a permanent rise 
in the oil price by US$20 per barrel. This would increase inflation and 
inflationary expectations requiring a monetary authority response. Output 
growth would be reduced by about 0.3 percentage points a year for each of the 
three years following the shock. Even with a response from the monetary 
authorities, raising rates by 0.7 percentage points at the end of 2005 and into 
2006 and 2007, inflation would still be 0.5 per cent higher on average over 
these three years. A stronger reaction of monetary authorities than suggested in 
… but risks remain 
from higher oil prices 
our scenario would bring inflation down significantly but the output effects 
would increase in size and duration.   
 
… Chinese currency 
appreciation nor 
demand  rebalancing 
a panacea for 
E p
The role of China in reducing the burden currently placed on Europe from a 
global rebalancing is also considered in the EUROFRAME-EFN report. A 10 
per cent Chinese Renminbi appreciation against the US dollar will dampen 
China’s exports and output but this impact will be short-lived as domestic 
prices adjust rapidly moving the real exchange almost all the way back to initial 
levels. A Renminbi revaluation will not in itself provide a panacea for lifting the 
burden from Europe but a permanent increase in Chinese domestic demand 
would have an impact, albeit limited.  
  
Corporate tax 
competition in 
Europe intensifying  
Further integration in the EU is bound to intensify tax competition, which is 
the special topic of this Report. One of the most evident signs of tax 
competition has been the widespread and continuous reduction in the statutory 
rates of companies’ taxation. Moreover, the share of corporate tax revenue 
over GDP began to decline since the beginning of the new millennium, adding 
strain on the keeping of fiscal balances. If globalisation induces the progressive 
vanishing of corporation tax, other sources of revenue should be found, or 
expenditures cut, and the overall systems of direct taxation traditionally 
adopted by the EU member states should be consequently reformed to provide 
a coherent setting.  
 
This Report’s special topic focuses on the potential costs of tax competition in 
the field of corporate taxation and discusses the potential benefits of different 
types of tax policy coordination. 
 
… different tax 
bases an obstacle to 
internal market 
integration  
The existence of 25 different tax systems increases transaction and compliance 
costs, penalising companies operating in the EU, relative to purely domestic 
companies. Another obstacle to internal market integration is caused by the 
fact that cross-border loss compensation in the EU is usually not allowed by 
the national tax systems currently adopted. The 2001 Commission’s proposal 
for a common consolidated corporate tax base goes in the direction of 
reducing these costs. This levels the playing field both within the EU, for 
companies operating either domestically or in more than one member state, as 
well as between the EU and its worldwide competitors.  
 
To the extent that consolidated profits are subsequently allocated by an 
automatic formula, as envisaged in the Commission’s proposal, rather than by 
separate accounting, other problems could be solved, in particular the 
convenience to shift profits from high to low tax countries. Despite the still 
limited empirical evidence on the quantitative importance of profit shifting in 
the EU, the use of transfer pricing, thin capitalisation or similar tax planning 
devices are widely known and used by multinational companies to minimise 
their tax burden. However, implementing a system of formula apportionment 
in the EU would not usually, depending on the formula adopted, be able to 
entirely solve this problem.  
 
… common 
consolidated tax base 
unable to address 
possible misallocation 
of capital  
A common consolidated tax base with formula apportionment would also be 
unable, again with differences depending on the formula adopted, to properly 
face the problem of the possible misallocation of capital, which could be 
induced by tax rates differentials. The Report shows that there is a wide 
dispersion of effective tax rates among EU countries and there is evidence that 
foreign direct investments are sensitive to these differentials. The risk of tough 
tax competition to attract FDI is limited by the prominent importance on non-
tax factors in the location of FDI, but does exist in the European Union.  
 
… a common capital 
tax rate is neither 
necessary nor 
desirable  
The Commission’s proposal is strictly limited to tax base coordination: each 
member state would be left free to set the desired tax rate on apportioned 
profits. Moving in this direction would be an important step towards greater 
integration and a better functioning of the internal market, but would not 
constitute a complete and entirely satisfactory solution to all the relevant issues. 
To fully solve the problem of profit shifting, tax base coordination should be 
accompanied by tax rate harmonisation.  To prevent misallocation of capital, a 
common rate is not necessary and could even be harmful, as long as higher 
rates are accompanied by location specific rents (including those induced by 
agglomeration forces, or efficient public services or infrastructure), and as long 
as the common rate will force small, peripheral countries to increase their rates.  
 
… but a minimum 
tax rate could be 
desirable.   
That is why the proposal of a minimum tax rate tends to have a greater support 
in the literature. The level should be low enough to encourage growth in the 
EU and prevent losses for the less advantaged-low taxed countries. Another 
suggested policy is a two-tier approach with a higher minimum tax rate for old 
and a lower minimum tax rate for new member states, with the latter 
progressively increasing as countries converge. Otherwise, other solutions 
should be devised in order to compensate these countries losing from tax rate 
coordination. 
 
 
 
  
 
 1. OUTLOOK FOR THE 
EURO AREA 
The Euro Area remains weak relative to other major economies, but 
nonetheless GDP growth accelerated to 1.8 per cent in 2004. The outlook for 
2005 is less favourable, with output projected to rise by just 1.2 per cent. 
Private sector investment and trade growth were particularly disappointing in 
the first half of 2005. Our projections for Euro Area growth have been revised 
downward by roughly 0.2 percentage points per annum since spring. This 
revision may seem relatively modest given a rise in the oil price of roughly $20 
per barrel over this period. While the oil price rise lifts inflationary pressures in 
the Euro Area, the negative impact on growth is largely offset by the combined 
effects of a fall in both real and nominal long-term interest rates and a modest 
depreciation of the euro. These two developments should help stimulate 
investment growth and external demand, offsetting the downward pressure on 
consumer demand from higher prices.  
1.1 
Overview 
 
Table 1.1: Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for the Euro Area 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
        
Output Growth Rate  1.7      0.9      0.7      1.8     1.2     1.8    2.0 
Inflation Rate 
(Harmonised) 
2.4      2.3      2.1      2.1     2.2     2.0   1.9 
Unemployment Rate  7.8      8.2      8.7      8.9     8.6     8.4    8.3 
Govt. balance as % of GDP  -1.9  -2.5  -3.0  -2.7  -2.8  -2.7  -2.4 
        
 
Euro Area export growth has been restrained by the strength of the euro 
since 2002, with the effective exchange rate roughly 25 per cent stronger than 
at the beginning of that year. Accompanying the exchange rate appreciation, 
relative export prices rose in all the Euro Area economies in 2002 and 2003, 
with significantly higher rises experienced in Greece, Italy and France over this 
period. Hence, net trade is expected to have a negative impact on GDP growth 
in 2005. But external demand is projected to strengthen in 2006, thanks to a 
slight improvement in external competitiveness and a relatively high level of 
exports to oil exporting countries such as Russia, Norway and the members of 
Opec where windfall receipts from high oil prices are recycled into high import 
demand. We project a modest positive impact of net trade on growth in 2006 
and 2007. 
The rising oil price puts upward pressure on inflation in the Euro Area, 
although this is offset to some extent by the strength of the euro. We have 
revised our forecast for inflation up by 0.2 percentage points since March, and 
we do not foresee the harmonised inflation rate falling below 2 per cent before 
1 
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2007. The outlook for unemployment, on the other hand, has improved in the 
last six months, as the unemployment rates in Spain, and to some extent 
France and Germany, have come down more rapidly than anticipated. The 
fiscal outlook remains disappointing, and the dampened outlook for growth 
combined with statistical revisions to the historical data make the prospects for 
achieving a budget of close to balance this decade more remote. 
 
World growth accelerated to its fastest pace in 28 years in 2004, reaching 5.1 
per cent. Global growth well above trend reflected strong domestic demand in 
the US, France, the UK, Canada and Spain, as well as oil exporting nations 
such as Russia, Mexico and Opec members. Japan and China also benefited 
from a strong boost to net trade, with world trade growth rising to 7.9 per cent 
following 3 years of sub-trend growth. Growth in both the US and Japan rose 
well above recent trends last year, while the UK and Canada also performed 
relatively well. We also saw a strong acceleration in South America and Africa.  
1.2 
Global Outlook 
The outlook remains buoyant on a global level, with world GDP expected 
to rise by 4¼ per cent in both 2005 and 2006. Nonetheless, this represents a 
marked slowdown, with US growth projected to slow by nearly 1 percentage 
point this year. Output growth in the UK is projected to slow by more than 1 
percentage point, to 2 per cent, while the outlook for Japan remains strong. 
World trade growth is expected to moderate this year relative to 2004, with 
growth of 6.1 per cent projected, but a recovery towards 6¾-7 per cent per 
annum is foreseen for 2006 and 2007. 
 
1.2.1 KEY DEVELOPMENTS 
Table 1.2 reports EUROFRAME-EFN forecasts for GDP growth in major 
regions in spring and autumn of this year. We have made a modest downward 
revision to our projection for 2005 since March. This reflects a weaker outlook 
for both North America and the Euro Area, while outside the OECD we also 
see weaker prospects in China. Our forecast for world growth is unchanged 
for 2006, but we do see a downward revision to prospects for the Euro Area, 
offset by slightly stronger prospects outside the OECD, primarily in oil 
exporting economies, which benefit from high revenues thanks to oil prices of 
over $60 per barrel. 
 
Table 1.2: GDP Growth Forecasts in Spring and Autumn 2005 
 
 World OECD NAFTA Euro Area 
 Spring Autumn Spring Autumn Spring Autumn Spring Autumn 
2004 4.6 5.1 3.2 3.4 4.3 4.1 1.8 1.8 
2005 4.5 4.2 2.7 2.6 3.6 3.3 1.5 1.2 
2006 4.3 4.3 2.9 2.7 3.3 3.2 2.0 1.8 
 
We identify three key developments over the last six months that influence 
the revisions to our forecast since the Spring Report: the oil price has risen by 
roughly $20 per barrel; long-run interest rates have come down by about 0.6 
percentage points; and the dollar has appreciated against the euro by roughly 5 
per cent. Each of these developments is analysed below, and their net impact 
on our forecast is assessed. 
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OIL PRICES 
Oil prices have risen further this year and in September reached a new nominal 
record level of $67 per barrel for Brent crude. On top of this, a shortage of 
refinery capacity has pushed up profit margins for oil refineries, raising the 
price of final oil products by more than the crude price. Real oil prices facing 
Euro Area consumers are now higher than at any time since 1986, and have 
exceeded the levels seen in the 1970s. With real prices roughly triple their 
average value in the 1990s, this will inevitably impact on inflation and demand 
in the Euro Area.  
 
Chart 1.1: Oil Price in the Euro Area 
 
 
The high oil price is the result of a steep increase in global demand in 
rec
 by the rise in the number of oilrigs in operation, oil supply is 
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ent years in combination with a limited increase in supply. As a result, spare 
capacity of the Opec producers is very low. Furthermore, the oil price was 
boosted by temporary disruptions such as the hurricane Katrina and possibly 
to some extent by speculation. The limited rise in supply up to now is due to 
the long period it takes to develop new oil fields and the current strong 
discipline within the Opec-cartel preventing a sharp investment reaction in this 
crucial region.  
As indicated
ected to increase further in the near future. However, this rise in supply will 
only be sufficient to cover the expected increase in demand and the oil price is 
projected to drop only marginally, from $62 per barrel for a weighted average 
of Brent and Dubai in 2006 to $57 per barrel in 2007. With the oil market tight 
and reserve capacity limited, temporary drops in oil production, caused for 
instance by international political tensions or more events like damaging 
hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, could easily lead to substantially higher oil 
prices.  
W - ?  
Long-term interest rates reflect a combination of expectations o
of the medium to long-term real interest rate. These latter rates should in turn 
reflect the expected growth rate of the economy, and in the longer term we 
would expect them to exceed the combined rates of growth of the labour force 
and of technical progress. As we can see from chart 1.2 on indexed French 
government bonds (OATi), inflation expectations have not moved much in the 
last year or so, and remain at an average of 2 per cent per annum over the next 
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10 years. However, real interest rates expected to prevail over the same period 
have fallen markedly. Longer-term real rates have also fallen, with long real 
rates in the Euro Area settling at around 2 per cent per annum if expected 
inflation remains at 2 per cent. Elsewhere, the difference between a US 
government indexed bond maturing in 2008 and one maturing in 2028 imply 
that real rates in the US will also average 2 per cent over this period.  
 
Chart 1.2: 10-Year Inflation Indexed Bonds, France 
 
There exist a number of tentative explanations for the current low long-
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m interest rates. Low inflation expectations associated with pessimism about 
growth prospects may be reducing interest rates in Europe. Perceptions that 
labour market reform in Europe is slow may also be reducing perceptions of 
longer-term growth prospects1, as may the ending of a period of rapid US 
technical progress. In the shorter term, Asian central banks have been buying 
up more US Treasury bonds than ever before and hence US Treasury bond 
yields fallen, and this has affected the securities of other governments. In 
addition, there is the view prominently advocated by Ben Bernanke, former 
Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, that a significant increase in the global 
supply of savings helps to explain the relatively low real interest rates in the 
world today.2 The non-OECD world especially has ample savings but few 
profitable investment opportunities. Recent changes in prudential supervision 
of institutional investors may have also helped reduce long-term rates. 
Prudential supervisors require more and more pension funds and life insurance 
companies to match the duration of their assets and liabilities. As a result, 
pension funds and life insurance companies are demanding more government 
bonds. Finally, investors probably perceive central banks to be more effective 
in maintaining price stability. Going from a period of high and volatile inflation 
to a period of low and stable inflation has certainly contributed to a fall in 
inflation risk premiums, and hence lower long-term interest rates.  
 
1 This view is not shared by OFCE. 
2 Ben S. Bernanke, The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit, at the Homer 
Jones Lecture, St. Louis, Missouri. Governor Ben S. Bernanke presented similar remarks at the 
Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economists, Richmond, Virginia, on March 10, 2005.  
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EXCHANGE RATES 
The euro nominal effective exchange rate rose sharply in 2002 and 2003, and 
now stands roughly 25 per cent higher than in early 2002. The strong exchange 
rate has hampered competitiveness and has been an import factor behind weak 
export growth in several Euro Area economies. However, it also reduces the 
cost of commodities, such as oil and manufacturing equipment, which are 
priced in US dollars, easing costs to manufacturers, and has helped keep under 
control the inflationary pressures that were emerging in the Euro Area until 
2002. 
 
 
Chart 1.3: Nominal Effective Exchange Rates 
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rch, and the exchange rate assumptions embedded into our forecast see the 
euro about 5 per cent weaker than anticipated in our Spring Report. We do not 
see any significant change in the exchange rate over the forecast, and it moves 
broadly in line with the path indicated by interest differentials between the US 
and the Euro Area. Our interest rate projections in turn broadly reflect the 
shape of the yield curve on both sides of the Atlantic. 
D  
Forecasts are revised in the light of developments in bo
accounts and because of a changed environment. Since our forecast in March 
2005 we have revised down growth prospects for the Euro Area by 0.2-0.3 
percentage points in 2005 and 2006, whilst we have revised our inflation 
forecast upward. Prospects for long rates, the exchange rate and for oil prices 
have all changed markedly since our March evaluation of the Euro Area, and it 
is useful to decompose the effects of these changes. Chart 1.4 shows the rise in 
the oil price relative to our projections in March, with a differential of about 
$20 per barrel. Of course the rise in oil prices will have reduced our growth 
projections and increased our inflation forecast, and this is discussed in more 
detail in Section 1.4 of this Report. But the financial market developments may 
not have worked in the same directions. Since our last forecast long rates (both 
real and nominal) have fallen everywhere, but more in the Euro Area than in 
the US, as we can see from the projections in Chart 1.5. In total they have 
come down by roughly 1 percentage point over last 18 months. As we can see 
from Chart 1.6, the euro exchange rate has also fallen by around 5 per cent 
against a basket of currencies since March, and in combination these two 
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events in the financial market should cause us to revise upward our forecasts 
for output growth and inflation.  
 
Chart 1.4: Revision to Oil Price since March 
hart 1.6: Revision to €/$ rate since March 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1.5: Revision to Long Rates since March 
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It is relatively clear that financial market developments have largely offset the 
impact of the oil price on Euro Area. Using our model, NiGEM, we have 
simulated the impact of these three major changes to our forecast, and 
cumulated them. We started with a cut of 0.6 percentage points in long real 
rates (long rates) everywhere in forward mode, allowing bond prices and 
wealth to respond. We then simulated a 5 per cent depreciation of the euro 
against the dollar, but in backward mode as the exchange rate is a jump 
variable and had to be held fixed in the first period. Finally, we have simulated 
a $20 per barrel rise in the oil price in forward mode with policy reactions in 
place. The impacts of these on output and inflation are plotted in the two 
charts 1.17 and 1.18 below.  
 
Chart 1.7: Cumulating Impact on Growth 
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Looking first at growth, we can see from the chart that the fall in long rat
and in the euro exchange rate would have boosted growth since March, and i
the first 12 months after such a combined shock their expansionary effects jus
offset the impact of the increase in the oil price. Hence we would argue tha
these factors together would not lead us to revise down our forecast for 2005, 
and as we can see they may have led us to revise up our growth forecast
2006 but not 2007. Overall prospects look rather weaker than they did, and we 
would argue that this has come more from developments in trade and i
domestic conditions than from oil and financial market developments.  
 
Chart 1.8: Cumulating Impact on Inflation 
 
 
The three shocks together should have had an upward impact on inflation, 
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forecast revision to inflation is about half this size3, reflecting in part the 
impact of the excess weakness in growth discussed above. In general we would 
say that weaker growth prospects account for about half of the difference 
between our forecast revisions and that implied in the simulations, with the 
remainder reflecting the combined judgement of the member Institutes in the 
group.  
We have also revised our US forecast in the light of these and other events, 
and we would judge that oil prices, the exchange rate and long rates have 
probably reduced growth in the US by around 0.3 per cent a year between 
2005 and 2007. This in part reflects the facts that the dollar has appreciated 
and that long rates in the US have fallen by around half as much as in the Euro 
Area. However, offsetting the downward influence, house price growth has 
been 5 per cent stronger in 2005 than we expected in March, boosting output 
growth by 0.3 to 0.6 per cent, with the effects come through wealth effects in 
onsumption and Q effects in housing investment. Overall we see little reason 
r
 for NAFTA growth in the opening quarter of this year, as compared 
to 
f of the new mortgages had a variable 
rate, up from a quarter in 2000-2002; around 60 per cent of the new bigger 
                                                
c
fo  significant further downward revisions in the US, except those discussed 
below in relation to hurricane effects. 
1.2.2 NORTH AMERICA: OUTLOOK REMAINS FAVOURABLE   
EVEN AFTER KATRINA 
The two largest economies in North America, the US and Canada, began 2005 
at a healthy pace. The slowdown in Mexico, where growth fell sharply from a 
solid rise of 4.9 per cent per annum in the final quarter of last year to just 
above 2.4 per cent in the first quarter of 2005, contributed to a relatively soft 
outcome
2004. We expect growth in North America to decelerate by about ¾ 
percentage point from the rate recorded in 2004, to about 3¼ per cent per 
annum in 2005 and 2006.  
Stemming mainly from private consumption, US real GDP growth has 
remained high in the first semester (3.5 per cent at an annual rate). This pace is 
broadly unchanged from the two previous semesters and somewhat lower than 
the second semester of 2003 when the recovery really got under way. Strong 
private consumption growth is triggered by sizeable wealth effects, caused by 
the pronounced rise in house prices as well as strong equity prices. This 
development has created additional risks. Households have become financially 
more vulnerable: last year, almost hal
mortgages were interest-only, up from 5 per cent in 2001; household debt 
reached a record level of 86 per cent of GDP, 10 percentage points more than 
in 2001; the saving ratio has dropped to only 0.5 per cent of disposable 
income. The current financial position of households should, however, be no 
major problem during the projection period, unless house prices collapse or 
mortgage rates jump up substantially. Both developments are not projected for 
the short term, but cannot fully be excluded. 
The US economic outlook is seen as favourable even after the hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita. Loss of wealth in the region hit by the hurricane at the end 
of August is substantial. But, while the region is as big as the UK, its share in 
US GDP is only 3 per cent. Moreover, lower production of manufactured 
goods and services will to a great extent, and with some delay be offset by the 
 
3 It is difficult to evaluate the inflation forecast revision from the tables, as an accounting shift 
resulting from healthcare reforms in the Netherlands will move some health-related costs from 
the private sector to the public sector. This reform will only impact 2006 and is expected to 
translate into a deflation rate of 2.5 per cent in the Netherlands and a net effect of -0.2 
percentage points on the Euro Area HICP. This masks some of the rise in our inflation forecast 
for the Euro Area since March, which otherwise would rise by 0.2 percentage points in 2005 and 
0.4 percentage points in 2006 and 2007. 
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positive impact of reconstruction efforts. Real GDP growth in 2006 is 
projected at 3¼ per cent. Although no further drop in the saving ratio is 
expected, private consumption growth is likely to remain strong as the labour 
market should improve further. Business investment will be boosted by high 
capacity utilisation, high profitability (especially in the service sector), strong 
balance sheets and low capital costs. With domestic demand growth remaining 
high, import growth is projected at almost 5.9 per cent in 2005. As a result, the 
current account deficit should average around the record level of 6 per cent 
GDP over our forecast. 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Unlike Other Natural Disasters  
Hurricanes and other great natural disasters cause significant human and 
material losses. From the point of view of the business cycle, such calamities 
usually decrease growth opportunities at first but ensuing reconstruction tends 
to compensate for a great deal of the loss in growth. Effects of even a large 
catastrophe are usually relatively small on the world economy. First Katrina 
and later Rita differ from most other natural disasters in that its impact was felt 
strongly in the main energy production region of the United States. The 
hurricanes and the flooding stopped or seriously damaged a considerable part 
of energy output in Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. 
In the direct aftermath of Katrina, some 90 per cent of the production of 
crude oil in the region (the share of the Gulf producers is 29 per cent of total 
output in the USA) stopped. About 70 per cent of the output of gas (19 per 
cent share of US output) also came to a halt. Some 12 per cent of all US 
refining capacity stopped in the areas affected by the hurricane. Hurricane Rita 
followed Katrina and added to the damage. In the end of September 72.4 % of 
819 manned platforms, 47.8 % of 134 rigs, 100 % of oil production and 80.3 
% of gas production was still stopped in the Gulf of Mexico according to the 
arted to 
(gasoline) in the US rose 
by 
he winter proves to be a particularly 
col
Mineral Management Service. After the hurricane, output has st
recover and reconstruction is under way.  
At first, problems in oil production raised the world market prices of crude 
oil, gas and fuels considerably. Since then, oil prices have declined because 
some of the oil or oil products in global strategic reserves has been released 
and sold to the market and Saudi Arabia has promised to increase its output. 
The major problem caused by these hurricanes is, however, the extensive 
damage to refinery capacity and perhaps for the gas production capacity. 
There already was a shortage of refining capacity before the hurricane. 
Consequently, the difficulties that are anticipated in starting up the refineries 
will keep the petrol market tight. The price of petrol 
about 40 per cent during the first couple of days in September and 
exceeded three dollars to the gallon, but has since fallen back. The rise in 
gasoline prices alone may raise the US inflation rate temporarily by one 
percentage point.  
Katrina’s impact is buffered by the good performance of the US economy 
before the hurricane struck. It is likely that the Federal Reserve and the Federal 
government will react rapidly if any signs of a recession appear. The increase in 
fuel prices will decrease households’ purchasing power both in the US and 
worldwide and raise firms’ costs. Indeed, Katrina will cause a dip in economic 
activity. The risk will further intensify if t
d one. 
 
1.2.3 ASIA WILL REMAIN THE SECOND MOTOR OF THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 
Despite robust headline economic growth in China and a strong rebound in 
Japanese domestic demand, export growth decelerated across most of the East 
Asia region in the first half of 2005. Global demand, especially in the IT related 
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industries, has weakened, while Asian currencies such as that of South Korea 
and Taiwan have seen notable appreciation in the last year. However, the 
deceleration in Asian exports is mainly due to the slowdown in import demand 
from China, although the value of Chinese exports continued to grow by 
around 30 per cent in the first half of 2005. In the first half of 2005, Chinese 
eco
ontinuing, economic growth is projected to again outpace growth in 
e rest of the world. The recent revaluation of the Chinese renminbi is small 
and will only have a minor negative impact on Chinese economic growth. The 
to 4.2 4, and is likely to rise further. Government administered 
ith growth of 
con
k to 
record growth rates above 2 per cent this year. In Sweden, economic activity 
 since gathered considerable 
nomic growth was unchanged at 9½ per cent year-on-year. India, the other 
awakening Asian giant, also showed high growth as it benefited from strong 
demand from oil-producing countries in the Middle-East. However, economic 
growth in the rest of emerging Asia diminished somewhat due to softer 
Chinese import demand and an inventory correction in the IT-sector.  
The outlook for Asia is very favourable. With the integration into the world 
economy c
th
Chinese current account surplus has risen from 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2001 
 per cent in 200
curbs on domestic investment growth since the middle of 2004, coupled with 
overcapacity in many industries, has reduced China’s import demand, 
especially of capital goods and primary goods such as raw materials. Japan, 
which exports mainly machinery and equipments to China, is likely to take the 
bulk of the burden in China’s inventory adjustment, while the newly 
industrialised Asian economies, which export processing goods to China, will 
be only mildly affected. Nonetheless, we expect some softening in East Asian 
growth in the next 2 years from the robust expansion in 2004. 
The Japanese economy appears to have made a rapid turnaround since the 
beginning of 2005 from the technical recession experienced in the second half 
of 2004. There is a danger that Japan will follow the stop-start pattern seen in 
most of its past economic cycles, as the important electronics sector is still 
suffering from inventory overhang, growth prospects in Europe are weak and 
import demand from China is falling off. But the recent surge in investment 
spending points to strong domestically driven demand, and the Japanese 
cyclical rebound is projected to continue. The period of mild deflation since 
1999 could end by late 2006, although our projection of a further 
strengthening of the yen will restrain any inflationary pressures in Japan.  
1.2.4 OTHER EUROPEAN ECONOMIES 
The outlook for European growth outside the Euro Area has been revised 
down since our Spring forecast. Marked downward revisions to growth 
projections for the UK and Sweden have contributed to a reduction in our 
EU-25 growth projection from 2 per cent to 1.6 per cent for 2005. The revised 
outlook for the UK reflects a significant revision to the historical data, showing 
the economy decelerating in the second half of 2004 and into the first half of 
2005. The UK economy is becoming better balanced, w
sumer and government spending easing and a projected recovery in export 
growth. This rebalancing is partly due to the stabilisation of house prices, 
which will moderate consumer demand, while rising demand from oil 
producing countries will stimulate UK exports, which are highly exposed to 
oil-exporting economies. Prospects for investment are buoyed up by strong 
profits and high equity prices, and we expect business investment growth to 
average above 4 per cent over the forecast period, but growth is likely to be 
held back, especially in 2005, by weak housing investment which is expected to 
growth at less than 1 per cent a year over the same period. 
The Scandinavian economies of Sweden and Denmark are on trac
weakened in the beginning of this year, but has
momentum. Favourable developments in private consumption and investment, 
supported by strengthening household purchasing power and low interest 
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rates, will continue to bolster Swedish growth over the next couple of years. 
Indeed, with the net wealth position and saving rate of Swedish households 
comparatively high, there is considerable scope for consumer spending growth 
in the future. In Denmark, economic growth has been driven by private 
consumption over the past two years, with low interest rates, tax cuts and 
rising housing prices supporting household expenditure. The combined impact 
of these factors on private consumption is now set to fade, and private 
consumption growth is forecast to moderate during the forecast period. 
Private investment activity will nevertheless accelerate next year, bolstered by 
investment in the oil and gas industries in response to high energy prices. Oil 
revenues will continue to provide a significant boost to the Danish current-
account position, and the same is true for Norway. Norway’s economy is 
currently in the midst of a strong upturn. Last year, GDP growth accelerated 
noticeably in response to heavy oil-related investment activity, looser monetary 
po
look resulting from 
slo
Ec
licy and expansionary fiscal policy. Growth this year will continue to be 
driven by massive investment in the country’s oil industry, which accounts for 
approximately one-fifth of GDP and half of total exports.  
Russia has also benefited from the high oil price, and economic growth has 
become more balanced, supported by strong increases in investment and 
exports. Rising household purchasing power, spurred by nominal wage gains 
and generally moderating inflation, has also led to a revival in private 
consumption in recent times. Russia has followed Norway's lead in establishing 
a stability fund with unexpected oil revenue, with which it hopes to prevent a 
decline in industrial activity in the longer term. Russia has also been paying off 
foreign debt rapidly. With oil prices expected to remain high, the Russian 
economy is projected to continue expanding at rates of 6-7 per cent over the 
next few years.  
After high growth rates in most of the EUs New Member States (NMS) in 
2004, in large part due to one-off effects connected with accession and the 
modest recovery in the Euro Area, we expect growth to slow down to 4.1 per 
cent in 2005 and accelerate slightly to 4.4 per cent and 4.5 per cent in 2006 and 
2007, respectively. Most countries are expected to grow in the range of 4-5 per 
cent per annum, with the Baltic States maintaining their higher rates of 6-8 per 
cent. In medium-term in most countries, investment demand (including the 
part covered by EU funds) and exports will be strong elements of GDP 
growth. However, exports face a weakened short-term out
w growth in the Euro Area and the recent strengthening of some currencies 
against the euro, most notably in the Polish zloty and the Hungarian forint.  
In all NMS (with the exception of Latvia) we expect a fall in inflation in the 
coming years. Inflation for the 10 countries should average 2-2½ per cent per 
annum, allowing a small inflation differential above the other Member States. 
After 4.3 per cent inflation in 2004, this moderation is partly a reflection of 
strengthening currencies in biggest countries, while the influence of accession-
related hikes of food prices in May, June and July 2004 is wearing off from the 
annual rate of inflation.  
 
onomic growth in the Euro Area remains rather weak, and is projected to 
slow from 1.8 per cent in 2004 to 1.2 per cent in 2005, before rising to 1.8 per 
cent in 2006 and 2.0 per cent in 2007.4 The outturn for GDP growth in the 
first half of 2005 was disappointing. Although there was a modest acceleration 
of growth in the first quarter of the year, after growth of just 0.2 per cent in 
the final quarter of 2004, growth dipped back slightly in the second quarter of 
2005. Private sector investment and trade growth were particularly 
                                                 
4 All GDP data and forecasts discussed in the text and reported in the tables are adjusted for 
working-day variation. There were approximately four extra working days in 2004 compared to 
2003 and the unadjusted numbers show Euro Area GDP growth of 2 per cent in 2004, as 
opposed to 1.8 per cent on an adjusted basis. 
1.3 
Euro Area 
Detail 
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dis
ut Growth 
he outlook 
next year 
 2006  2007 
appointing, and as a result we have revised our projection for Euro Area 
growth down by 0.3 percentage points since March. We expect to see little, if 
any, acceleration in the second half of the year, with GDP projected to rise by 
0.3-0.4 per cent per quarter. 
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The delayed investment recovery and rising inflation also weigh on t
for 2006, and we have revised our forecast for Euro Area growth 
down by 0.2 percentage points since March. 
 
Table 1.3: Euro Area Forecasta 
 
2001   2002  2003   2004   2005 
Consumptio 1.0 1.2 1.9 n                             1.8 0.9 1.0 1.4 
Private in 1.6 2.8 2.5 
Gove 1.0 2.3 1.8 
Stockbuild 0.2 -0.1 0.0 
Total d 1.4 1.6 1.9 
Export volumes                          4.1 1.9 0.7 6.0 3.3 5.9 6.7 
Import volumes       
 
GDP 
vestment                     -0.2 -3.0 0.5 1.9 
rnment expenditure             2.2 2.4 1.5 1.0 
ing(b)                       -0.5 -0.3 0.3 0.4 
omestic demand                   1.0 0.2 1.4 1.8 
                   2.2 0.3 2.7 6.1 3.7 5.7 6.6 
       
1.7 0.9 0.7 1.8 1.2 1.8 2.0 
        
Average ear 3.5 2.9 2.2 2.5 2.9 2.9 
Harmonised consumer prices    2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.9 
rivate cons mption deflator       
  
  
  7 70.8 72.2 72.3 71.7 
-0.1 0.9 0.3 0.6 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 
nings                        3.8 
P u 2.5 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.2 1.9 
Real personal disposable income 2.5 1.5 0.9 1.6 1.6 0.8 1.4 
Standardised Unemployment, % 7.8 8.2 8.7 8.9 8.6 8.4 8.3 
Govt. balance as % of GDP          -1.9 -2.5 -3.0 -2.7 -2.8 -2.7 -2.4 
Govt. debt as % of GDP           
Current account as % of GDP   
69.3 69.2 0.4 
a  GDP data shown in table are adjusted for working-day variation. 
b change as a per cent of GDP. 
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The forecast is based on the following assumptions: 
The oil price is projected to remain above $60 per barrel next year, but will recede to 
average $57 per barrel in 2007. 
The exchange rate between the US$ and the euro is expected to remain relatively 
stable, averaging $1.26 in 2005 and 2006 and $1.27 in 2007. 
The short-term interest rate in the Euro Area is projected to be 2.1 at the end of 2005, 
2.3 at the end of 2006 and 2.5 at the end of 2007. 
The forecasts are based on data available up to 19th September 2005. 
 
The assumptions for commodity prices, exchange rates and interest rates used in the 
forecast were constructed by consensus, as the average projections of the 10 member 
Institutes. These are broadly consistent with current financial market expectations and 
forward markets, as the majority of Institutes use this information in constructing their 
own forecasts. 
Our forecast for GDP growth in France for 2005 has been revised 
ownward by over ½ percentage point since March, and this is largely 
umer spending and 
rt growth in the first 
p 
t 
 The outlook for Portugal has worsened over the 
each 
cant fiscal tightening in 
 
row by 2.2 per 
ent this year up slightly from 2.1 per cent in 2004 and from our forecast of 2.0 
e 
r 
 
 
d
attributable to the unexpected declines in both cons
investment recorded in the second quarter of 2005. Expo
half of the year was also weaker than anticipated. We have also made a shar
downward revision to our forecast for Italy, due to both weaker investmen
and exports than anticipated.
last 6 months, as the revealed budget crises, with the deficit projected to r
over 6 per cent of GDP this year, will require signifi
2006 and 2007. On the upside, domestic demand in Spain will remain robust 
this year, but is projected to wane in the near term as investment growth is set
to slow. 
The harmonized index of consumer prices is expected to g
c
per cent made last March. This measure of inflation, which is tracked by th
ECB, continues to reflect the higher cost of energy inputs and othe
commodities. However, core inflation, which excludes the most volatile
components, remains subdued. A negative output gap and strong exchange
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rate helps keep inflation in check. Nonetheless, we are expecting a modest 
acceleration in wage growth in 2006, allowing real wages to rise slightly. But 
real wage growth will remain below 1 per cent in 2006 and 2007, restraining 
gro
DP in 2004, a modest improvement on the 3 per cent recorded in 
200
TH 
wth in real disposable incomes. An accounting shift resulting from 
healthcare reforms in the Netherlands will move some health-related costs 
from the private sector to the public sector. This reform will only impact 2006 
and is expected to translate into a deflation rate of 2.5 per cent in the 
Netherlands and a net effect of -0.2 percentage points on the Euro Area 
HICP. This masks some of the rise in our inflation forecast for the Euro Area 
since March, which otherwise would rise by 0.2 percentage points in 2005 and 
0.4 percentage points in 2006 and 2007. 
Fiscal balances in the Euro Area remain a contentious issue among 
Member States and our projections show some progress in fiscal consolidation 
over the short-term horizon. The overall Euro Area deficit stood at 2.7 per 
cent of G
3. Deficits in France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Portugal are projected to 
remain above 3 per cent of GDP in 2005 and 2006, while tight policy in the 
Netherlands will bring the deficit below to 2 per cent of GDP in 2005. Fiscal 
policy is discussed in more detail in the next section of the report. Constraints 
of the Stability and Growth Pact mean that fiscal policy in the Euro Area will 
tighten in 2006 and 2007, despite the subdued growth prospects. However, we 
anticipate only a modest improvement in the Euro Area deficit ratio by 2007, 
to 2.4 per cent of GDP.  
While growth has been modest, the unemployment rate in the Euro Area 
has managed to come down slightly. The unemployment rate dropped from an 
average of 8.9 per cent in 2004 to 8.6 per cent in July 2005. This can be partly 
attributed to a slowdown in labour force growth, and we foresee a further 
small reduction in the unemployment rate to 8.4 per cent in 2006 and 8.3 per 
cent in 2007. Unemployment remains higher in Greece, France, Germany and 
Spain. 
EXTERNAL DEMAND AND GROW
Euro Area export growth has been restrained by the strength of the euro 
since 2002, with the effective exchange rate roughly 25 per cent stronger than 
at the beginning of that year. While we saw an impressive rise in export 
volumes of 6 per cent in 2004, this apparent recovery did not carry over into 
2005, and trade growth in the first half of this year was much weaker than 
anticipated. As a result, net trade is expected to have a negative impact on 
GDP growth in 2005. We expect export volumes to grow by 3.3 per cent this 
year while import volumes should rise by 3.7 per cent. As the exchange rate 
has now stabilised, we expect Euro Area export volumes to move more closely 
with world trade growth from 2006, rising by 5.9 per cent next year and 6.7 per 
cent in 2007. With domestic demand expected to grow more slowly than in 
other major economies, this should allow a small positive impetus from net 
trade to GDP growth. 
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Chart 1.10: Net Trade Contribution to GDP Growth 
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As shown in Chart 1.10, of the four largest Euro Area countries, only 
Germany has been supported by external sector in recent years. In the case of 
Spain this reflects strong domestic demand growth relative to other major 
economies, pulling in import demand. In the case of France and Italy, 
however, this is more a reflection of deteriorating competitiveness. 
The Euro Area as a whole has lost a significant level of external trade share 
since the euro began to strengthen, with a loss of nearly 10 per cent between 
2001 and 2004. As Charts 1.11 and 1.12 show, this masks considerable 
differences across the Euro Area economies, and also developments in intra-
Euro Area trade. The charts show export volumes as a share of import 
volumes in each country’s main export markets, based on 2000 trade patterns5.  
 
Chart 1.11: Export Market Shares   
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Notably, Germany has done well to retain its external competitiveness despite 
the strong euro. Spain has only suffered a minor deterioration of less than 3 
per cent, while France and especially Italy have suffered significant losses. The 
French export market share was down by about 11 per cent by 2004, while 
Italy had lost 16 per cent. A further deterioration is projected for the largest 
                                                 
5 All trade figures reported in this section refer to trade in goods and services, unless otherwise 
specified. 
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Euro Area economies this year, with the exception of Germany, which 
continues to perform relatively well. 
 
 
Chart 1.12: Export Market Shares 
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Chart 1.12 shows the shift in export market shares for the other Euro Area 
economies. The smaller economies have generally held up rather well against 
the strong euro, with the exception of Finland and Greece, who by 2004 had 
lost 7½ per cent and 11 per cent, respectively, of export market share.  
The winners and losers in terms of export market share depend on a 
umber of factors, including export price competitiveness, the destination of n
each economy’s exports, the produc e
Relative export prices rose in all the Euro Area economies in 2002 and 2003 
with the exchange rate, but significantly higher rises of 13-16 per cent were 
experienced in Greece, Italy and France over this period. Serious impediments 
to competition in the industrial sector of Italy have seen this country’s 
competitiveness shrink markedly. Since the end of 2003, relative export prices 
have come down significantly in Germany, Austria and Finland, bringing 
relative prices roughly back to their level at the start of 2002. We also saw 
significant declines in French and Irish relative export prices over this period, 
leaving French prices about 7 per cent above their level at the start of 2002, 
while Irish prices are about 2 per cent below this level. Further rises in relative 
export prices have been recorded in Spain and Greece since the end of 2003, 
and can be expected to weigh on their performance in the next few years. 
Relative export price developments can account for a significant share of the 
deterioration in the export shares of Italy and Greece, and the relatively strong 
performance of Germany and Ireland, but they cannot explain the relatively 
favourable outcome for Spain and the more significant deterioration in 
F
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Chart 1.13: Relative Export Prices 
 
 
 
125
 
 
Chart 1.14: Relative Export Prices 
 
 
 
 
For Germany, France and Italy, the greatest loss in trade share has occurred 
in North America, with US importing more from China and other Asia as well 
as other countries in North and South America. Within the Euro Area, only 
Ireland has gained trade share in North America. Italy has been most 
significantly affected by the loss in North American trade, and has also lost 
greater trade share within the Euro Area. Finland has also suffered a significant 
lost of trade share within the Euro Area. A relatively high level of exports to 
oil exporting countries such as Russia, Norway and the members of Opec have 
helped sustain market share for countries like Germany, as windfall receipts 
from high oil prices are recycled into high import demand. Germany 
accounted for 18.7 per cent of Russian goods imports in 2004 and 13.8 per 
cent of Norwegian imports. As Chart 1.15 shows, this is significantly greater 
than the shares accounted for by France or Italy. The Euro Area as a whole is 
much more exposed to oil exporting nations than either the US or Japan, with 
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the Euro Area accounting for over 30 per cent of goods imports into Opec, 
ared to just over 6 per cent for the US and 
pan. Germany has also benefited from trade exposure to the relatively 
ynamic New Member States and other Eastern European economies, as well 
as emerging economies such as China, where imports rose by 26 per cent in 
2003 and 16 per cent in 2004. 
 
Chart 1.15: Share of Oil Producer’s Goods Import Volumes, 2004 
Finland and Spain is their relative exposure 
to Euro Area export markets. Exports within the Euro Area are sheltered from 
exchange rate developments and in 2004, nearly 60 per cent of Spanish exports 
were destined for other Euro Area economies. This compares to only 30 per 
cent of Finnish exports, making Finnish exports roughly twice as sensitive to 
exchange rate developments as Spanish exports. 
The product make-up of exports, and competitors in these markets, can 
also explain some of the differences in trade share developments across 
countries. Italy exports a relatively low share of high-tech goods, which capture 
an increasing share of world trade. This puts Italy at a disadvantage relative to 
countries such as Germany, France and Ireland, where high-tech goods 
account for a more significant share of exports. Italy exports a relatively high 
share of textiles, clothing and shoes, and these products compete with the 
more dynamic low-cost economies of Asia. Spanish exports, on the other 
hand, are more strongly oriented towards services, such as tourism, than many 
other Euro Area economies, with services capturing over 30 per cent of 
Spanish exports in 2004. 
 
 1.1 Different Stories Behind the Weak Growth in Germany and Italy  
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An important distinction between 
Box
The German and Italian economies have been the weakest performers in the Euro 
Area in recent years. Over the past 5 years (1999-2004) real GDP growth has averaged 
only 1.2 per cent and 1.3 per cent, respectively, compared to 2.1 percent in the rest of 
the Euro Area. While overall growth performance has been very similar, the pattern of 
growth in terms of demand components has been very different. The same is true 
when it comes to the factors that are judged to be at the root of the growth problem in 
these countries.  
     The relatively poor economic performance in Germany is due to slow domestic 
demand growth; exports have been supportive and net exports contributed the bulk of 
1.0 percentage points to growth on average. With the rise in unit labour costs 
significantly below the Euro Area average, the competitive position of the German 
economy has improved in recent years. As a result of strong exports, German 
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industrial production has outperformed that of the other large Euro Area economies 
by a substantial margin. This is the mirror image of the situation in Italy, where 
industrial production was relatively weak and net exports made a substantial negative 
contribution to GDP growth. As the Italian economy has traditionally been export led, 
slow export growth and rising import penetration resulted in sluggish investment 
activity, while housing investment and household consumption have held up relatively 
well. 
    In the case of Germany, the weakness of domestic demand is partly related to wage 
moderation that, while contributing to a recovery in German competitiveness, is 
slowing income growth and weighing on private consumption. Against this 
background and with income perspectives depressed probably also because of a grim 
outlook for public finances in general and the public pension system in particular, the 
personal savings rate has increased in recent years in contrast to many other countries 
in the Euro Area. There is also no relief from increased net wealth related to house 
prices as in some other countries. Investment activity has still to start a recovery from 
the recession following the burst of the IT bubble despite substantially improved 
profitability. With monetary conditions favourable given low real interest rates – even 
if relatively low inflation in Germany gives a somewhat higher real rate than for most 
other Euro Area countries – an important element in this context is that companies 
have been eager to improve their balance sheets and have therefore been slow in 
increasing demand for credit. Increasingly, disappointing demand by private 
households is also contributing to hesitation on the corporate side. A special factor 
dragging down investment is the multi-year recession in the German construction 
sector following the unification boom that has still not fully bottomed out.  
    Growth of German potential output is not only low, perhaps in the region of 1.0 to 
1.75 percent, but has also displayed a downward trend in the past few years. This is in 
contrast to the rest of the Euro Area taken together where potential output growth has 
perhaps been more or less stable at around 2 percent. An important difference to most 
other OECD countries is the behaviour of labour input which is on a declining trend, 
suggesting the labour market is one of the root causes of slow trend growth. The 
supply side has been tackled by recent labour market reforms, but the reforms have 
not succeeded in improving significantly the incentives to work in terms of the 
marginal tax rate (including both the explicit tax rate from income tax and social 
security contributions and the implicit tax rate from withdrawal of benefits). However, 
substantially tightened eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits should lead to a 
rising labour supply.  
   In the case of Italy, there are several tentative explanations for the dismal export 
performance and low levels of trend growth. First, relatively fast increases in labour 
costs and general (administrative, legal, public utilities, etc.) costs in combination with 
low productivity growth have led to an erosion of price competitiveness of Italian 
firms in the context of a fixed exchange rate with respect to the Euro Area countries 
and an appreciating currency with respect the others. Second, product specialisation 
has become unfavourable as most traditional export goods belong to low-growth 
traditional consumer goods and capital equipment sectors, while shares in high-growth 
sectors (such as information technology, consumer electronics, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals) are comparatively low.  
   There are, however, signs that things are changing. An aggressive relocation of 
production toward cheap labour countries is underway. The short-term effect is to 
reduce domestic production but, at the same time, also to increase profits and improve 
the financial position of Italian firms. Corporate restructuring has started, with the 
disappearance of less competitive companies (usually very small) and sectors. In 
macroeconomic terms, it is a move towards services at the expense of manufacturing, a 
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phenomenon which has been recorded in most industrialised countries in the past but 
has been very modest in Italy so far. Not only economists but also policymakers, 
general public, associations of employers and unions are aware of the problems and 
the debate is lively. However, it is unlikely that the government will pass unpopular 
measures at this late stage of the electoral cycle. The measures would require a huge 
amount of resources, in order to support ICT and advanced sectors, to enhance R&D 
and investments in education and infrastructure. Given the strict budget constraints, 
this would imply an unpopular reduction of other expenditure, namely social and 
welfare. A policy package for enhanced competitiveness (it is a long menu, which 
ranges from financing the Olympic games to boosting investment in R&D, to 
strengthening incentives to the corporate world) passed some months ago, but it is 
only a first limited step.  
    All in all, we expect that both the Italian and the German economy will grow less 
than the Euro Area average for some more years. In Italy we have to wait until next 
summer for a newly elected government to undertake structural measures to improve 
competitiveness, and structural adjustment in the corporate sector will take more time. 
In Germany, the best we can hope for as a result of recent reforms is to arrest the 
downward trend in potential output growth. Faster growth in the coming years would 
require both a combination of increased labour supply and stronger domestic demand. 
The incoming government can, however, be expected to be slow in making progress 
on these fronts given the conflicting views on how best to bolster growth.  
DOMESTIC DEMAND AND GROWTH 
The economic slowdown projected for 2005 can largely be attributed to 
domestic demand, with both consumer spending growth and investment 
growth slowing relative to last year. We expect growth in Euro Area 
consumption to remain subdued this year at 1 per cent and to rise modestly to 
about 1.2 per cent in 20066. A more robust recovery is forecast for 2007, with 
consumer spending projected to rise by 1.9 per cent. While real disposable 
income growth is projected to remain moderate, we have seen strong growth 
in the value of household financial wealth as well as tangible wealth in several 
economies such as Ireland, Spain and France. This will support consumer 
spending over the medium-term, as households readjust their savings. 
Investment growth will moderate slightly this year to 1.6 per cent down from 
1.9 per cent growth recorded last year. However, we are projecting an upturn 
in investment from next year, with growth of 2½-2¾ per cent per annum 
projected in 2006 and 2007, supported by low financing costs. 
Government spending is also expected to record weak growth this year of 
just 1 per cent. The lack of fiscal stimulus, despite lacklustre growth, stems 
from the fiscal crises facing many of the Euro Area economies, and the 
constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. The rise in Euro Area 
government spending growth to 2.3 per cent in 2006 is distorted by a statistical 
revision to the national accounts in the Netherlands, which shifts some health-
related costs from the private sector to the public sector.  This adds roughly 
0.4 percentage points to Euro Area government spending growth in 2006, 
bringing our adjusted projection for government spending more in line with 
the outlook for 2007, when we expect a rise in government spending of 1.8 per 
cent. 
                                                 
6 Adjusting for the statistical manoeuvre in the Netherlands, which shifts some health-related 
costs from the private sector to the public sector, adds roughly 0.2 percentage points to Euro 
Area consumer spending growth in 2006. 
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Exposure to Housing Market Shocks: Spain and Ireland  
A significant concern for policy-makers in the Euro Area is the possibility of 
asset-market bubbles developing, in particular in the housing market. The very 
different real interest rates facing the household sector across the Euro Area in 
recent years have provided rather different incentives for housing investment. 
Not surprisingly in Spain and Ireland the low (and even negative) real interest 
rates for households that have resulted from EMU membership have provided 
a very strong stimulus to the housing market. As shown in Chart 1.16, housing 
completions in Ireland and Spain have more than doubled in number since the 
mid-1990s so that today they are at a record high level.  
 
Chart 1.16: Housing Completions, thousands 
 
 
 
The result of this boom in house building is that the construction of dwellings 
accounts for a substantially larger share of GDP in Ireland and Spain than is 
the case for the rest of the EU. As shown in Table 1, while housing activity has 
increased its share of GDP in the EU between 1996 and 2004, the increase has 
been particularly large in Spain and Ireland. In both these economies the 
housing sector accounts for a significant share of economic activity. In the case 
of Ireland it is now approaching an eighth of all economic activity.  
With the housing sector accounting for such a large share of overall 
economic activity in these two economies they are especially vulnerable to any 
shock to the sector. Experience in Scandinavia and the United Kingdom in the 
late 1980s indicates that this sector of the economy can suffer from sudden 
and dramatic reversals in fortune. Any such reversal in fortune in Spain and 
Ireland would have a very significant direct impact on economic activity in 
those countries. 
Table 1.2: Investment in Dwellings as a per cent of GDP 
 1996 2004 
European Union (25) 5.1 7.2
Germany 7.6 6.4
Spain 4.8 8.3
France 4.1 4.7
Ireland 6.1 11.4
United Kingdom 2.9 7.0
Source: Eurostat National Accounts 
 
The direct impact of a shock to the housing market in Spain and Ireland 
would be magnified by the fact that housing investment tends to have a 
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relatively low import content. Thus the indirect impact of a fall in housing 
this prospect may be 
that could reduce growth below 
• The oil market is an important source of uncertainty for the global 
economic outlook in the short term. Lower supply than in the baseline 
projection would lead to higher oil prices with negative consequences 
for global economic growth.  
• Another uncertainty concerns both short term and long-term interest 
rates, which are very low. Both rates could rise more than in the 
baseline projection and this would probably have a negative impact on 
global economic growth.  
• The current scale of the US current account deficit is unsustainable in 
the longer term and exchange rate adjustments are likely to play a role 
in the reduction of the US deficit. This would have a negative impact 
on Euro Area output growth.  
• A realignment of the renminbi would have only a small impact on US 
imbalances, which can only be corrected by US actions.Any 
adjustment of US imbalances, either from lower US domestic demand 
or from a lower dollar exchange rate, would be likely to reduce growth 
in the Euro Area.  
ness investment could drive such a stronger rebound. 
t trade is expected to 
make a neutral impact on growth in 2005 and 2006, whereas it has had 
a significant negative impact  ast several years. 
Underestimatin and an upside risk to the forecast 
for Euro Area 
THE OIL PRICE MAJOR DO W D RISK TO THE 
FORECAST 
The oil price, measured  of Dubai and Brent prices, is projected 
(at $61.9 per barrel) before easing somewhat in 
00
1.4 
output on the rest of the domestic economy would be significant, including the 
negative impact on the public finances. If government, in turn, had to respond 
to the deterioration in its budget balance by raising taxation or cutting 
expenditure, this could further accentuate the deflationary impact on the 
economy. From the point of view of the ECB, while the exposure of Spain and 
Ireland to shocks to the housing market is of some concern, there is clearly no 
danger to the wider Euro zone economy.  
 
Our forecast is for relatively weak growth during 2005 and into 2006, as is also 
uggested by the EUROFRAME indicator but even Risks soptimistic, and there remain substantial risks 
our projection. 
• In Europe there is a debate on the future development of the 
European Union. In general, political uncertainty has a negative 
impact on output growth in the medium term, and if the malaise over 
both the constitution and the budget continues growth prospects 
could weaken.  
 
On the other hand, a stronger rebound in the Euro Area cannot be 
excluded.  
 
• The response of supply and demand from the strong oil price rise in 
recent years is uncertain; a bigger positive impact on supply or 
negative impact on demand could ease the oil market and dampen the 
oil price in the near future.  
• With profitability strong, balance sheets improved and capital costs 
low, busi
• US import growth is projected to slow, and ne
 for the p
g US import dem  is 
growth. 
IS A WN AR
 as the average
to remain fairly high next year 
2 7 (to $57 per barrel). In the current situation of very limited excess capacity 
in oil production and oil refining, oil price developments in the near future are 
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uncertain and an important risk to the forecast. We have simulated a much 
higher oil price with the NiGEM. 
The simulation shows the impact of a permanent increase in the oil price of 
$20 per barrel. Such a jump in oil prices will increase inflation in the Euro Area 
by around 0.6 percentage points in the first year. This will reduce real 
disposable income of households, causing a drop in private consumption. 
Multiplier and accelerator effects will enhance the negative impact on domestic 
demand. Business investment will also be affected by the drop in trend output 
sulting from the higher oil price. Oil producing countries will step up 
an the anticipated impact on the US, as production and 
consum
from Eu
it was in
econom
 
Chart 1.
 
 
The iG tains policy rules for monetary authorities, while long-
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ates rise as well. After the first year, the inflation impact depends 
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looking 
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prospec
group. A he monetary authorities would mean a rise in 
ar in the stronger response. Output growth is 0.1 per cent 
re
imports only with a delay, while lower domestic demand in other industrial 
countries will have a negative impact on exports from the Euro Area. Real 
GDP in the Euro Area will be reduced by almost 0.4 per cent in the first year. 
This is less th
ption in the Euro Area are less oil intensive and as Opec imports more 
rope than from the US. The impact on the Euro Area is also less than 
 the seventies and eighties as oil intensity of output has halved and the 
y is more flexible. 
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m rates are the forward convolution of short-term interest rates. Thus, 
central banks raise their key rates in reaction to higher inflation and nominal 
long-term r
 bo  policy and the role of expectations, which in part reflects the 
at d degree of inertia in the labour market. As NiGEM has forward-
agents and forward-looking policy rules, inflation expectations are 
 to be well-anchored and the inflation impact of an oil price shock 
inis es from the third year onwards. To explore the importance of the 
tio  of the monetary authorities, we repeat the simulation allowing a 
nger reaction of the monetary authorities to the rise in inflation instead of 
sta dard reaction of the previous simulation. Feedbacks have been 
d to twice normal in the stronger response. Our choice reflects signals 
from the ECB that indicate that it is more concerned about the 
ts for inflation than are the members of the EUROFRAME-EFN 
 stronger reaction of t
real interest rates and would increase the negative output effect in the first two 
years. Interest rates rise by 0.4 points more in the first year and 0.3 points more 
in the second ye
lower in each of the first 2 years in the stronger case. Inflation is 0.04 points 
lower in each year on average over the same period, and second round effects 
are reduced. From these simulations can be concluded that the reaction of 
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monetary authorities is highly relevant for output impacts in the short run, and 
dominate the longer-term inflation effects.  
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THE ROLE CHINA CAN PLAY IN REDUCING EUROPE’S 
BURDEN FROM A GLOBAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
CORRECTION 
As analysed in detail in the EUROFRAME-EFN Spring Report, the current 
global current account positions are not sustainable in the longer term and 
need to be reduced. There is fear in Europe that it has to bear a more than 
proportional share of the burden of this coming correction. The euro has 
appreciated much more than the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar, while until 
recently the Chinese renminbi was pegged to the dollar. The US is calling for a 
major renminbi realignment to help solve its problems. In this box we analyse 
an appreciation of the renminbi vis-à-vis the US dollar and argue that it is no 
more than a short term palliative. The NiGEM model contains an estimated 
model for the Chinese economy that reflects the rapid response of prices to 
the exchange rate that we have seen in the last decade, and we would expect to 
see this pattern repeated. 
We simulate a 10 per cent appreciation of the renminbi vis-à-vis the US 
dollar. This is much more than the appreciation of around 2 per cent since July 
when the Chinese monetary authorities officially ended the peg with the dollar. 
A 10 per cent appreciation will hurt the competitive position of Chinese 
exporters and will lead to an initial fall in exports and therefore a drop in 
output, as we can see from the chart. Due to J-curve effects, the Chinese 
current account position initially improves but in the third year the external 
surplus is 1.3 per cent of GDP below baseline. However, the slump in exports 
and output is short lived as Chinese domestic prices react very quickly to the 
appreciation and to the lower import prices, and inflation falls by 2½ 
percentage points on average in the first three years of the scenario, moving 
the real exchange rate almost all the way back to where it would have been.  
 
Chart 1.18: Impact of a Chinese Realignment 
 
 
 
 
 
Much has happened after the appreciation that followed the 1998 Asian 
crisis, the deterioration in price competitiveness is quickly undone and exports 
and output converge to the initial baseline. Hence the Chinese current account 
surplus also returns to where it would have been within a few years. The only 
permanent impact of the appreciation is a drop in the Chinese price level of 
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around 10 per cent. Given the risk of overheating in China and the risk of real 
estate bubbles, a further appreciation of the renminbi will serve the Chinese 
rrection of global current account imbalances and therefore 
le 
 place after the change does matter, and it is designed not to offset the 
tyle of model the length of time 
r which the interest rate is expected to stay high matters, even in the first 
year, as it affects both the rational expectations based jump in the exchange 
rate in the first period and the scale of the increase in long term interest rates 
at the start of the scenario. 
 
monetary authorities well because of this drop in prices. From these simulation 
outcomes it can be concluded that an appreciation of the renminbi will not 
contribute to a co
will not limit Europe’s burden from the inevitable correction.  
A permanent increase in Chinese domestic demand due to higher private 
consumption, housing investment and government expenditures would change 
the fundamental determinants of the current account surplus, and would help 
remove some of the world imbalances. However, as Al Eyd, Barrell and Choy 
(2005) argue7 a reduction of the Chinese current account surplus of 1 per cent 
of GDP would lead to an improvement of the US current account of less than 
0.1 per cent of GDP. Therefore, it can be concluded that a permanent increase 
in Chinese domestic demand can only contribute to a limited extent to a 
correction in the global current account imbalances and is not likely to change 
Europe’s burden from the expected correction. 
 
THE IMPACT OF AN INCREASE IN INTEREST RATES IN THE 
EURO AREA 
The ECB has been clear that it is concerned about the inflationary impact of 
increases in oil prices, and one risk we face is that interest rates may move 
upward more rapidly than we anticipate, slowing growth. In order to 
investigate the potential impact of such a tightening we have undertaken three 
scenarios. In the first, interest rates are higher than projected by 0.5 in the first 
year and 1.0 in the second year. In the second scenarios the interest rate is 
increased by 1.0 in the first year, and 2.0 in the second, whilst in the third 
scenario the ECB makes it clear that it will hold rates 2.0 higher in the third 
year as well. As we are using a model with rational expectations, the policy ru
in
effects of the tightening. In addition, in this s
fo
                                                 
7 Ali Al-Eyd, Ray Barrell and Amanda Choy, (2005)  ‘Global Realignment of Exchange Rates: 
Asia’s Dilemma’ National Institute Economic Review, July 2005.  
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Chart 1.19: Impact of Interest Rates on Inflation in the Euro Area 
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as we can see from the chart, and doubling the size of the innovation dou
the effect, and th
intentions, and is clear that rates will stay high for some time, then inflation 
will come down more markedly. Around half of the impact comes from the 
change in the exchange rate that the innovation induces. As we can see from 
the chart, output effects also increase with the size and duration of the 
innovation, but they increase over time, with growth being reduced by about a 
third of a percentage point in each of the three years in the most extreme 
contraction we consider, whilst inflation is only reduced by around half of this 
in the first year, and by less in subsequent years.  
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Interest rate policy should be used with care, but would be more effective if 
wage bargaining was more forward looking. The Euro Area has some distance 
to go before reactions are as fast as in the US, where monetary policy impacts 
on inflation are perhaps twice as high as those observed in Europe.  
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Forecast Tables 
 
 
 
Annex Table 1: Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for Euro Areaa 
        
 
 
 
 
 a GDP data 
shown in the tables are adjusted for working-day variation.
Anne
 
x Table 2: Real GDP in Major Economies 
 World OECD NAFTA China 
EU
-25
Euro 
Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
1995-
2001 3.6 2.9 3.4 8.5 2.7 2.5 3.4 1.2 1.9 2.6 2.0 3.0 
2002 3.0 1.7 1.7 8.3 1.1 0.9 1.6 -0.3 0.1 1.3 0.4 2.0 
2003 4.0 2.1 2.6 9.3 1.1 0.7 2.7 1.4 -0.2 0.9 0.4 2.5 
2004 5.1 3.4 4.1 9.5 2.1 1.8 4.2 2.6 1.1 2.0 1.0 3.2 
2005 4.2 2.6 3.3 9.1 1.6 1.2 3.3 2.4 0.8 1.5 0.0 2.0 
2006 4.3 2.7 3.2 8.1 2.1 1.8 3.2 2.3 1.3 2.1 0.9 2.2 
2007 4.3 2.6 3.0 8.5 2.2 2.0 3.0 1.7 1.7 2.2 1.1 2.3 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex Table 3: Private Consumption Deflator in Major Economies 
 OECD NAFTA China EU 
Euro 
Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
1995-
2001 3.3 3.3 4.5 2.1 2.0 1.9 -0.2 1.0 1.2 3.2 2.4 
2002 2.0 2.0 -0.8 2.0 2.1 1.4 -1.2 1.2 1.0 3.1 1.5 
2003 1.9 2.3 1.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 -0.7 1.5 1.1 2.5 2.0 
2004 1.7 2.8 3.9 1.7 1.9 2.6 -0.6 1.4 1.5 2.2 1.3 
2005 1.8 2.9 3.5 1.9 1.9 2.8 -0.6 1.3 1.5 2.1 1.9 
2006 2.1 3.2 3.6 2.2 2.2 3.4 -0.5 1.6 2.1 2.7 2.3 
2007 2.1 3.0 2.8 2.0 1.9 2.9 0.6 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.2 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Output Growth Rate 0.9 0.7 1.8 1.2 1.8 2.0 
Inflation Rate 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2 1.9 
Unemployment Rate 8.2 8.7 8.9 8.6 8.4 8.3 
Gov. Balance as % GDP -2.5 -3 -2.7 -2.8 -2.7 -2.4 
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Annex Table 4:  World Trade Volume and Prices 
 World trade volume 
World export prices 
in $ 
Oil price ($ 
per barrel)a
 Annual percentage changes 
1995-2001 7.4 -1.5 19.3 
2002 3.4 0.6 24.4 
2003 4.8 8.9 27.8 
2004 7.9 8 35.9 
2005 6.1 5.3 53.5 
2006 6.7 2 61.9 
2007 6.9 2.1 57 
a Based on the unweigh erag  Br TI T at Dubai oil 
ble 5: Interest Rates 
ted av e of the ent, W  (West exas Intermedi e) and 
prices. 
 
 
Annex Ta
 
 Short-term interest rates  Long-term interest rates  
 USA Japan 
Euro 
Area UK USA Japan Euro Area UK 
2002 1.7 0.1 3.3 4 4.6 1.2 4.9 4.9
2003 1.2 0 2.3 3.7 4 1.1 4.2 4.5
2004 1.6 0 2.1 4.6 4.3 1.5 4.1 4.9
2005 3.4 0 2.1 4.7 4.2 1.2 3.4 4.4
2006 4.3 0.2 2.2 4.3 4.5 1.4 3.5 4.3
2007 4.5 0.4 2.4 3.9 4.7 1.6 3.7 4.4
                
2005Q1 2.8 0 2.1 4.9 4.3 1.3 3.7 4.7
2005Q2 3.2 0 2.1 4.8 4.2 1.1 3.4 4.4
2005Q3 3.4 0 2.1 4.7 4.2 1.2 3.2 4.4
2005Q4 4 0 2.1 4.5 4.2 1.3 3.3 4.1
                
2006Q1 4.2 0 2.1 4.4 4.3 1.4 3.4 4.2
2006Q2 4.4 0.1 2.2 4.4 4.4 1.4 3.4 4.2
2006Q3 4.4 0.2 2.2 4.3 4.5 1.5 3.5 4.3
2006Q4 4.4 0.3 2.3 4.2 4.6 1.5 3.6 4.3
                
2007Q1 4.4 0.3 2.3 4.1 4.6 1.6 3.7 4.4
2007Q2 4.5 0.4 2.4 4 4.7 1.6 3.7 4.4
2007Q3 4.5 0.4 2.4 3.8 4.7 1.7 3.8 4.4
2007Q4 4.5 0.5 2.5 3.9 4.8 1.7 3.8 4.5
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Annex Table 6: Effective Exchange Rates 
 USA Japan Euro Area Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
2002 3 -0.5 7.4 2.9 3.3 4.8 2.5 
2003 -6 3.9 13.7 6.6 6.4 7.1 -2.7 
2004 -4.7 4.2 5.4 2.3 2.3 2.7 5.3 
2005 -3.2 -1.7 -0.4 -0.5 0 -0.2 -1.1 
2006 -0.6 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 
2007 
-0.7 3.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.4 
2005Q1 -1.4 -0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 
2005Q2 1.3 -2.2 -2.9 -1.3 -1.4 -1.5 0.8 
2005Q3 0.5 -2.4 -1.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.9 -2.2 
2005Q4 -1.3 1.1 1 0.2 0.4 0.5 2 
2006Q1 0 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
2006Q2 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.2 
2006Q3 -0.2 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 
2006Q4 -0.2 0.9 0 0 0 0 -0.1 
2007Q1 -0.2 1 0 0 0 0 -0.1 
2007Q2 -0.2 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
2007Q3 -0.2 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 
2007Q4 -0.1 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.1 
 
 
 
 
A able 7: ro Area, Main F res orecannex T  Eu eatu  of F sta
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 Annu ercenta hanal p ge c ges 
Volumes   
Consumption 1.8 0.9 1 1.4 1 1.2 1.9 
Private investment -0.2 -3 0.5 1.9 1.6 2.8 2.5 
Government expenditure 2.2 2.4 1.5 1 1 2.3 1.8 
Stockbuildingb -0.5 -0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0 
Total domestic demand 1.0. 0.2 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.9 
Export volumes 4.1 1.9 0.7 6 3.3 5.9 6.7 
Import volumes 2.2 0.3 2.7 6.1 3.7 5.7 6.6 
GDP 1.7 0.9 0.7 1.8 1.2 1.8 2.0 
Average earnings 3.8 3.5 2.9 2.2 2.5 2.9 2.9 
Harmonised consumer prices 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.9 
Private consumption deflator 2.5 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.2 1.9 
Real personal disposable income 2.5 1.5 0.9 1.6 1.6 0.8 1.4 
 Levels 
Standardised unemployment %  7.8 8.2 8.7 8.9 8.6 8.4 8.3 
Government financial balancec -1.9 -2.5 -3.0 -2.7 -2.8 -2.7 -2.4 
Government debtc 69.3 69.2 70.4 70.8 72.2 72.3 71.7 
Current accountc -0.1 0.9 0.3 0.6 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 
a See footnote a of Annex table 1. 
b Change as percentage of GDP.  
 
c As a percentage of GDP.  
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Annex Table 8: Real GDP in the European Union a
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 Annu rcentage ch es al pe ang
Austria 1.2 0.8 2.2 1.5 1.8 1.5
Belgium 0.9 1.3 2.7 1.3 1.7 2.4
Denmark 0.5 0.7 2.4 2.6 2.1 2.1
Finland 2.2 2.4 3.5 1.7 3.8 2.9
France 1.3 0.9 2.0 1.5 2.1 2.2
Germany 0.1 -0.2 1.1 0.8 1.3 1.7
Greece 3.8 4.6 4.7 3.1 2.6 3.2
Ireland 6.1 4.4 4.5 5.7 5.1 5.1
Italy 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.9 1.1
Netherlands 0.1 -0.1 1.7 0.6 2.1 2.3
Portugal 0.4 -1.1 1 0.8 1.6 1.6
Spain 2.7 3 3.1 3.3 2.8 2.8
Sweden 2.0 1.6 3.1 2.4 3.2 2.7
United Kingdom 2.0 2.5 3.2 2.0 2.2 2.3
Euro Area 0.9 0.7 1.8 1.2 1.8 2.0
EU-15 1.1 1.0 2.0 1.5 2 2.1
NMS-10 2.4 3.7 5.0 4.1 4.4 4.5
EU-25 1.1 1.1 2.1 1.6 2.1 2.2
a G  data shown in the tables are adjusted for working-day variation.  DP
 
 
Annex Table 9: Inflation in the European Union 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 Annual percentage changes 
Austria 1.7 1.3 2 2 1.7 1.9
Belgium 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.7 2.4 1.8
Denmark 2.4 2 0.9 1.8 2.5 2.3
Finland 2 1.3 0.2 0.8 1.7 1.8
France 1.9 2.2 2.3 1.9 2 2 
Germany 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.4
Greece 3.9 3.4 3 3.5 3.4 2.4
Ireland 4.7 4 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.6
Italy 2.6 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.1
Netherlands 3.8 2.2 1.4 2.2 -2.5 1.2
Portugal 3.7 3.3 2.5 2 2.7 1.7
Spain 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.5
Sweden 2 2.3 1 0.8 2.3 2 
United Kingdom 1.3 1.4 1.3 2.1 2.3 2 
Euro Area 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2 1.9
EU-15 2.1 2 2 2.1 2 1.9
NMS-10 2.7 2.1 4.3 2.4 2.1 2.3
EU-25 2.1 2 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9
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Annex Table 10: Fiscal Balances in the European Union 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 % GDP 
Austria -0.4 -1.2 -1 -1.8 -2 -2 
Belgium 0 0.1 0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 
Denmark 1.4 1 2.3 2.1 3 2.3 
Finland 4.3 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.6 
France -3.2 -4.2 -3.6 -3.2 -3.2 -3 
Germany -3.8 -4.1 -3.7 -3.8 -3.4 -2.9 
Greece -4.9 -5.7 -6.6 -4.6 -4.3 -4.2 
Ireland -0.4 0.2 1.4 0.3 -0.4 -0.7 
Italy -2.7 -3.2 -3.2 -4.2 -4.4 -3.7 
Netherlands -2 -3.2 -2.1 -1.8 -1.8 -1.5 
Portugal -2.8 -2.9 -3 -6.2 -5 -3.8 
Spain -0.3 0 -0.1 0.7 0.6 0.2 
Sweden -0.3 0.2 1.6 1 1 0.9 
United Kingdom -1.6 -3.2 -3.1 -2.9 -2.7 -3.1 
 
Euro Area 
-2.5 -3 -2.7 -2.8 -2.7 -2.4 
 
 
 
Annex Table 11: Standar d Unem ment Rate in the EU-15 dise ploy
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 % Total labour force 
Austria 4.1 4.3 4.8 5.1 5.1 4.9
Belgium 7.3 7.9 7.8 8 7.8 7.9
Denmark 4.6 5.6 5.4 4.9 5 4.4
Finland 9.1 9 9 8.4 8.1 7.8
France 8.9 9.4 9.7 9.7 9.5 9
Germany 8.2 9.1 9.5 9.5 9.2 9.1
Greece 10.3 9.7 10.5 10.1 10.2 10.1
Ireland 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.1
Italy 8.6 8.4 8.1 7.7 7.7 7.7
Netherlands 2.8 3.7 4.6 4.9 4.7 4.1
Portugal 5 6.3 6.7 7.3 7.4 7.3
Spain 11.5 11.5 11 9.6 9.2 9.2
Sweden 4.9 5.6 6.3 6.2 6.3 6
United Kingdom 5.2 5 4.8 4.8 4.9 5
Euro Area 8.2 8.7 8.9 8.6 8.4 8.3
 
 
  
 
 
 
2. EUROPEAN POLICY 
MONITORING 
 
Monetary conditions in the Euro Area have hardly changed in recent 
months. The ECB’s key interest rate (the minimum bid rate on the main 
refinancing operations of the Eurosystem) has remained at 2.0 percent since 
June 2003. Money market rates (3-month EURIBOR) were only marginally 
higher than the rate for overnight deposits; apparently, markets expect that 
interest rates will not be raised in the near future. This is confirmed by the 
implied rates of LIFFEs euribor contracts (at the end of September the rates 
implied were 2.2 per cent in December 2005 and 2.5 per cent in September 
2006).  
2.1 
Monetary Policy 
in the Euro Area 
The real short-term interest rate (nominal rate adjusted for actual core 
inflation) has increased somewhat since the beginning of this year and amounts 
to about ½ percent, after having been close to zero for about one year. 
Nevertheless, it is still well below its long-term average and monetary policy 
can therefore be characterised as accommodative. Moreover, long-term 
interest rates have continued to decline in recent months. The yields for 10-
year government bonds are about 100 basis points lower than one year ago. In 
real terms, the long rates are well below their historical average independent of 
the inflation measure used, be it the core rate of inflation or be it inflationary 
expectations (approximated by the ten-year break-even inflation rate for the 
Euro Area).  
As discussed in chapter 1, there are several reasons for the low level or the 
decline of long-term interest rates. Among them are the high level of 
worldwide liquidity as well as the weak economic activity in the Euro Area; in 
recent months, the forecasts for real GDP growth in 2005 and 2006 have been 
reduced continuously. Monetary aggregates, which play a role in the monetary 
policy strategy of the ECB, have accelerated considerably; the rate for M3 has 
reached 8.1 percent in August. Also, credit growth has strengthened further. 
This indicates that the transmission of monetary impulses is working even 
though this shows up not so much in aggregate demand for goods and thus in 
consumer prices, but rather for housing and on financial markets. The increase 
of stock prices implies that financial conditions for firms have improved. 
Besides, monetary conditions are positively affected by the depreciation of the 
euro. Since the Spring of 2005, the European currency lost ground against 
major world currencies, in particular against the US dollar. In real and effective 
terms (EER-42, CPI basis), the depreciation amounted to about 5 percent 
during the past six months; this is a minor correction from the appreciation of 
around a quarter in the four previous years. 
In spite of the recent small increase of the short-term real interest rate, 
current short-term rates are still slightly below the range of rates derived from 
the Taylor rule and still clearly less than the range of estimated neutral rates 
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(see Table).1 Even though estimates concerning potential output growth vary, 
the calculated Taylor rates do not differ much.2 For the neutral real rate of 
interest we assume, following theoretical considerations, that it is equal to the 
estimated growth rate of potential output. Given Phelps’ golden rule, this rate 
should prevail when the output gap is closed and the inflation rate is on target. 
The calculated “neutral” rate of interest do not differ much either. According 
to various calculations, this neutral rate is between 3.3 and 3.7 percent. 
The ECB has not given in to demands to cut interest rates in response to 
the slowdown of economic expansion due to the rise of oil prices. In a similar 
vein, some have argued that rates should be raised because inflation accelerated 
due to the surge in oil prices. However, a change of monetary policy in 
response to higher oil prices alone would not be appropriate as is also 
discussed in the literature. The ECB was correct in not raising rates in response 
to the pickup of inflation because the inflation perspectives have not 
deteriorated; neither core inflation nor inflationary expectations have increased 
in recent months. However, there has been some reaction by the ECB in the 
following sense: in the fall of 2004, the central bank had prepared markets for 
a rate hike which did not take place in the light of the developments on oil 
markets. Therefore, monetary policy is probably more expansionary today than 
it would have been otherwise. 
We expect that the ECB will keep interest rates constant for some time 
because the economic expansion will remain modest and the perspectives for 
inflation will probably not worsen in the near future. All in all, the actual 
interest rate will be fairly close to the Taylor rate. In our judgment, however, 
key interest rates will be raised in the medium term because they are lower than 
the “neutral” rate according to all calculations. We expect that the ECB will 
start to tighten policy at the end of next year. 
 
Table 2.1: Various Calculations of the Taylor Rate and the Neutral Interest Rate 
in the Euro Area 2005a 
 
                              
Method 
Potential growth 
(approx. real rate) 
Output gap Taylor rate Neutral rate 
OECD estimate 1.9 –2.1 2.2 3.7 
HP filter 1.5 –0.4 2.6 3.3 
IfW estimate 1.8 –1.7 2.3 3.6 
IMF estimate 1.9 -1.6 2.5 3.7 
NiGEM 1.5 -0.5 2.6 3.3 
a The inflation target is assumed to be 1.8 percent. The Taylor rate is calculated for the core rate 
of inflation (HICP excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco); we assume the core rate to be 
1.5 percent in 2005. 
 
 
 
2.2. Fiscal Policy 
in the Euro Area 
This section provides a brief assessment of the short-term budgetary prospects 
in the Euro Area. Our Spring report focused on budgetary prospects as 
compared with the perspectives of the updates of the Stability programmes 
                                                 
1 As in our previous report, we use the Taylor rule in its original version (Taylor 1993):  
(1) i = r + π + 0.5 (π – π*) + 0.5 (y – y*), 
with i being the nominal interest rate, r the equilibrium real interest rate, π the rate of inflation, 
π* the inflation target, y actual real GDP, and y* potential real GDP. We assume an inflation 
target of 1.8 percent, which is consistent with the ECB’s target of inflation close to but below 2 
percent. The core rate of inflation (HICP excl. unprocessed food and energy) is used because it 
appears to be a better orientation for monetary policy because volatile prices are largely 
excluded. For the output gap, various estimates are reported in the table. 
2 This is due to the fact that there are compensating factors. For example, a high growth rate of 
potential output implies that the negative output gap is larger which would lead to a lower 
interest rate according to the Taylor rule. However, the Taylor rate is raised by the fact that the 
equilibrium real rate of interest is higher. 
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(SP) released at the turn of the year. We wish to address in our Autumn reports 
on the latest budgetary developments, highlighting any major reforms 
underway and considering if recent developments are in line with the latest 
SPs. We will start with changes of GDP and deficits prospects since our Spring 
report before providing an assessment of the expected fiscal stance.  
GROWTH PROSPECTS 
Our Autumn 2005 forecast expects Euro Area GDP to grow by 1.2 per cent 
this year and 1.8 in 2006, slightly below our Spring forecast (respectively 1.5 
and 2.0) and hence further below the forecasts of the SPs where Euro Area 
GDP was expected to grow by 2.3 per cent this year and 2.4 next (see Table 
2.2).  
Our forecasts for GDP growth in 2005 have been revised downwards since 
last Spring in a majority of Euro Area countries, by up to 1 percentage point in 
Italy, Portugal and Finland. However, lower GDP growth prospects in Finland 
for this year reflect more the effects of the disruption of production in the 
paper industry earlier this year than major changes in economic prospects. In 
this more depressed context for Euro Area growth, the exceptions are 
Germany, with GDP prospects unchanged at 0.8 for this year, Spain where our 
forecast has been upwards (from 2.6 to 3.3) and Ireland (from 5.4 to 5.7). We 
have also lowered our forecasts for 2006 for almost all Euro Area countries at 
the major exception of Spain where we expect growth of 2.8. 
We expect a slight acceleration of Euro Area GDP growth in 2007 that 
would help stabilising the cyclical component of the deficits. However, GDP 
growth prospects are not sufficiently robust to allow for any significant 
improvement in fiscal balances up to 2007.  
GOVERNMENT BALANCES 
Lower than expected growth for 2005 leads us to anticipate deficits higher by 
about 0.2 percentage points of GDP this year at -2.8 per cent of GDP, or -3.1 
excluding one-off measures (see Table 2.2).  
Deficit targets announced in the SPs are unlikely to be met in 2005 at the 
Euro Area level. This is especially true for the countries running higher than 3 
per cent of GDP deficits: France, Germany, Italy, Greece and Portugal. In 
France, the government deficit to GDP ratio is higher than expected due to 
lower than expected growth. In Germany, the fiscal stance seems less 
contractionary than announced. In Italy, the deficit has risen under much 
lower than expected growth, and the government has not planned any 
contractionary measures for this year. One-off measures are expected to 
reduce deficits in Germany (0.4) and France (0.5) this year. The Greek 
government has announced contractionary measures that would also leave the 
deficit well above 3 per cent of GDP while the revised deficit figures for 
Portugal, low growth prospects and the government’s announcement not to 
rely on one-off measures makes the deficit likely to stand around 6 per cent of 
GDP this year. 
In the other Euro Area countries, deficits targets will almost be met. In the 
Netherlands, this will result from contractionary measures, whereas stronger 
than expected growth keeps on reducing automatically the deficit in Spain. 
Deficits will remain at around -2.7 per cent of GDP next year under our 
assumptions, or -2.8 excluding one-off measures. The expected phasing out of 
one-off fiscal measures (-0.3 per cent of GDP in 2005, -0.1 in 2006) masks a 
0.3 per cent of GDP decrease in deficits in 2006. The French deficit is likely to 
remain slightly above 3 per cent in 2006, German and Italian deficits will 
remain above 3 per cent too. The situation is likely to remain almost 
unchanged in 2007. The three largest Euro Area countries are likely to 
implement restrictive measures, of at least 0.5 percentage point a year on 
average, but they seem unlikely to introduce any major additional corrective 
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measures to bring more rapidly their deficits below 3 per cent, in the current 
contexts of weak activity and recent (Germany) or upcoming (Italy in 2006, 
France in 2007) elections. 
Although no new major fiscal measures have been announced since our 
Spring report, it is worth noting that a rising number of Euro Area countries 
have implemented or announced cuts in domestic corporate tax rates in order 
to strengthen the attractiveness of their countries for the location of 
productive activities: Germany, Austria, Greece, Portugal...The special topic of 
this report is dedicated to this issue.  
 
 
Table 2.2. Euro Area GDP Growth & General Government Balances according 
to the Stability Programmes 
 GDP growth assumptions (%) General government balance (% GDP) 
 Stability Programmes Stability Programmes 
 J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 J05 
Actual 
J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 J05 
Actual 
98 2.8     2.9 -2.1 -1.9    -2.3
99 2.5 2.2    2.8 -1.7 -1.4 -1.2    -1.3
00 2.6 2.8 3.3   3.5 -1.5 -1.1 -0.7 -0.8   -1.0
01 2.6 2.5 3.1 1.7 1.5 1.6 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -1.2 -1.6  -1.7
02  2.5 2.9 1.9 1.0 0.9 -0.6 -0.3 -0.9 -2.2  -2.5
03  2.5 2.8 2.6 2.1 0.6 0.7 -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -1.8 -2.7 -2.9
04   2.8 2.6 2.6 1.9 2.0 1.8 0.4 0.1 -1.1 -2.4 -2.7 -2.8
05    2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 1.21 0.3 -0.6 -1.8 -2.3 -2.81
06     2.6 2.5 2.4 1.81  -0.2 -1.3 -1.8 -2.71
07      2.5 2.4 2.01   -0.9 -1.3 -2.41
08      2.4 –    -1.0 – 
1. EUROFRAME-EFN, Autumn 2005 Forecast.  
Memo: Spring 2005 forecast: GDP growth: 1.5 in 2005 and 2.0 in 2006; Deficits: 2.6 in 2005 and 
2.5 in 2006. 
Sources: EUROFRAME-EFN, Stability programmes, Eurostat, own calculations. 
 
EXPECTED FISCAL STANCE 
The assessment of the fiscal stance depends not only on GDP growth and 
government balances, but also on potential growth estimates that may vary 
significantly from one method to another (see table 2.1). Table 2.3 shows two 
estimates of the fiscal stance in the Euro Area, based on our forecasts for 
GDP and government deficits. One uses potential output growth taken from 
the SP’s, leading to a potential growth close to 2.2 per cent for the Euro Area 
as whole, the other one uses NiGEM estimates that suggest Euro Area trend 
output growing by around 1.5 per cent this year before rising to almost 2 per 
cent in 2007. The two associated fiscal stances are given to provide bounds of 
the fiscal stance underway in the Euro Area. 
Both measures suggest that fiscal policy will have a dampening effect on 
economic growth at the Euro Area level over the forecast horizon. According 
to the first measure, the Euro Area fiscal stance will be restrictive on average 
by an annual 0.4 percentage point of GDP from 2005 to 2007, while it will be 
slightly less contractionary according to the second measure, amounting to an 
average 0.2 percentage points.  
Both measures also suggest that policy would become slightly more 
restrictive in 2006 and 2007 than in 2005. This would be especially true for 
most of the countries currently running the larger deficits: Germany, Italy, 
Portugal. In France the election year and the recently announced cuts in 
personal income taxation could make it difficult for the government to 
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significantly reduce the structural deficit in 2007. Over the forecast horizon, we 
expect the fiscal stance to be restrictive in all countries running higher than 3 
per cent of GDP deficits as well as in the Netherlands, while it will be neutral 
or slightly expansionary in the other countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Ireland and Spain. We do not expect the change in the implementation of the 
SGP introduced in the March 2005 Council to affect the conduct of fiscal 
policy in member states. 
 
Table 2.3 GDP Growth, Fiscal Balances in the EUROFRAME-EFN forecast & 
Fiscal Impulses Under Two Estimates 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Real GDP growth, % 
Germany -0.2 1.1 0.8 1.3 1.7 
France 0.9 2.0 1.5 2.1 2.2 
Italy 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.9 1.1 
Spain 3.0 3.1 3.3 2.8 2.8 
The Netherlands -0.1 1.7 0.6 2.1 2.3 
Belgium 1.3 2.7 1.3 1.7 2.4 
Austria 0.8 2.2 1.5 1.8 1.5 
Finland 2.4 3.5 1.7 3.8 2.9 
Portugal -1.1 1.0 0.8 1.6 1.6 
Greece 4.6 4.7 3.1 2.6 3.2 
Ireland 4.4 4.5 5.7 5.1 5.1 
Euro Area-11 (1) 0.8 1.8 1.2 1.8 2.0 
General government balance, % GDP 
Germany -4.1 -3.7 -3.8 -3.4 -2.9 
France -4.2 -3.6 -3.2 -3.2 -3.0 
Italy -3.2 -3.2 -4.2 -4.4 -3.7 
Spain 0.0 -0.1 0.7 0.6 0.2 
The Netherlands -3.2 -2.1 -1.8 -1.8 -1.5 
Belgium 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 
Austria -1.2 -1.0 -1.8 -2.0 -2.0 
Finland 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.6 
Portugal -2.9 -3.0 -6.2 -5.0 -3.8 
Greece -5.7 -6.6 -4.6 -4.3 -4.2 
Ireland 0.2 1.4 0.3 -0.4 -0.7 
Euro Area-11 -3.0 -2.7 -2.8 -2.7 -2.4 
One-off measures, % GDP 
Germany 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 
France 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Italy 2.0 1.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Spain 0.0 -0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 
The Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Belgium 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Austria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Portugal 2.5 2.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ireland 0.0 0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 
Euro Area-11  0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 
Fiscal impulse, under SP potential output growth assumptions, % GDP (2) 
Germany  -0.7 -0.6 -0.1 -0.8 -0.7 
France 0.3 -0.7 -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 
Italy 0.8 -0.5 -0.9 -0.8 -1.1 
Spain 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.4 
The Netherlands 0.1 -1.2 -1.1 -0.1 -0.3 
Belgium 0.1 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.3 
Austria 0.4 -0.1 0.7 0.1 -0.3 
Finland 1.8 0.6 0.0 0.9 0.4 
Portugal -0.1 -0.6 0.5 -1.6 -1.3 
Greece 1.9 1.8 -2.1 -0.9 -0.2 
Ireland -1.9 -1.6 -0.2 0.4 0.5 
Euro Area-11 0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 
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Fiscal impulse, under NiGEM trend output growth assumptions,% GDP (3)
Germany  -0.2 -0.3 0.2 -0.5 -0.6 
France 0.5 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 
Italy 0.8 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 
Spain -0.4 -0.6 0.1 0.0 0.3 
The Netherlands 0.5 -0.9 -0.5 0.3 -0.1 
Belgium 1.0 -0.8 0.3 -0.1 0.1 
Austria 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.2 -0.1 
Finland 1.9 0.7 -0.1 0.4 0.1 
Portugal 0.5 0.2 1.1 -1.2 -1.2 
Greece 0.9 1.2 -2.2 -0.5 -0.1 
Ireland -1.1 -1.0 0.5 0.9 0.4 
Euro Area-11 0.2 -0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 
(1) Excluding Luxembourg. (2) Excluding one-off measures. Fiscal impulse is the opposite of the 
change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, derived from EUROFRAME-EFN Autumn 
forecasts for GDP growth, fiscal balances and one-off measures, with potential output growth as 
in the stability programmes. (3) Excluding one-off measures. Fiscal impulse here is the opposite 
of the change in the cyclically-adjusted balance, derived from EUROFRAME-EFN Autumn 
forecasts for GDP growth, fiscal balances and one-off measures, with trend output growth as in 
NiGEM 
Sources: EUROFRAME-EFN Autumn 2005 forecast, Stability programmes, sixth updates, end 2004, 
Eurostat, own assumptions. 
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Table 2.4. GDP Growth, Fiscal Balances in the EUROFRAME-EFN forecast & 
Fiscal Impulses Comparison:  2005/Autumn 2005 
 Forecast for 2005 Forecast for 2006 
  
2005 
Autumn 
2005 2005 
Autumn
2005 
  Real GDP growth, per cent 
Germany 0.8 0.8 1.6 1.3 
France 2.1 1.5 2.2 2.1 
Italy 1.0 0.0 1.5 0.9 
Spain 2.6 3.3 2.3 2.8 
The Netherlands 1.0 0.6 2.3 2.1 
Belgium 2.2 1.3 2.3 1.7 
Austria 2.3 1.5 2.3 1.8 
Finland 2.9 1.7 3.0 3.8 
Portugal 1.8 0.8 2.3 1.6 
Greece 3.0 3.1 3.2 2.6 
Ireland 5.4 5.7 5.4 5.1 
Euro Area-11 (1) 1.5 1.2 2.0 1.8 
General government balance, per cent of GDP 
Germany -3.5 -3.8 -3.3 -3.4 
France -3.1 -3.2 -3.0 -3.2 
Italy -3.5 -4.2 -3.6 -4.4 
Spain -0.2 0.7 -0.5 0.6 
The Netherlands -2.1 -1.8 -1.9 -1.8 
Belgium 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.7 
Austria -1.7 -1.8 -1.8 -2.0 
Finland 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.7 
Portugal -2.7 -6.2 -2.0 -5.0 
Greece -4.2 -4.6 -3.3 -4.3 
Ireland 0.0 0.3 -0.7 -0.4 
Euro Area-11  -2.6 -2.8 -2.5 -2.7 
One-off measures, per cent of GDP 
Germany 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 
France 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Italy 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Spain 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
The Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Belgium 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Austria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Portugal 1.4 0.2 0.7 0.0 
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ireland -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 
Euro Area-11  0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 
Fiscal impulse, per cent of GDP (2)
Germany  -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 
France -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 
Italy -0.3 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 
Spain 0.6 0.3 0.1 -0.1 
The Netherlands -1.1 -1.1 -0.2 -0.1 
Belgium 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.1 
Austria 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.1 
Finland 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.9 
Portugal -0.9 0.5 -1.2 -1.6 
Greece -1.0 -2.1 -1.5 -0.9 
Ireland -0.7 -0.2 0.7 0.4 
Euro Area-11 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 
(1) Excluding Luxembourg. (2) Excluding one-off measures. Fiscal impulse is the opposite of the 
change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, derived from EUROFRAME-EFN 
/Preliminary Autumn Forecasts for GDP growth, fiscal balances and one-off measures, with 
potential output growth as in the stability programmes. 
Sources: EUROFRAME-EFN Autumn and 2005 forecasts Stability programmes, sixth updates, end 
2004, Eurostat, own assumptions. 
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3. THE FUTURE OF 
CORPORATE TAXATION IN 
THE EU1
Tax competition is a complex and controversial phenomenon, which is 
difficult to investigate and is bound to intensify along with further integration 
in the EU. It may concern a wide range of taxes, including: consumption taxes, 
mainly through cross-border shopping and e-commerce of digital product; 
personal taxation, above all to attract skilled and more mobile workers, the 
wealthy and businesspeople; some special subject or area of taxation (e.g. 
shipping, the taxation of capital gains from share disposal by parent 
companies). Not surprisingly however, given the high and increasing capital 
mobility in the EU, the most important area of concern has been tax 
competition on capital and corporate income taxation. The latter is considered 
as particularly important, since company taxation is an easily available 
instrument employed by national governments competing for increasingly 
mobile firms, investment, and profits. Several recent studies estimating tax 
reaction functions between countries (e.g. Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; 
Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano, 2002; Devereux and Griffith, 2003) 
support the hypothesis of strategic interaction of tax policies on mobile factors. 
It is often expected that the accession of ten new member states (NMS) in May 
2004 will increase the downward pressure on company tax rates in the EU. The 
NMS on average already have considerably lower company tax rates than the 
old member states (OMS), and it is highly probable that they will reduce 
company taxation further. Also European Court of Justice (ECJ) litigation, 
with its general aim of eliminating existing barriers to the four fundamental 
freedoms, is a driver behind increasing tax competition for mobile capital or 
profits.   
3.1  
Introduction  
Tax competition in the field of corporate taxation has potentially significant 
costs. First of all, the existence of different tax systems increases transaction 
and compliance costs for tax administrations and firms and creates an obstacle 
to internal market integration. Second, the existence of diverging effective tax 
rates might lead to misallocation of real capital. In addition, statutory tax rates 
differentials provide incentives to shift the tax base from high to low tax 
countries. To the extent that profits, rather than factors move towards low 
taxed jurisdictions, efficiency costs are limited, but nevertheless tax revenue 
from corporate taxation would be lower than optimal. Hence, tax competition 
 
1  Alfred Boss (IfW), Malgorzata Markiewicz (CASE), Margit Schratzenstaller (WIFO) 
contributed to Section 2.  
Albert van der Horst (CPB) to Section 3, Silvia Giannini (Prometeia) to Section 4.. 
Henri Sterdyniak to Appendix 2, Alfred Boss expressed a dissenting view in Appendix 
3.  Silvia Giannini ensured the coordination of the report. 
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might eventually lead to under-provision of public goods, and particularly 
social expenditure, thus potentially hampering the redistribution of income 
(Huber, 1999; Sorensen, 2000).  
Not surprisingly, the issue of corporate taxation is also a priority on the EU 
policy agenda. After the 1997 Monti Package - including the Code of conduct, 
the parent subsidiary directive on interest payments and royalties and the 
directive on saving income, in the form of interest payments, definitely 
approved in June 2003 - the most important initiative subsequently undertaken 
by the Commission is in the field of corporate taxation, more precisely 
corporate tax base harmonisation. This initiative was launched with the 
publication of the 2001 Commission services’ study on “Company taxation in 
the Internal Market” (SEC (2001) 1681) and the accompanying 
Communication (COM (2001) 582 final). There are signals that time could be 
ripe to allow progress to be made in this field. The EU Commission has 
endorsed the introduction of common accounting standards (IAS/IFRS), for 
the time being limited to consolidated accounts2, but potentially useful at the 
individual company level as a starting point to compute a common EU 
definition of taxable profits.3 Moreover, the business community strongly 
supports a move in the direction of a common tax base, along the lines 
suggested by the Commission (see, for example, UNICE, 2000).   
Corporate taxation is a controversial tax and as extensively discussed in the 
literature, is not the most efficient, nor the simplest way of taxing companies. 
There are also conceptual difficulties, above all since it is not clear who actually 
bears the burden of this tax. As we will mention at the end of this Report, 
there might be better alternatives, which could deserve attention. However, the 
corporate tax systems traditionally adopted by the majority of countries, 
including the EU member states, with the only exception of Estonia, is still an 
important source of revenue, which would be difficult to substitute and is an 
important component on which the coherence of the systems of direct taxation 
is based. Radically reforming the way in which companies are taxed would 
require an overall reform of the system of direct taxation.   
For all the above mentioned reasons, this special report on tax competition 
focuses on the present system of company taxation, its effects on the location 
of capital and profits, and its likely future development in the EU in the light 
of the Commission’s proposal.  
In assessing the effects of corporate taxation on location decisions, it is 
important to bear in mind that a variety of different factors interact and that 
competition to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) may also occur through 
public expenditure competition or regulatory competition (including, for 
example, corporate governance rules). Moreover, for a comprehensive analysis 
one should consider not only corporate taxation, but the whole range of taxes 
impinging on the company, including taxes on labour and other productive 
factors as well as property taxes and on the final owner of capital, like personal 
taxation of dividends and capital gains, gift and inheritance taxes, personal 
taxation on individual owners, as well as the taxation of intermediaries that 
convert households’ saving into financial flows to finance companies’ 
 
2 The compulsory use from 2005 of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
formerly known as International Accounting Standards (IAS), was introduced by the “IFRS 
Regulation” (EC (1606) 2002). As the Commission recognises: “ Although only the consolidated 
accounts of some 7 000 companies are directly affected, the IFRS influence is much wider. All 
the subsidiaries of the 7 000 companies will have to maintain IFRS records, credit institutions 
can be expected to press for IFRS style information, some Member States are already permitting 
wider usage and national accounting standards are confidently expected to converge towards 
IFRS”. (COM (2003), 726 final, p.16). 
3 In February 2003 the EU Commission’s services (TAXUD) released a consultation document 
on “The application of International Accounting Standards (IAS) in 2005 and the implications 
for the introduction of a consolidated tax base for companies’ EU-wide activities”. The 
document was discussed in a workshop with member states on 18 March 2003.    
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investment. One should also take into account the wide range of incentives and 
allowances that are granted for each possible type of investment and location 
choice and last but not least, the variety of arrangements that could be planned, 
exploiting the different tax provisions of the various jurisdictions as well as 
double taxation agreement provisions (‘treaty shopping’), in order to minimize 
the company’s tax burden. Needless to say, facing all these issues would go 
beyond the feasible scope of this report, which rather than providing an overall 
overview of all possible relevant issues, aims at deepening the analysis on the 
specific question of corporate tax competition and coordination in the enlarged 
EU. Extending the analysis in the previously mentioned directions should 
however be objective of further research.  
As is the case with many other tax coordination issues, there is much 
disagreement among member states, particularly but not exclusively, on tax rate 
coordination. Therefore, it is not surprising, in the light of the unanimity 
decision rule still governing EU decisions in tax matters, that so little progress 
has been made up to now in coordinating company taxation. Enlargement, 
along with the persistence of the unanimity decision rule, will make decisions 
even more difficult, if not impossible, in the future. This situation explains the 
new strategy of the Commission towards more flexible approaches, such as the 
peer pressure procedure under the Code of Conduct on business taxation.  
It is also recognised that further progress towards integration in the Union can 
be facilitated by the possibility of proceeding through new institutional 
procedures, as Enhanced Cooperation4 between a subgroup of member states. 
(COM (2003), 726 final). 
It is well known that EU countries have different attitudes towards tax 
coordination: some countries, notably the UK, Ireland and some of the new 
small member states are generally more inclined to favour tax competition. 
With regard to corporate tax harmonisation, some member states are in favour 
of tax base, but not tax rate harmonisation. In contrast, some countries, mainly 
among OMS, not only large countries like Germany and France, but also 
smaller ones, such as Denmark, are in favour not only of tax base, but also 
some kind of tax rate coordination.  
These different opinions are grounded on the many qualifications of the 
theoretical literature which makes it difficult to adequately measure both the 
costs of tax competition and the benefits of tax coordination, above all when 
the models get more sophisticated in order to encompass the complexities of 
the real world. At the same time, the results of the existing empirical studies are 
still too fragile to be able to solve the dispute. There are also different, if not 
contrary, beliefs about the need to develop (in NMS) and maintain (in OMS) 
the European social model. Countries in favour of higher coordination are 
usually those OMS where the welfare state intervention is more developed and 
grounded in the socio-institutional context. These countries are concerned 
about the possible impact of tax competition on their ability to collect the 
necessary tax revenue, in the desired amount and desired composition, to 
finance the preferred level of public social expenditure. Frequently, behind 
different attitudes towards tax coordination are diverging opinions concerning 
the role of the state and the behaviour of governments. If one believes that 
governments act as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan, as is often suggested in 
 
4 The concept of  “enhanced cooperation” was introduced  with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty,  in 
order to enable a group of willing member states to integrate further, on matters covered by the 
Treaty. The Treaty of Nice (2001) facilitates  “enhanced cooperation”. Nevertheless, there are 
strict conditions. At present, a minimum of eight member states are required to launch the 
procedure. Enhanced cooperation must not create a barrier to or discrimination in trade 
between the Member States and must not distort competition between them. Moreover, 
according to art. 43a, it “may be undertaken only as a last resort, when it has been established 
within the Council that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a 
reasonable period by applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties”. 
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the public choice literature, one is inclined to welcome tax competition as an 
indirect way of arresting the over-expansion of the public sector.5 By contrast, 
if one believes that the democratic process works efficiently and governments 
act in the interest of their citizens, maximising social welfare rather than tax 
revenue, one is inclined to underline the negative externalities of tax 
competition and the resulting inefficiencies, calling for some tax 
harmonisation. In reality, both views as they stand, seem too extreme, but at 
the same time both are able to explain part of the story. In their seminal work 
trying to encompass these opposing views, Edwards and Keen (1996) outline 
that tax competition is “good” (i.e. increases consumer welfare) if the elasticity 
of the tax base, with respect to the tax rate is lower than the part of marginal 
public spending that can be regarded as wasteful. Moreover, they conclude that 
over time the elasticity of the tax base is bound to increase due to further 
integration, presumably more than political rent-seeking, thus increasing the 
possibility that tax competition is costly, rather than beneficial. Since it is 
impossible to provide a reliable empirical estimate of these countervailing 
factors, “the controversy on the vices and virtues of tax competition can easily 
degenerate in an unproductive exchange of political article of faith” (Sorensen, 
2004a, p. 104). To avoid this risk, and to provide a fruitful contribution to the 
debate, this Report will not discuss the general question of whether tax 
competition is “good” or “bad”6, rather it will try to focus only on the results 
that are grounded in the literature and in the empirical evidence. The scope is 
not to provide a unique interpretation of facts and to support a specific EU 
corporate tax strategy, but to review the empirical evidence and provide 
concrete elements to evaluate the pros and cons of alternative tax coordination 
strategies currently under discussion.  
The Report is organised as follows. Section 2 by looking at different tax 
indicators, collects the empirical evidence on the existence and nature of tax 
competition and tries to interpret them in the light of the theoretical literature. 
Section 3 reviews the effects of tax competition on base and factor shifting, by 
comparing the results of empirical studies on FDI and profit shifting. Finally, 
Section 4, on the basis of the theoretical and empirical evidence, as well as the 
experience of other countries, will discuss the pros and cons of different tax 
coordination policies concerning corporate tax base and tax rate coordination.  
 
The aim of this Section is to discuss, on the basis of the theoretical literature 
and existing empirical evidence, the evolution and particularly the long-run 
development of company taxation that may be expected in the enlarged EU.  
3.2 Does tax 
competition 
exist in the EU?  
 
5 It has been argued (for example, Ceriani and Giannini, 2004; Sorensen, 2004a) that this 
argument is weak. “If the political process is imperfect, allowing rent seeking by policy-makers, 
the cuts in public spending would tend to take place in areas where politicians have less “rents” 
to defend, rather than in those where the public sector is less efficient. Tax competition would 
be a very indirect and poorly targeted instrument: the appropriate response would be to reform 
the political process and the public sector institutions, curbing the disproportionate power of 
some interest groups.” (Ceriani and Giannini, 2004, p. 980). Moreover, one may think that each 
people must keep the freedom to choose its level of redistribution and its level of public sector 
as well as the responsibility to elect efficient governments. 
6 See however Boss, 2005a,b. 
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3.2.1 COMPANY TAX COMPETITION IN THE ENLARGED 
EUROPEAN UNION – THE THEORY 
Two hypotheses concerning the long-term effects of international tax 
competition on national company taxation were put forward in the tax 
competition literature of the nineties: The "race-to-the-bottom-" hypothesis 
(e.g. Frey, 1990; Sinn, 1997) predicted the complete disappearance of capital 
and company taxes. This expectation was somewhat moderated by a 
"convergence-" hypothesis (Pluemper and Schulze, 1999), according to which 
capital and therefore also company taxes are moving gradually downwards 
towards a similar or identical (and rather low) level. 
The theoretical framework on which both hypotheses draw is the basic tax 
competition model as summarised recently by Zodrow (2003) and Wilson and 
Wildasin (2004).7 It was initially formulated for a scenario of interregional tax 
competition between a large number of identical jurisdictions within one 
country; by assumption, capital is completely mobile across jurisdictions (e.g. 
Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). Governments dispose of two tax 
instruments: a source-based property tax on capital income and a lump sum tax 
on immobile production factors (land or labour) to finance public services. The 
model implies that international tax competition will lead to a "race to the 
bottom" within capital taxation: taxes on capital income will vanish completely, 
and the tax burden will be shifted onto the immobile factor. If governments 
are allowed to raise a limited amount of lump-sum taxes only and therefore 
also depend on the capital tax as a revenue source, public services will be 
underprovided as jurisdictions – for fear of driving capital abroad – will lower 
their capital tax rates and consequently their expenditures for public services to 
an inefficiently low level (Janeba and Schjelderup, 2002). Within this theoretical 
framework, the downward pressure on tax rates and levels of public services 
increases with the number of competing jurisdictions (Hoyt, 1991). 
Consequently, the EU eastern enlargement, which increased the number of 
competing jurisdictions considerably, should accelerate the "race to the 
bottom" of company tax rates or at least their downward convergence within 
the enlarged EU. 
However, some of the rather strong assumptions underlying the basic tax 
competition model may not hold for the case of the enlarged EU. The EU 25 
represents an economic area consisting of two heterogeneous country clubs, 
which may change the predictions suggested by the basic tax competition 
model with respect to the working of company tax competition itself and its 
potential effects on the levels of company taxation and public services in the 
EU member states. Three extensions of the basic tax competition model 
(Zodrow, 2003) should be particularly relevant for the case of the enlarged EU: 
(1) jurisdictions of different size; (2) existence of agglomeration economies; (3) 
imperfectly mobile capital. It remains to be investigated empirically which of 
the extensions reviewed in what follows (which are only partly 
complementary8) may serve as an explanation for potentially persisting tax rate 
differentials between OMS and NMS.  
 
(1) Size differentials: The reality in the enlarged EU is characterised by a 
twofold asymmetry concerning the size of the competing jurisdictions. Firstly, 
and most obvious, individual member states' sizes differ largely in terms of 
GDP and population. Secondly, the OMS club and the NMS club can be 
 
7The first tax competition model that inspired many of the following theoretical contributions 
was formulated by Tiebout (1956). 
8 Whereas the theoretical results expected from asymmetrical tax competition rest on the 
assumption of high capital mobility, agglomeration and other location-specific rents create 
mobility barriers which allow the maintenance of high tax rates. 
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conceived as a large jurisdiction competing against a small one. Thus, tax 
competition between the OMS club and the NMS club can be characterised as 
"asymmetrical". Such constellations are theoretically treated in models of 
asymmetrical tax competition (e.g. Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991). In 
contrast to large countries, small ones cannot influence the international 
equilibrium after-tax rate of return to capital through their corporate tax rates, 
but have to take it as given. This in turn implies a higher elasticity of the tax 
base in small countries, as a tax-induced reduction of the national after-tax rate 
of return to capital must be compensated by a higher before-tax rate of return 
to capital, brought about by capital outflows. Therefore possible outflows of 
capital as a reaction to company tax rate differentials are a larger concern for 
small countries than for large ones, which will choose higher company tax rates 
accordingly. In turn, tax rate reductions will cause a larger inflow of capital in 
small countries that accordingly have a stronger incentive to underbid the large 
countries' tax rates. Thus, the different overall size of the two country clubs 
forming the enlarged EU may be one factor to prevent the elimination of the 
existing tax rate differential (and at the same time the elimination of the 
existing differences in the levels of public services) between them. 
 
(2) Agglomeration economies: In the last few years tax competition has been 
analysed from a different theoretical perspective building on the framework of 
the new economic geography (e.g. Kind, Knarvik and Schjelderup, 2000; 
Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Borck and Pflueger, 2004; Baldwin and Krugman, 
2004). In the model of Baldwin and Krugman (2004), the competing 
jurisdictions differ with respect to the degree of industrialisation. In the core 
country (region) agglomeration economies exist, whereas the peripheral 
country (region) offers no (or only low) agglomeration rents. Agglomeration 
rents enable the core (within certain limits) to set higher company tax rates 
than the periphery without risking capital flight. Applied to the enlarged EU in 
which the OMS club can be viewed as the core and the NMS club as the 
periphery, this implies the sustainability of a certain tax rate differential as long 
as the peripheral NMS have not caught up to the OMS.  
 
(3) Imperfectly mobile capital: It may be assumed that the mobility of 
capital (FDI) between the OMS club and the NMS club in effect is limited; e.g. 
by the agglomeration rents already mentioned or by location-specific rents, 
particularly rents created by public inputs provided for companies (e.g. Haufler, 
1998). Given the prevailing deficits in public infrastructure in the NMS club, 
existing tax rate differentials may be maintained. 
Based on this short theoretical discussion, two hypotheses may be suggested. 
Firstly, a "convergence"-hypothesis concerning the development of company 
taxation within the two country clubs and predicting a downward convergence 
of company tax rates within each of the two clubs consisting of rather 
homogeneous and integrated countries between which capital should be rather 
mobile. Secondly, a "tax-rate-differential-persistence"-hypothesis concerning 
the relationship between the two country clubs, where agglomeration 
economies and imperfectly mobile capital may allow substantial and sustained 
tax rate differentials. 
 
3.2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTORY TAX RATES  
Between 1982 and 1994, statutory tax rates9 declined in almost all 14 OMS for  
 
9 Including surcharges and local business taxes. 
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which data are available10 (exceptions are Italy and Spain) (see Table 1 in the 
appendix). Accordingly, the average statutory company tax rate went down by 
12.1 percentage points (see Graph 3.1).  
 
 
Graph 3.1: Statutory company tax rates OMS, 1982 to 1994 
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Sources: Institute for Fiscal Studies; Office of Tax Policy Research, University of Michigan; own 
calculations. 
 
 
During the time period 1995 to 2006, for which data for all OMS and the eight 
central and eastern European NMS are available, the downward trend of 
statutory tax rates is continuing (see Graph 3.2).  
 
10 No data dating back to 1982 are available for Luxembourg. 
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Graph 3.2: Statutory Company tax rates in the EU-23, 1995 to 2006 
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 Sources: Institute for Fiscal Studies; Office of Tax Policy Research, University of Michigan;      
               national tax laws; own calculations. 
Note:   Spread OMS = difference between the highest and lowest tax rate in OMS. 
 Spread NMS = difference between the highest and lowest tax rate in NMS. 
 Spread OMS & NMS = difference between the average of the statutory tax rates in    
                                                      OMS and NMS. 
 
In the OMS, the average statutory tax rate goes down by another 8.5 
percentage points, in the NMS (which started out from an on average lower 
level) even by 11.3 percentage points (see table 2 in the appendix). In the long 
run the standard deviation slightly decreases (from 8.9 in 1982 to 6.4 in 2006 in 
OMS and from 7.8 in 1995 to 3.7 in 2006 for NMS), indicating some 
convergence in statutory tax rates in both country clubs.  
The tax rate spread between the OMS and NMS average tax rates is 
substantial in all years regarded, but shows certain fluctuations at the same 
time. It decreased between 1995 and 1999, as only two NMS, but almost half 
of the OMS cut their statutory tax rates in this period. After a rather sharp 
increase in 2000 (due to marked tax rate reductions in the majority of the 
NMS), the gap slightly narrowed again as a number of OMS followed suit in 
the years after. In 2004, at the eve of the enlargement, most NMS again 
reduced their statutory tax rates; due to the following tax rate cuts in the OMS, 
the tax rate differential is gradually declining. Still, it will amount to 10.2 
percentage points in 2006 and thus be higher than in 1995 (7.3 percentage 
points). Therefore average statutory company tax rates do not seem to be 
converging over time between OMS and NMS, which provides some support 
of the “tax-rate-differential-persistence-hypothesis” formulated above.  
The gradual decline of statutory company tax rates in the EU is most likely 
a direct consequence of an intensifying tax competition between member 
states. For a sample of 21 OECD countries, spanning the period 1983 to 1999, 
Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002) demonstrate empirically that 
countries also compete over statutory tax rates. Even if they are not a good 
proxy for the effective tax burden, since they do not take into account the rules 
to determine the tax base, statutory tax rates seem to have an important 
"psychological" function, insofar as they are used by national governments and 
perceived as signals reflecting a country’s general tax environment for 
international investors. This signalling function is the more important as, due 
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to the still remarkable differences between national company tax codes, reliable 
and generally valid effective company tax rates are difficult to determine. In 
addition, as we will see in Section 3, profit shifting (the transfer of the tax base 
from high-tax- to low-tax-countries by manipulating intra-firm transfer prices 
or by a tax-minimising design of intra-firm financial structures, i.e. thin 
capitalisation) is motivated by cross-country differentials between statutory 
company tax rates (e.g. Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000; Lammersen, 2002). 
Moreover, the overall statutory rate is the most important driver influencing 
the effective average tax rate (EATR), which in turn is the most important tax 
indicator affecting investment location decisions (European Commission, 
2001; Giannini and Maggiulli, 2002).  
 
3.2.3 TAX BURDEN INDICATORS 
For measuring the tax burden of companies, a number of different methods 
and indicators exist; the statutory rate is only one of them. To capture the total 
effects of corporate taxation, one should apply effective tax rates that consider 
all factors influencing the tax base or tax liabilities. For the purpose of 
computing taxable profits, corporate income may be subject to adjustments for 
exemptions (income excluded from taxation) and allowances (amount deducted 
from gross income). Hence, the actual tax liability may be influenced by tax 
rate relief (a reduced tax rate applied to a certain group of taxpayers or 
activities), tax credits (amount deducted from tax liability), and tax deferral (a 
relief which takes the form of a delay in paying taxes). Thus, effective 
corporate tax rates may substantially deviate from statutory ones.  
Box 1 briefly describes the most frequently used indicators of the corporate 
tax burden, distinguishing between backward and forward-looking measures. 
As the extensive literature on how to measure the tax burden on labour and 
capital shows (see for example, Sorensen 2004b) there exists no “ideal” unique 
indicator; each of them has merits and drawbacks and the choice largely 
depends on the scope of the analysis.  
As regards corporate taxation, we can conclude that statutory rates are 
preferable when trying to capture the impact of taxation on financial and tax 
planning decisions like profit shifting, but for the analysis of real activity 
effective measures should be applied. To evaluate investment choice problems 
and the expected impact of taxes on future earnings, effective marginal tax  
rates (EMTR) and effective average tax rates (EATR) are considered to be the 
most useful indicators. More precisely, the former is the relevant concept for 
decisions on the scale of the investment, while the latter can be important for 
decisions regarding lumpy investment, investment in the presence of imperfect 
competition, and for location decisions of firms. Backward-looking indicators, 
instead, are more useful concepts when the scope of the analysis is to appraise 
the past and present effective tax burden on companies, taking also into 
account the administrative capacity to enforce taxation.   
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BOX 3.1 Corporate tax burden indicators 
1.  Backward looking indicators 
Within this category one should further distinguish between micro and 
macro measures. 
    Micro backward-looking measures use financial statements of individual 
companies and relate taxes paid to pre-tax profits.  
Using macro data, the most commonly used backward-looking indicator for 
effective taxation is the ratio of corporate tax revenues to GDP. It is not a 
good proxy for the tax burden imposed on capital, as GDP combines 
income jointly generated by labour and capital (Martinez-Mongay, 2000). As 
this indicator is highly affected by the cycle, it is difficult to identify the 
direction of the bias. 
    More refined macro backward-looking effective corporate tax rates 
(implicit tax rates) are calculated as ratios of taxes paid by corporations taken 
from national accounts over a measure of the tax base which can be 
aggregated: domestic corporate profits, corporate gross operating surplus, 
gross domestic product, or gross profits reported by corporate tax payers in 
tax settlements (Jacobs and Spengel, 1999). This approach was applied first 
by Mendoza et al. (1994) and refined further in a number of subsequent 
studies (e.g. Martinez-Mongay, 1997;  European Commission, 2004a).  
    Backward-looking measures have some advantages and many 
shortcomings. On the one hand, it is claimed that backward-looking 
measures reflect certain complexities of the tax systems that forward 
measures do not capture, as even the most complex forward-looking 
methods do not consider all rules to determine the tax base. On the other 
hand, the main concerns associated with the interpretation of backward-
looking indicators are as follows: 
(a) difficult to measure: both the numerator (how to split taxes bearing on 
the different factors) and the denominator (how to find a correct macro 
proxy of the tax base); 
(b) endogenity to the cycle (mainly due to high allowances in the period of 
high investment); 
(c) time inconsistency (taxes are levied on previous year profits, and tax 
receipts can be reduced by loss carry-over). 
    Moreover, it is argued in the literature that backward-looking measures 
are conceptually not adequate to evaluate the effects of taxation on business 
decision-making, which is based on the future tax burden (Lammersen, 
2002). Backward-looking measures reflect the history of investments and of 
tax systems, but say nothing about the present investment incentives 
generated by a particular tax system or future tax reforms. Finally, backward-
looking indicators are inappropriate to evaluate decisions on the foreign 
location of investments, since profits from national and international 
activities cannot be disentangled (Bellak et al., 2005). It is argued that 
backward indicators are useful when policy makers are concerned with the 
development of the distribution of the tax burden, for example the shifting 
of the tax burden from capital to labour or consumption or when the tax 
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burden is examined across branches or firms (Giannini and Maggiulli, 2002). 
One important advantage of backward-looking indicators is that they reflect 
the degree of tax compliance and tax enforcement, respectively, as due to tax 
evasion the tax actually paid by taxpayers may deviate considerable from the 
"theoretical" tax liability. In general, it is difficult to interpret backward-
looking indicators as there are different forces biasing the results in different 
directions.  
2. Forward-looking indicators 
    According to the forward-looking approach, the tax burden is calculated 
for a hypothetical future investment project over the assumed duration of 
the project. The approach was developed by King and Fullerton (1984) and 
extended from a closed to an international context by OECD (1991) and 
from the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) to the effective average tax rate 
(EATR) by Devereux and Griffith (1999). The EMTR measures the tax 
wedge between the pre- and post tax return on a marginal investment 
project that does not yield an economic rent (the return is equal to the cost 
of capital). For projects earning more than the capital cost (so-called infra-
marginal investment projects), effective average tax rates (EATR) can be 
calculated as the ratio of future tax liabilities to pre-tax financial profits (in 
present value terms) over the estimated duration of the project. Both EMTR 
and EATR assume a mixed structure of assets and financing sources. It is 
also possible to include personal taxation on dividends, interests and capital 
gains.  
    The forward-looking approach is the most appropriate one when 
analysing incentives for undertaking new investment projects, as the 
resulting effective tax rates are based on present and future cash flows. 
Forward-looking indicators allow analysing the impact of the tax system on 
the decisions of multilateral investors on location, investment strategies, and 
financing options for subsidiaries. It is also possible to distinguish between 
domestic and international investment.  
    The application of EMTR is limited by the fact that in practice only 
projects with a rate of return above the cost of capital are realized. Therefore 
EMTRs are relevant for assessing the allocative efficiency of a tax system, 
the incentives it provides to marginal investments, while EATR are a more 
suitable concept for decisions regarding lumpy investment, investment in the 
presence of imperfect competition, or when an investor has to choose 
between several projects involving different locations. Thus EMTR 
determine the scale of investment, while EATRs explain the location of 
investment.  
    Both forward-looking measures are derived from models, and their level 
highly depends on the assumptions of these models about the market, 
investment and financing conditions (e.g. rates of return, interest rate, 
inflation). The calculations are based on the assumption that the company 
can take full advantage of the benefits of tax legislation. As only a limited 
number of important rules to determine the tax base enter the calculations 
(Jacobs and Spengel, 1999) (e.g. loss carry-over is omitted), certain 
complexities of the tax systems are not reflected. Despite these 
shortcomings forward-looking indicators are of high international 
acceptance and are considered as concepts providing information on the tax-
related investment incentives. The credibility and reliability of these 
indicators is increased by the robustness of their qualitative results to 
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different assumptions (Giannini and Maggiulli, 2002).  
3.2.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON TAX COMPETITION 
Different empirical measures of effective taxation have been calculated for EU 
countries, however available time series are short and samples are limited.  
Implicit tax rates were calculated for 12 OMS by EUROSTAT for 1995-2002 
(European Commission, 2004a). Simplified calculations were then repeated by 
Jakubiak and Markiewicz (2005) for 25 EU countries for 1995-2003.  
The most comprehensive research, applying the forward-looking concepts 
was conducted by Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002) for 1982-2003 and 13 
OMS. Forward-looking measures were also calculated for the NMS, but only 
for 2003 and 2004 (Jacobs et al., 2003, 2004; Finkenzeller and Spengel, 2004). 
There are a number of studies on a limited number of countries and limited 
samples, which do not allow for comparisons over time or across countries 
(Gorter and de Mooij, 2001, Nicodeme, 2001, Baker & McKenzie, 1999, 2001, 
Heinemann and Overesch, 2005). The most detailed analysis computing EATR 
for inbound and outbound investment was made by the 2001 Commission’s 
services study on corporate taxation (European Commission, 2001), but only 
for 1999 and 2001 and only for the OMS. 
In the last two decades, the fall in the average statutory rate in OMS was 
accompanied by a fall in effective taxation measured by forward-looking 
indicators (see Graph 3). The effective tax rates on profitable investments 
(measured by EATR) fell by more than those on investments that break even 
(measured by EMTR) (Griffith and Klemm, 2004). The fall in average statutory 
rates was accompanied by a base broadening strategy. As regards backward 
looking indicators (the share of corporate tax revenues to GDP and implicit 
corporate tax rates), they both show a similar pattern, which is however 
notably different from forward-looking indicators: they both increase up to 
2000 and only afterwards start decreasing. The reason for the different trend of 
backward and forward looking tax burden indicators may lie in the fact that 
they capture the base broadening strategy to a differing extent, which might be 
better reflected in implicit tax rates developments than in the forward looking 
indicators (which apply only limited features of the tax regulations). The similar 
trend of corporate tax revenues in GDP and implicit rates could also be caused 
by the similar sensitiveness of these indicators to the business cycle. Another 
explanation for the increase, up to 2000,  of macro backward looking 
indicators, could be the expansion of the corporate sector in the economy. 
Since the beginning of the new century, all these counteracting factors seem to 
have lost their ability to prevent the continuing decline in statutory rates also 
produce a decline in both tax revenue and implicit tax rates.  
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Graph 3.3: Development of statutory and effective tax indicators in OMS 
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Source: Statutory, implicit and corporate taxation/GDP: Structures of the taxation systems in the 
European Union. Data 1995-2002, Eurostat, 2004, 2003-2006: OECD Tax Database and 
Country Sources. EMTR and EATR: Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002). 
 
The situation differs for the sample of NMS, as all indicators moved in the 
same direction. Forward-looking indicators as well as implicit tax rates and 
statutory rates fell from 1995 to 2004 (see Graph 4). The average level of 
corporate tax revenues in GDP decreased as well. NMS granted many tax 
incentives, most of which had to be abandoned as they were in conflict with 
European law; this happened mainly in the last two years before the EU 
accession (Jacobs et al, 2003). The decline in all indicators may suggest that the 
fall in statutory rates was not compensated by base broadening strategy, at least 
not to such an extent as in OMS.  
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Graph 3.4: Development of statutory and effective tax indicators in NMS 
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Source: Statutory and corporate taxation/GDP: Structures of the taxation systems in the 
European Union. Data 1995-2002, Eurostat, 2004. Data 2003-2006: OECD Tax 
Database and Country Sources. Implicit: Jakubiak and Markiewicz (2005), EATR: 
(Jacobs et al., 2003, 2004) 
 
As different measures of effective taxation for OMS moved in opposite 
directions, the empirical analyses on tax competition may lead to different 
conclusions depending on the indicator applied.  
On average, implicit corporate tax rates as well as corporate tax ratios and 
particularly statutory company tax rates (averaged over the period 1995 to 
2003) are higher in OMS compared to NMS (see table 3 in the appendix). Of 
course, this finding does not say anything about the reasons behind the tax rate 
differential between OMS and NMS as a whole. Moreover, the limitations of 
the corporate tax ratio as a measure to compare cross-country effective tax 
burdens have to be kept in mind: for example, cross-country differentials may 
simply be caused by differences in the structure of the enterprise sector; i.e. by 
a different degree of incorporation within the enterprise sector. It may be 
assumed that the on average lower corporate tax ratios in the NMS date back 
to a relatively higher weight of non-incorporated firms. Unfortunately, there 
are no long-time series for EATR and EMTR for OMS and NMS, but only 
cross-country comparisons for one or two years, which, however, also show a 
tax rate differential in favour of NMS, thus altogether supporting the 
assumption that the size differential between OMS and NMS me be one of the 
factors sustaining the observable tax rate differential between the two country 
clubs. 
 
3.2.5 TESTING HYPOTHESES FOR INTERNATIONAL TAX RATE 
DIFFERENTIALS 
This section tries to find some empirical evidence for several of the issues and 
questions related with the working and the effects of company tax competition 
in the enlarged EU.  
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Differences in country size 
Following the approach used by Chennells and Griffith (1997), in what follows 
we try to test the proposition that size differentials11 across countries may 
result in company tax rate differentials. Table 1 gives an overview of OMS and 
NMS included, grouped by country size and the degree of openness.12  
 
Table 3.1: Old and new member states by size and degree of openness 
 Old Member States New Member States 
Large Open Closed Open Closed 
 Germany 
United Kingdom 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Poland 
Small  Open Closed Open Closed 
 Belgium 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Finland 
Greece 
Austria 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Estonia 
Slovak Republic 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Slovenia 
 
Statutory tax rates, EMTR and EATR (averaged over 1995 to 2003) are slightly 
higher in the large OMS, whereas implicit corporate tax rates and corporate tax 
ratios are smaller in comparison to the small OMS (see table 4 in the 
appendix). Confirming theoretical expectations, large countries are able to 
maintain higher company tax statutory and effective (forward-looking) tax rates 
than small ones. Despite this, tax revenue and implicit tax rates are relatively 
lower in large countries. This apparently paradoxical effect may in fact be 
explained by, for example, the shifting of profits and factors to countries with 
lower rates and presumably also a higher tax evasion in countries with higher 
rates. Calculations done for NMS (using statutory tax rates, implicit corporate 
tax rates and corporate tax ratios) show that all three tax burden measures 
indicate a lower level of company taxation in the small NMS compared to the 
large ones (see table 5 in the appendix): a result that is in line with theoretical 
expectations.  
 
Differences in country size and degree of openness 
Just looking at country sizes as an explanatory factor for tax burden 
differentials is misleading, however, as other influences that may also cause tax 
differentials across countries, notably the degree of openness, are neglected. 
One proposition often put forward in the literature (see Section 2.1) is that 
large closed countries can set the tax rate at a higher level than small open 
ones.  
Based on the classification in Table 3.1, first we compare the available 
measures for the effective tax rate (averaged over the period 1982 to 2003) for 
OMS (see table 6 in the appendix). Statutory tax rates as well as EMTR and 
corporate tax ratios hardly differ between large closed countries and small open 
ones. Only EATR are considerably lower in the small open country sample, 
although it has to be noted that (judging from the standard deviation) their 
variance is rather large, so that it can be doubted whether the difference 
between small and open countries on the one hand and large and closed ones 
on the other hand is statistically significant. Somewhat counter-intuitively at 
first sight, implicit corporate tax ratios are higher in the small OMS considered. 
 
11 Country size is captured by GDP and population; both measures lead to an identical 
classification of countries as small or large. 
12 The degree of openness is captured by the sum of exports and imports related to GDP. 
  
 
56 THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE TAXATION IN THE EU      
The latter finding may again hint at both tax evasion and profit shifting from 
the larger countries. Interesting is also the finding that statutory tax rates, 
EMTR and EATR within the large country group are markedly higher in the 
open countries compared to the closed ones; which is not in line with 
theoretical expectations. On the other hand, EMTR and EATR are 
considerably smaller in the open small countries than in the closed ones, which 
is in line with expectations. 
Within the group of NMS, statutory tax rates as well as implicit corporate 
tax rates are markedly higher in Poland, the only closed large country, than in 
the open small ones (see table 7 in the appendix). Again, however, a rather 
large variance of these measures has to be considered within the group of small 
open NMS.  
Before concluding, a number of caveats of these comparisons must be 
briefly mentioned. First of all, the number of countries included in these 
comparisons is relatively small. This holds particularly for the NMS, where 
there is only one large closed country (Poland), whereas the other three sub-
groups consist of three countries at maximum. Moreover, often the variance of 
the effective burden indicators used is quite large within the individual sub-
groups. Also the variance of some of the measures used to divide the countries 
considered into sub-groups (particularly the openness-measure) must be taken 
into account – the countries assigned to the individual sub-groups are 
heterogeneous themselves. Finally, the openness measure applied may not be 
appropriate; it might be useful to conduct these tests with several alternative 
openness measures (e.g. the export ratio). 
Given these limitations, the analysis conducted above yields only weak 
results. Focusing on statutory company tax rates, which should be given 
particular attention as tax competition mainly seems to take place through 
statutory company tax rates and as they are the main driver behind the 
development of EATR, several rather clear conclusions can be drawn however.  
First, statutory company tax rates on average are markedly higher in OMS 
compared to MNS. Second, statutory company tax rates are higher in large 
countries than in small countries – within OMS as well as within NMS. Third, 
large closed countries tend to have higher statutory company tax rates than 
small open ones. The same holds for EATR, at least for OMS (no long-term 
data are available for NMS), which are also used as a tax parameter countries 
are applying to compete for FDI (see also section 3 below). 
 
Differences in the level of public goods 
According to the theoretical tax competition model, as a consequence of tax 
competition the corporate tax rate is set at an inefficiently low level, and if 
there are no compensatory increases of other taxes, tax revenues and therefore 
public expenditures will be inefficiently low. The risk of an under-provision of 
public goods is perceived mostly by countries with high levels of social 
expenditure. According to this theoretical prediction, countries with high levels 
of public expenditures, which they would like to sustain, should resist the 
temptation to enter tax competition as they have too much to lose.  
Graph 5 examines the relationship between the variability of statutory 
corporate rates in relation to the changes in average rates in the enlarged EU 
and the level of primary general government expenditures (expenditures less 
interest payments) over the period 1995-2003 (see: note below the graph). It 
may be hypothesized that countries with high average levels of public 
expenditures should be characterized by a lower variability of statutory 
corporate tax rates. The correlation is indeed negative but very low (-0.39) 
which means that an under-proportional fall in corporate taxation (compared 
to the EU average) in EU countries is not strongly connected with high levels 
of primary budgetary expenditures. Similar conclusions may be reached 
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considering ‘productive’ expenditures (see Graph 6). ‘Productive’ expenditures 
are those public inputs that enhance the productivity of capital. The proxy for 
‘productive’ expenditures applied here is the sum of public investment and 
education expenditures expressed as percent of GDP. The correlation is again 
negative and weak (-0.39). It therefore seems that a fall in statutory rates is not 
strongly connected with the average level of ‘productive’ expenditures. Rather 
the majority of countries are engaging in statutory tax rates competition, and 
even those with high levels of public expenditures do not resist this pressure.  
 
Graph 3.5: Variability of corporate taxation versus primary public expenditure 
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
variability of corporate taxation
pr
im
ar
y 
bu
dg
et
ar
y 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
Notes: primary expenditure – general government, % of GDP, variability of corporate taxation 
– change in statutory corporate tax rate in 1995-2003 in country i over the change in 
average statutory corporate tax rate for EU (22 countries considered), positive value 
indicates that country i decreased the corporate tax rate by more than EU countries on 
average. 
 
 
Graph 3.6: Variability of corporate taxation versus ‘productive’ public 
expenditure 
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Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
Notes: productive expenditure – general government, % of GDP, variability of corporate 
taxation – see note on graph 5. 
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According to theoretical considerations, countries are able to sustain higher 
corporate tax rates if they provide services and infrastructure of high quality 
that create location-specific rents. Thus countries with high levels of public 
goods like Germany and France could preserve their attractiveness for foreign 
capital despite high tax rates. The empirical literature is inconclusive in this 
respect. Benassy-Quere et al. (2005) examined double competition via both 
corporate tax rates and the provision of public factors with FDI data from the 
US to the EU13 and found evidence of the coexistence of high tax/spending 
countries and low tax/spending ones. However, no strong evidence can be 
found for an important role of public expenditures in shaping locational 
attractiveness for FDI flows within Europe (Büttner, 2002). This could explain 
some involvement of countries with high public expenditures level in tax 
competition, as observed above. No research has been done yet on the role of 
public expenditures for corporate tax competition within an enlarged Europe.  
 
3.2.6 CONCLUSION  
According to the basic theoretical tax competition model, tax competition will 
lead to a disappearance of company taxes in the long run. However, an 
important distinction has to be made between tax competition to attract 
profits, which may lead to a “race to the bottom”, and tax competition to 
attract foreign investment, which may be cushioned, for example, by the 
presence of location rents and by the higher provision of public services and 
infrastructures offered in countries with higher rates. 
Empirical investigations and analyses for OMS and NMS provide mixed 
results on tax competition. On the one hand, there is evidence of some sort of 
competition, above all over statutory tax rates that have been falling 
considerably in the OMS and the NMS over time. Also forward-looking 
effective tax rates show a declining trend. On the other hand, actual tax 
revenues have not declined on average and in the majority of OMS, at least not 
until the last few years. This may be due to the strategy of tax-cuts-cum-base 
broadening pursued by most countries, but also to the increasing weight of 
incorporated firms, or, in general, to a low elasticity of tax yield to tax revenue, 
due for example, to the way in which taxable profits are defined. The slight 
decline of the corporate tax ratio that can be observed for the last few years 
may date back to tax competition, but may also reflect low growth rates 
resulting in low taxable profits, as well as other factors.  
There are still considerable tax rate differentials between OMS and NMS 
that could be sustained by countervailing factors, such as agglomeration rents, 
a high level of public inputs, or differences in country size and the degree of 
openness. There is some evidence that large closed countries are able to 
maintain higher statutory and forward-looking company tax rates than small 
open ones. That the former tend to experience falling tax ratios and implicit 
corporate tax rates is only seemingly a contradiction: high tax rates in those 
countries may induce the shifting of profits or economic activities to low-tax 
countries and therefore lead to an erosion of the tax base.  
It may be too shortsighted, however, to conclude from these observations 
that the tax rate differential between OMS and NMS can be sustained in the 
long run. The countervailing factors that currently seem to prevent the 
convergence of company taxes between OMS and NMS may lose in 
importance over time, as the experience within the group of the OMS suggests. 
Here the tax gap between the core and the peripheral countries has narrowed 
over time. Moreover, the options to broaden the tax base further are limited in 
 
13 EU15 plus the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
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the long run, so that finally continuing tax rate reductions should be expected 
to cause a fall in actual tax revenues. The consequences will depend on the 
share of corporate taxation in tax revenues. In general this share in NMS is 
below the average level of EU15, but there are many exceptions like the Czech 
Republic with extremely high level of CT/Tax revenues and on the other hand 
Germany with the lowest share in the whole EU.  
 
How important are international differences in the taxation of corporate 
firms for the location of firms, foreign direct investment and for profit 
shifting? High responsiveness of multinational firms implies that governments 
have a strong incentive to compete with their corporate tax rate. Tax 
differentials are, however, sustainable if the corporate income tax is only a 
minor determinant of firm location. 
3.3 Economic 
consequences of 
tax differentials 
As discussed in Section 3.2, differences in the statutory tax rate create 
incentives for firms to relocate their profits to low-tax countries; for 
incremental investment and location decisions however, the most important 
indicators are the effective marginal (EMTR) and the effective average tax rates 
(EATR) respectively. Unfortunately, empirical studies are unable to distinguish 
between the location and incremental investment decisions of multinational 
firms. They are put together under the heading of (FDI). Studies do, however, 
distinguish between alternative measures of the corporate tax rate, as we will 
show below. 
This section summarizes the empirical evidence on the impact of the 
corporate income tax on FDI and profit shifting. 
 
3.3.1 TAXES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT14
FDI has become increasingly important. While FDI outflows in the European 
Union represented less than 5% of total investments in the early 80s, they have 
mounted to about one-third in recent years (UNCTAD). How sensitive is FDI 
to differences in corporate taxes? 
Devereux and Griffith (2002) divide the empirical studies on taxation and 
foreign investment in four main categories, distinguished with respect to the 
type of capital data used. 
1. Time-series data on FDI. This category contains the early studies for 
especially the US, starting with the article of Hartman (1984).  
2. Panel data on FDI. Starting with Devereux and Freeman (1995), a 
large number of recent studies have used this methodology.  
3. Cross-section data on the allocation of assets by US multinationals. 
Studies by Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) are 
examples of this category.  
4. Discrete choice models where count data on location choice is 
regressed on tax rate variables. Studies by Bartik (1985) and Papke 
(1991) were among the first using this methodology. 
The first study on the impact of taxation on FDI is Hartman (1984) who 
investigated for the United States FDI inflows financed out of retained 
earnings or by a transfer of funds. Hartman argues that if a tax change makes it 
more attractive for domestic firms to invest, it becomes more expensive for 
foreign investors to acquire a US firm. He claims that retained earnings should 
be more sensitive to US taxes because mature firms will use retained earnings 
as the marginal source of finance (which is cheaper than the transfer of new 
funds). Hartman’s empirical results imply that, indeed, the tax rate elasticity for 
retained earnings is significant while for transfers the results are insignificant. 
 
14 This section draws heavily on De Mooij and Ederveen, 2005. 
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Slemrod (1990) criticizes Hartman’s specification as it lacks a properly specified 
model. He argues that the marginal effective tax rate should be used instead of 
the statutory rate. With this alternative measure, Slemrod shows that, in 
contrast to Hartman, retained earnings are not responsive to US taxes, while 
for transfers a significant elasticity is found. The results suggest that taxes exert 
a significant negative effect on FDI. 
Another contribution by Slemrod (1990) is that he controls for the tax 
system in the home country of the parent firm. In particular, he argues that the 
tax response by investors from credit countries (Japan, UK and Italy) should be 
different from those of exemption countries (Germany, Netherlands, Canada 
and France).15 To explore this claim, he considers the bilateral investments 
flows from seven industrialized countries in the US and then looks for a 
systematic difference between the two types of investors. The picture that 
emerges from this exercise is not clear, though. In fact, the country-specific 
evidence yields mixed results on the tax effect on FDI, including many 
insignificant coefficients.  
The papers by Hartman and Slemrod are two examples of time-series studies 
on the relation between corporate taxation and FDI. De Mooij and Ederveen 
(2005) show that 111 time-series regressions in 7 different studies generally 
point at a negative impact of the corporate income tax on FDI, but the 
variation across different studies is large.  
An extension to the time-series literature is to combine the FDI-
responsiveness of different countries in a panel regression, based on either 
aggregate or bilateral FDI flows. The evidence for the few studies employing a 
panel of aggregate FDI flows is remarkably mixed. Swenson (1994) reports a 
significantly positive effect of high average effective tax rates on FDI. A likely 
explanation for this result is that high tax rates raise FDI from investors in tax 
credit countries, if they are not in excess credit. Others observe a negative 
impact of taxes on FDI. For example, Broekman and Van Vliet (2001) report 
semi-elasticities in the order of -2, based on a study for aggregate FDI inflows 
in 15 EU countries. The evidence from several studies on bilateral FDI flows is 
more conclusive: 102 regression in 10 studies generally point at a negative tax-
effect on FDI. For example, Büttner (2002) shows that a 1%-point reduction 
in various tax measures raises inward FDI flows by 1.5%. This estimate is 
obtained for FDI flows financed by a transfer of funds (not retained earnings) 
in the EU between 1991 and 1998. 
Grubert and Mutti (1991) were the first to use an alternative measure for FDI, 
namely investments in property, plant and equipment (PPE) which is believed 
to be more closely related to real investment, but leaves out several other 
components of FDI. The advantage of using a more uniform measure of FDI 
shows in the empirical results. The available evidence from 78 regressions in 5 
studies indicates that the negative impact of the AETR is stronger on PPE than 
on broader measures of FDI. 
The final type of literature focuses on the probability that multinationals 
locate subsidiaries in a particular country. These studies abstract from the size 
of FDI flows, but only investigate the go / no go investment decisions of 
multinationals only. A typical study in this literature is Devereux and Griffith 
(1998), who investigate the location of US firms in France, Germany and the 
UK. They show that firms are less likely to invest or locate in a country with a 
high average effective tax rate, whereas the statutory tax rate has no significant 
impact. Büttner and Ruf (2004) perform a similar analysis for the location 
decisions of German multinationals in European destination countries. They 
are however unable to identify a significant impact of either the effective or the 
 
15 In the first case, the relevant tax rate is the one of the residence country of the parent (unless 
the latter is smaller than the rate in the investing country and profits are retained); in the second 
case, the relevant tax rate is that of the source country. 
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statutory tax rate on FDI. This points to a general observation in the survey of 
De Mooij and Ederveen (2005), namely that studies for intra-EU capital flows 
yield smaller responses than studies for FDI within or outside of the US. There 
is no evidence, yet, that the European internal market stimulates the 
responsiveness of FDI to tax differentials. 
 
Table 3.2: Impact of tax differentials on FDI 
Study Type Semi-elasticity 
   
Büttner, 2002 2, panel data -1.52 
Büttner and Ruf, 2004* 4, discrete choice -0.42 
Cassou, 1997 1, time series -7.46 
Gorter and Parikh, 2000* 2, panel data -4.56 
Hines, 1996 3, cross section -12.37 
 4, discrete choice -6.71 
Pain and Young, 1996* 2, panel data -1.51 
Slemrod, 1990 1, time series -5.47 
Stöwhase, 2005* 2, panel data -5.26 
Swenson, 2001 4, discrete choice -3.51 
   
De Mooij and Ederveen, 2005 Typical semi-elasticity -4.28 
   
Source: De Mooij and Ederveen (2005); we selected the studies which include regressions for European FDI. The studies marked 
with * are based on European data only. 
The typical semi-elasticity is based on 33 studies in the meta-analysis. 
Elasticity: %-change in FDI in response to %(-point) change in the corporate tax rate. 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes the studies based on data for European FDI outflows. 
The table reveals that the relation between the corporate income tax and FDI 
is generally negative, meaning that a higher tax in the country of destination 
reduces FDI towards that country. Next, the variation in estimates between 
studies, but also between different regressions within a single study, is quite 
large. Among others, this variation depends on: 
• Type of data: cross-section studies show higher elasticities (in absolute 
terms) than discrete-choice models. 
• Definition of FDI: data for plant extensions produce larger elasticities 
than estimates with merger-and-acquisition data. 
• Definition of the tax rate: the effective tax rate has a stronger impact 
on FDI than the statutory rate. 
 
The latter observation is worth stressing. Theoretically, plant relocation 
should be determined by EATR, measuring the average tax bill on profits in 
the destination country. Incremental investment in foreign countries should be 
influenced by EMTR. As previously mentioned, it is impossible to distinguish 
between these types of FDI empirically. However, the combined hypothesis 
that FDI should be more sensitive to the (marginal or average) effective tax 
rate than to the statutory rate is clearly confirmed by the empirical evidence, as 
shown in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.3 The impact of various tax measures on FDI  
  
 Semi-elasticity 
Statutory tax rate -2.05 
Marginal effective tax rate -3.48 
Average effective tax rate -5.90 
Micro average tax rate -2.03 
Macro average tax rate -4.23 
Mean -4.28 
  
Source: De Mooij and Ederveen (2005)  
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Table 3.3 distinguishes between the backward and forward-looking measures 
of average tax rates. The backward measures (micro and macro average tax 
rates) are able to take account of tax planning activities, complex tax provisions 
and discretionary administrative practices of tax authorities, as they are 
calculated from the actual payments by firms in the past. The effective tax 
measures (EMTR and EATR) are calculated from tax codes. In particular the 
forward-looking effective average tax rate (EATR) appears to influence FDI 
heavily, as expected. 
As an aside, we now turn to a few words on the NMS. To our knowledge, 
only two studies have investigated the impact of the corporate taxation on FDI 
towards these countries. Jakubiak and Markiewicz (2005) analyse a panel with 
investors from OMS and eight NMS as receiving countries. They do not find 
strong evidence that comparative tax advantages of NMS expressed by lower 
statutory and effective corporate tax rates influences the location of FDI 
coming from OMS. 
A similar conclusion is drawn by Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil (2005), 
who do not find any significant impact of taxes for EU investment in NMS. 
Possible explanations are that FDI in these new EU states has not yet reached 
its long-term pattern or that the lower tax rates do not compensate for location 
disadvantages that these countries still have compared to more mature EU 
economies.  
Overall, the risk of tough tax competition to attract FDI does exist in the 
EU. This risk is however limited by the prominent importance of non-tax 
factors in the location of FDI. 
 
3.3.2 TAXES AND PROFIT SHIFTING 
Profit shifting is a well-known reality, widely used by multinationals to reduce 
their tax burden. To get an impression of its size, we cite Sullivan (2004): “U.S. 
multinational corporations are increasingly shifting tens of billions of dollars of 
their profits to such tax havens as Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, and 
Singapore.” Profit shifting might be induced by tax-rate differentials, as we 
argue in section 2. What does the empirical literature tell us about the size of 
this relation? 
The empirical studies on the impact of corporate taxation on profit shifting 
can be divided in two categories, focusing directly on the link between taxes 
and profits, or investigating the channel by which profits are shifted, namely 
transfer pricing or thin capitalisation.  
The direct route is to investigate the impact of the statutory tax rate on the 
gross profitability reported by firms. Of course, these studies have to control 
for several other factors affecting firm profitability, like differentials in GDP 
per capita and firm size. The empirical studies summarized in Table 3 are 
generally limited to one or a few sectors. These studies reveal that a higher 
statutory tax rate goes hand in hand with a reduction in reported profits. A 
plausible explanation for this phenomenon is profit shifting within 
multinational firms. 
Table 3.4 reports for five empirical studies the semi-elasticity of profits to 
the tax rate, which measures the percentage change in profitability to a 
percentage point change in the corporate tax rate. In many cases, these semi-
elasticities are not reported in the studies, but have to be calculated from the 
empirical results. We have used an average tax rate of 34.5%, which is the 
unweighted average of the statutory tax rate for OMS in 1999. In addition, we 
have used the profitability of Dutch firms between 1992 and 2002, as these 
data were easily available. Different assumptions regarding the tax rate and 
profitability would not affect the ranking in estimates, and would only slightly 
change the numbers. 
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Table 3.4 Semi-elasticity of reported profits to the legal corporate income tax 
rate 
   
Study Application Semi-elasticity 
Grubert and Mutti (1991) Industry sector, 1982 -2.3 
 Multinational subsidiaries from the US 
in 33 countries 
 
   
Hines and Rice (1994) Non-financial corporations, 1982 -2.5 
 Multinational subsidiaries from the US 
in 73 countries 
 
   
Klassen and Shackelford (1998) All firms, 1983-1991 -0.1 
 10 Canadian provinces and 50 US-
states 
 
   
Bartelsman and Beetsma 
(2003) 
15 manufacturing industries, 1979-1997 -3.5 
 22 OECD countries  
   
Mintz and Smart (2004) Non-financial firms in 7 industries -1.4 
 6 Canadian provinces, 1986-1999  
   
Source: De Mooij (2005) 
 
Both the mean and the median estimate point at a semi-elasticity of -2. This 
implies that a 1%-point higher statutory tax rate would reduce profitability 
firms report in that country by about 2%. Of course, this would only apply to 
multinational firms, able to shift profits to low-tax countries. The lowest 
estimate for the semi-elasticity is derived in the study by Klassen and 
Shackelford (1998), based on profit shifting between the United States and 
Canada, using data for all firms (including domestic ones). On the other 
extreme is the study by Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), who base their 
estimate of profit shifting on the link between value-added per industry and the 
corporate tax rate.  
One problem with the aggregate studies in Table 3.3 is that the estimates 
may simply reflect systematic differences in the characteristics of firms that 
invest in low-tax countries, rather than profit shifting. Moreover, other 
variables affecting profit levels may be correlated with statutory tax rates. In 
these cases, the coefficient for the tax rate would pick up the impact that 
should be attributed to these omitted variables. Tax rates may also 
endogenously depend on profit levels, causing a bias in parameters estimated 
by OLS. Finally, the results may not necessarily reflect the impact of profit 
shifting if differences in tax rates have other implications on profit levels. For 
instance, high tax rates may encourage risk taking if losses can be offset. In that 
case, the average rate of return to investment rises. The positive coefficient 
would then wrongly be interpreted as evidence for profit shifting. An 
additional limitation of the estimates in the table is that the calculated semi-
elasticities are based on empirical studies for the United States and Canada, 
with the exception of Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003). In addition, several 
studies are based on 20-year-old datasets. For these reasons, the outcomes in 
Table 3.4 should be interpreted with caution: the qualitative conclusion seems 
warranted that tax differentials induce profit shifting, but the size is unknown 
yet. 
A most recent study, however, based on micro data for European 
multinationals (Huizinga and Laeven, 2005), finds “an average (semi-)elasticity 
of the pre-tax profits with respect to the tax rate of 1.43 in Europe” and 
concludes that “this elasticity is large enough for international profit shifting to 
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be a serious issue for the European tax authorities. This is confirmed by some 
estimates of the corporate tax revenue losses (or gains) that European 
Treasuries currently experience on account of international profit shifting” (p. 
5). 
Transfer pricing and thin capitalization are the main mechanisms for firms 
to shift their profits towards low-tax countries. We have no evidence on thin 
capitalization and know of only two empirical studies directly investigating the 
impact of the statutory tax rate on transfer prices. First, Swenson (2001) 
investigates the impact of tax differentials between 5 OECD countries on the 
product prices in 18 manufacturing industries. She shows that a 1%-point tax 
gap reduces the product price by only 0.005%. Clausing (2003) finds much 
larger elasticities in a study on US intra-firm trade prices. She shows that a 1% 
increase in the statutory tax rate reduces the transfer price of intra-firm trade to 
other countries by about 4%. The single conclusion we can draw from these 
two empirical studies, is that the impact of tax differentials on transfer pricing 
is highly inconclusive. 
 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
An increase in the tax burden on corporate firms, by raising the tax rate or 
broadening the tax base, affects FDI significantly. A one percent reduction in 
the tax rate (with unchanged tax base) would on average stimulate FDI-inflows 
by about 4%. However, the variation in reported estimates is large and about 
half of them are insignificant. For Europe, there is weak evidence that the 
sensitivity of FDI to the corporate tax rate is less than average. Moreover, there 
is no empirical evidence yet that taxes affect FDI in NMS.  
As expected, forward-looking effective average tax rates appear to be the 
most useful tax indicators to explain FDI. The statutory tax rate, instead, may 
trigger profit shifting through transfer pricing or thin capitalization. The few 
empirical studies on this issue, however, do not permit a firm conclusion. 
There is some evidence of profit shifting, but the volume is highly uncertain. 
Despite the increasing amount of empirical work, further effort should be 
dedicated to both research areas, above all for the enlarged EU. To make 
progress, though, more reliable and detailed data for all the 25 EU countries 
should be made available.  
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As we have seen in Section 2, countries compete primarily over statutory tax 
rates and EATR. This is not surprising since these indicators are the most 
important tax driving forces affecting respectively profit shifting and 
investment location decisions (Section 3). 
3.4. Do we need 
corporate tax 
coordination in 
the EU? The question to be answered at this point is whether this situation calls for 
corporate tax coordination in the EU. 
To provide a contribution in this direction, this section evaluates, on the 
basis of the theoretical and empirical economic literature and the experience of 
other countries, the pros and cons of different tax coordination policies, by 
focusing separately on the two major issues in corporate taxation presently 
under discussion in the EU: tax base coordination and tax rate coordination. It 
also distinguishes between different ways and different degrees of tax rate and 
tax base coordination, in as far as each type of policy would be able to solve 
different problems. The coordination strategy chosen largely depends on the 
objectives one wants to pursue.   
 
3.4.1 TAX BASE COORDINATION 
The Commission’s  Proposal 
Four types of tax base coordination proposals have been recently put forward 
in the EU debate. They have been extensively examined under the 
comprehensive solutions suggested in the 2001 Commission study on 
corporate taxation (European Commission, 2001). Two of these proposals, the 
Harmonised tax base (HTB) and the European Union company income 
taxation (EUCIT), are based on a compulsory common tax base, which would 
apply to all enterprises, and replace the existing national tax codes. These 
compulsory solutions, independently of their merits and drawbacks, are at 
present considered politically unfeasible alternatives. That is why the debate 
focused on two more flexible options suggested in the literature and 
extensively analysed in the Commission Study: Home state taxation (HST) and 
Common (consolidated) tax base (CTB), both leaving Member States the 
option to introduce a common tax base  
Under HST, corporate enterprises would have the option to apply the 
domestic tax code of the state where their headquarters are located to all the 
activities carried out in other member states by their subsidiaries or permanent 
establishments. The tax code would then be different depending on the 
location of the parent company, but for each single company the definition of 
the tax base would be the same independently of the states where it operates. 
The main advantage claimed in favour of HST is that it does not require 
participating Member States to agree in advance on a common system of 
accounting and taxation. All that is needed is a sort of “mutual recognition” of 
national tax laws whereby the Member States participating in the system would 
allow group companies operating within their borders to be taxed (in contrast 
to the present situation) on the basis of the rules of the country of residence of 
the parent company.  
Under CTB, a new common optional tax code would be adopted. All (or a 
group of) Member States would have to agree on a common set of rules for 
establishing the tax base. Companies headquartered in any member state 
belonging to the system would have the option to adopt this common 
(European) tax base as an alternative to the domestic one, and apply it to all 
their activities in participating member states. A possible problem with this 
approach is that it might discriminate between multinationals and purely 
domestic companies. In case, to avoid possible discriminations, the latter could 
be given the option for the common EU system. The common tax rules could 
take the agreed European accounting standards (IAS/IFRS) as a starting point.  
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In addition to suggesting a common tax base, the Commission’s proposal goes 
further by suggesting consolidation of profits and losses for companies 
operating in the EU and subsequent allocation of those profits by an 
apportionment formula. Each one of the elements of the proposal (common 
tax base, consolidation, formula apportionment) is aimed at removing specific 
obstacles to the functioning of the internal market, as we will see below. 
Since 2004 the Commission’s Directorate-General TAXUD has evoked the 
usefulness of a pilot scheme allowing SMEs to apply, on an experimental basis 
for five years, the principles of HST. Moreover it has created a working group 
with representatives of all Member States to discuss and examine the technical 
possibility to define a Common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) for 
companies operating in the EU.  All 25 EU member states, including those that 
are not in favour of tax base coordination, agreed to participate in the Working 
group.  
 
THE OBJECTIVES OF TAX BASE COORDINATION 
(a) reducing tax compliance costs 
A first important reason supporting tax base coordination is to reduce 
compliance costs for companies operating in more than one member state and 
costs incurred by tax administrations. At present these companies have to deal 
with up to 25 different accounting and tax rules, different arrangements for 
collection, administration and control of tax payments, and a whole set of 
different tax treaties networks. As a consequence, compliance costs are higher 
for companies operating in more than one EU member state than for purely 
domestic companies. Moreover, these costs tend to be much higher for SME 
operating at the EU level, than for large companies. According to a recent 
survey conducted by the TAXUD EU Commission services (European 
Commission, 2004b), they are 1.9% of tax payments for large multinationals, 
but reach 30.9% of tax payments for SME. Thus, compliance costs represent 
an obstacle for EU integration and cross-border economic activities, 
particularly for SME. In addition, EU multinationals are also at a disadvantage 
with respect to other competitors, such as the US, where companies operating 
in more than one state benefit from the presence of a common federal tax 
system.    
A reduction of the costs presently incurred due to the existence of 25 
different accounting and tax rules would be beneficial for both companies and 
the tax administration. It could be fairly readily achieved by adopting a unique 
tax base definition for companies operating in the EU. In principle, to reduce 
compliance costs for companies, compulsory approaches like HTB and 
EUCIT would be unnecessary, and more flexible solutions like HST and CTB 
could be sufficient.  
However, to properly judge these proposals and their ability to reduce 
compliance costs (for both taxpayers and tax administrations), one should 
enter into a deeper analysis, considering all the relevant issues.   
At first sight the HST proposal appears simpler than the CTB alternative, 
because it can be implemented “on a current legislation basis”. In contrast, 
CTB requires the definition of a new system, with all the complications this 
may involve not only in defining the items to be included in the tax base, but 
also in applying a new set of rules by companies and tax administrators. 
However, as the discussion in the Commission’s 2001 Study makes clear, on 
closer examination it would seem that HST will require those countries 
participating in the agreement to find detailed solutions to a series of problems 
in the accounting, tax and administrative fields. For example, if auditing and 
assessment were left to the tax authority of the subsidiary’s host country, each 
administration would need to know and apply no less than 25 sets of income 
  
   ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 67 
 
tax rules. To avoid this complication, auditing and assessment should be left to 
the authority of the parent company’s home country, but this would limit the 
power of the subsidiary’s host country. The right of each national 
administration have access to an assessment of the activity of each company 
operating within its territory, is a basic principle which should be protected 
somehow. 
CTB does not solve all these problems, but alleviates some of them, above 
all administrative costs, since each tax administration would have to know and 
apply only two sets of rules: the domestic ones and the European one. 
Auditing and litigations could be carried out as they are today, in the country 
where the company operates. 
Summarising, to reduce compliance costs a fully harmonised compulsory 
tax base would be the best solution; if a more flexible approach is envisaged, 
because of political and institutional constraints, CTB seems to be preferable to 
HST. 
(b) Cross-Border Loss Offset 
Cross border activities in the EU are disadvantaged, compared to similar 
domestic operations or to similar activities undertaken, for example, by 
multinational operating in the US, since cross-border loss compensation in the 
EU is usually not allowed.  Most Member States permit companies to 
consolidate, for tax purposes, domestic profits and losses of the group, but 
only in few cases (Denmark, and, in limited circumstances, France, plus, more 
recently, Italy and Austria) this possibility is extended to cross-border losses. In 
the case of Italy, different rules apply to domestic and foreign subsidiaries of 
the group. Also the rules for domestic consolidation vary widely among MS. 
The possibility that these systems progressively evolve towards extending loss 
offset to companies of the group operating in other Member States would only 
partially solve the problem, since the consolidation rules will remain highly 
different. The recent ECJ cases in the field, and particularly the forthcoming 
judgment on the Marks & Spencer case (Case C-446/03), expected for the end 
of 2005, will induce Member States to take action, in order to make their 
systems coherent with the Treaty principles. However, if the Court will 
confirm the Advocate General conclusions of April, 7, 2005, Member States 
will not necessarily have to extend loss consolidation to foreign (EU) 
subsidiaries. Other solutions are possible, in addition to the extreme one of 
abolishing group relief for domestic companies. Moreover, different methods 
of allowing cross border loss offset may be compatible with the Treaty.  
The Commission, in 1997after having withdrawn the directive proposal of 
1991 on cross border loss offset (COM (1990) 595), has recently announced 
new initiatives to remove what is considered “a fundamental obstacle to the 
proper functioning of the Internal Market”, with the main aim of “deepening 
the analysis of the issue and try to develop guidance on Member States' 
respective obligations under the EU Treaty.” (COM (2003) 726 final). 
Despite all these efforts, it can hardly be expected that the problem of cross 
border loss compensation will be properly solved unless countries agree on a 
common tax base, with a common definition of losses. Cross-border loss 
offset could then be achieved right from the beginning, for all the solutions 
involving the creation of a new set of common rules (as for CTB), by 
extending these rules to allow for cross-border loss offset. The latter could be 
granted, for example, according to the “deduction reintegration” method, 
already considered by the Commission in the 1991 proposal: the parent 
company would deduct losses of foreign subsidiaries from the tax base, but 
when the subsidiary will make profits the previously deducted losses should be 
added back to profits and taxed in the country of the parent. Symmetrically the 
subsidiary would be allowed to carry forward losses. The system would be 
compatible with the Treaty principles, it would avoid double deduction of 
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losses, and it would reassure Member States that they are giving relief for a 
subsidiary’s losses whose subsequent profits they would be able to tax (EU 
Commission, 2001, p. 476).  
As for HST, Member States’ tax systems should include the existence of 
group consolidation and loss offset as a prerequisite for joining. However, 
because those differ, problems might arise unless member states quickly align 
their rules. 
The 2001 Commission’s proposal for comprehensive solutions like HTB or 
CTB and HST goes beyond this approach by suggesting a more radical 
solution: full consolidation of profits and losses with subsequent allocation of 
profits through formula apportionment rather than by separate accounting. In 
addition to solve the problem of cross-border loss offset, this comprehensive 
approach to corporate tax base coordination is suggested in order to remove 
other important obstacles to internal market integration, as discussed in the 
next section.  
 
( c) Reducing Profit Shifting 
As we have seen in section 3.3.2, different statutory tax rates induce companies 
to shift profits to countries with lower rates. This problem is bound to become 
more important after some current ECJ decisions. For example, several EU 
countries introduced thin capitalisation rules in order to prevent companies 
from shifting their profits towards low tax jurisdictions, by using debt finance 
to deduct interests in high tax countries and tax them in low tax ones. 
However, the well-known German Lankhorst-Hohorst case (C-324/00), the 
ECJ held that member states cannot apply thin-capitalization rules that 
discriminate between domestic and other EU lenders. The response to this 
ruling was different across the various countries. Germany, Denmark, Italy and 
the UK have all acted to protect their tax base by extending thin-capitalization 
rules to domestic lenders, at the cost of high complexities. The UK has in fact, 
gone even further in this process to counter the ECJ discrimination argument, 
by widening the scope of its transfer-pricing rules to domestic transactions. 
Spain on the other hand, moved in the opposite direction and eliminated thin-
capitalization rules when the lender is resident in any EU country.  
This example shows that ECJ decisions might increasingly restrict the 
ability of each member state to devise unilateral anti-avoidance measures to 
limit profit shifting and protect tax revenue from tax rate competition within 
the EU, to the extent that these measures are in contrast to the Treaty.16 The 
guiding criterion of the most recent ECJ judgments is increasingly the non-
discrimination principle. Defence by member states based on the fiscal 
cohesion principle, the need to ensure effective fiscal supervision and to 
prevent tax avoidance are no more considered valid justifications. 
Transfer pricing is another issue of increasing concern in the EU. Not only 
because of the fear of profit shifting, but also because the complex rules of 
transfer pricing significantly add to compliance costs and may even lead to 
double taxation, creating barriers to full integration.  
Eliminating these obstacles, as well as the opportunity to undertake tax 
planning operations though transfer pricing or thin capitalisation, is another 
major scope of the comprehensive solutions suggested by the Commission, all 
of which (apart from a pure EUCIT, which would in fact be a truly European 
“federal” tax) includes formula apportionment of consolidated profits.  
 
16 Another example is the French exit tax, levied on holders of substantial interests in a company 
who transfer their residence abroad. In its judgment on March 11, 2004 the ECJ considered that 
the French tax provisions restrict the freedom of establishment – a principle established in 
Article 43 of the EC Treaty. 
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The definition of a common tax base is therefore only a first step, capable 
of reducing compliance costs, but itself is unable to remove other important 
obstacles to capital market integration, such as the absence of cross-border loss 
offset. Neither is it capable of avoiding the under-taxation of profits by means 
of “artificially” planned transactions. To simultaneously resolve all these issues, 
the suggested solution is the apportionment of consolidated profits according 
to a formula. Adopting this solution would entail a radical change in the 
separate accounting system (based on arm’s length principles), according to 
which the tax base of each member state is presently defined. The proposed 
system is similar to those already adopted by federal states like the United 
States or Canada (see, for example, McLure and Weiner, 2000; Hellerstein and 
McLure, 2004). As the analysis of these countries’ experiences outlines, the 
system is not marked by advantages alone. It raises both complex questions in 
need of resolution and has various drawbacks, mainly depending on the choice 
of the allocation factors in the formula. A point worth reminding, at this stage 
is that a tax levied on a base that is apportioned according to a given formula 
corresponds to a set of taxes levied on the various different factors included in 
the formula (McLure, 1980). Hence the choice of these factors, (which should 
be done by considering a variety of implications, including one's beliefs on 
what is the ultimate purpose of levying corporate income taxes), will affect 
incentives to allocate factors included in the formula. It will also affect the 
capability of the system to adequately prevent profit shifting from high to low 
tax jurisdiction. For example, one of the most interesting allocating factors 
proposed for the EU is a measure of origin value-added of the net-income type 
(Lodin and Gammie, 2001). This concept of value-added has notable 
conceptual and practical advantages over the use of distinct apportionment 
factors, such as payroll, property and sales adopted in the USA, since it 
allocates profits where the value-added of the company is produced. Moreover, 
as distinct from the US, it could be fairly easily implemented in the EU, using 
as a starting point the information collected for the traditional consumption-
Vat operations.17 The limit of this solution however, is that it would only 
remove the incentive of profits shifting through thin capitalisation (since 
interest payments are included in value-added), but not through manipulation 
of transfer prices. This problem would be exacerbated if labour costs were 
excluded from the measure of value-added used for allocation, as suggested by 
Hellerstein and McLure (2004), since these costs are usually the most 
important component of value-added. The implementation of other formulae 
will not entirely remove the incentives for tax planning and profit shifting. (see, 
for example,  Sorensen, 2004a; Weiner, 2005). 
 
(d) Increase Neutrality in the Allocation of Capital 
Section 3 concluded that investment location may be driven by tax 
rather than economic considerations, in which case would lead to the 
misallocation of capital.  
The question then arises whether a consolidated common tax base with 
formula apportionment as envisaged in the Commission’s proposal would 
be able to remove these inefficiencies in the allocation of capital. The 
economic literature is quite clear on the issue: a common consolidated tax 
base with formula apportionment will not, by itself, result in economic 
neutrality, as long as tax rates differ (among the most recent studies, see 
Hellerstein and McLure, 2004; Sorensen, 2004a; Weiner, 2005). As 
previously mentioned, the exact types of distortions, with regard to the 
 
17 Value-added as reported for VAT purposes should be adjusted for exports, imports, 
acquisitions from other Member States and depreciation rather than immediate deduction of the 
investment costs.  
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allocation of the factors of production within the EU (to which the system 
of formula apportionment would be restricted) will depend on the factors 
included in the formula. The magnitude of the welfare losses will be a 
function of the tax rate differential between countries and of the elasticity 
of the taxed factor to these tax rate differentials. If property or capital 
income is included in the formula, the location of capital would continue to 
be driven by tax considerations and countries would continue to have 
incentives to compete over tax rates to attract FDI. It is no coincidence that 
in federal states such as the United States and Canada, the fiscal autonomy 
of member states is limited by the floor effectively provided by federal 
taxation. Moreover, the variation in rates is much smaller than in the EU. 
Here, tax rates range from a minimum of zero, on retained earnings in 
Estonia or 12.5% in Ireland, to around 40% in Germany and Italy. The 
comparable state rates for the United States range from 0% to 8%, whereas 
in Canada the provincial tax rates range from 14% to 17%.18
Looking at the specific case of the EU, it is not easy to evaluate what the 
efficiency gains of moving from separate accounting to formulary 
apportionment would be. According to Mintz and Weiner (2003) “since it is 
not clear whether the inefficiencies that apportionment introduces are 
empirically more important than those that it removes, the efficiency gains 
in moving from the existing system to an optional formula apportionment 
system are unknown” (Weiner, 2005, p. 43) 
Other important questions should be considered in order to evaluate the 
efficiency implications of the proposal. 
First, efficiency calls for a common formula. In the US, where states can 
change the weights given to the various allocating keys, an increasing 
number of them have moved from the traditional three factors formula 
(labour, capital and sales) to a destination-based sales formula, in order to 
attract investments from other states (Edmiston, 2002). Competition 
moved from tax rates to factor weights in the formula. To avoid this risk, 
the EU countries should adopt a common formula, but such an agreement 
may be difficult to reach since each formula will have a different impact on 
tax revenue distribution across countries.   
Second, for efficiency reasons it would be preferable to have a truly EU 
common base, without exceptions and permitted divergences from the 
common rules. This means, for example, that member states should be 
prevented from granting additional fiscal incentives, such as accelerated 
depreciation allowances, that reduce the tax base. This would not however 
mean denying their sovereignty to use fiscal tools to pursue national public 
policy aims, if desired. Fiscal incentives could take the form of tax credits, 
or cash grants, rather than deductions from the tax base. The result could 
be equivalent, but the tax base would not be affected; the incentive would 
be more transparent and it would be easier and more straightforward to 
check for its compatibility with state aid provisions. A similar lesson can be 
drawn from the different experiences of the US and Canada.  
Finally, by looking at the efficiency content of the individual tax base 
coordination proposals, CTB turns out to be superior to HST. The latter 
may induce countries to compete over the tax base for headquarters – 
obviously by narrowing the tax base, which would be negative from an 
efficiency point of view, as generally moderate tax rates plus a broad tax 
base seem to be advantageous from an efficiency perspective. Moreover, 
HST may imply distortions of competition as subsidiaries operating in a 
given country are taxed on a different overall tax base depending on the 
 
18 European Commission (2001),  p. 512. 
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country of residence of their parent company and depending on the tax 
code existing there (Mintz and Weiner, 2003). 
 
3.4.2 TAX RATE COORDINATION  
The consolidated common tax base coordination policy examined in the 
previous section, and suggested by the Commission as a comprehensive 
solution to remove the main obstacles of the internal market, will leave 
Member States full autonomy to apply their own freely chosen tax rates on 
apportioned profits. This proposal, as we have seen in the previous section, 
would reduce compliance costs, and if accompanied by a consolidation of 
profits with formula apportionment, would solve the problem of cross-border 
loss offset. Depending on the formula adopted, it could also reduce although 
would be unlikely to fully eliminate the incentive to manipulate transfer pricing 
and use other profit shifting and tax planning devices to reduce the tax burden. 
Moreover, the question of the costs to be paid in terms of efficiency losses, 
due to the observed divergences of statutory and effective tax rates. As the tax 
policy scenarios simulated in the 2001 Commission Study demonstrate, in 
some circumstances potential distortions, measured by dispersions in effective 
tax rates, might even increase by harmonising the tax bases whilst leaving tax 
rates untouched. Thus the Commission’s proposal for a common consolidated 
tax base is not a complete and satisfactory solution to all relevant issues. 
 
Arguments in favour and against tax rate coordination 
The above mentioned results suggest that a common consolidated tax base 
with formula apportionment should be accompanied by tax rate coordination: 
only a common tax rate would entirely remove the incentive of profits shifting, 
within the EU; moreover, some kind of tax rate coordination would also be 
necessary to reduce tax distortions of cross-border EU investment, which 
could arise when tax differentials are not matched by cross-country differences 
in the value of productive public expenditure, agglomeration forces or other 
location rents. As the Commission study underlines, about three fourths of the 
observed dispersion of effective corporate tax rates, is due to difference in 
statutory rates. 
Despite these findings in favour of statutory tax rate coordination, the 
Commission’s 2001 Communication accompanying the study (COM (2001) 
528 final) concludes that: “at this point in time there is no convincing evidence 
for the Commission to recommend specific actions on the appropriation of the 
national corporate tax rates or the fixing of a minimum tax rate” (p. 9). Since 
then, the Commission has continuously assured Member States that the 
objective of coordinating the tax base does not entail any kind of tax rate 
coordination.  
This apparently contradictory position has in fact more than one 
justification. 
Firstly, making progress, above all reducing compliance costs, is given priority 
in the policy agenda. The Commission seems more concerned with facilitating 
firms’ operations in the internal market, than reducing distortions of cross-
border investment in Europe, with preventing avoidance and tax planning and 
preserving the capacity of Members States to collect revenues. As we have 
seen, reducing compliance costs requires a common tax base, but not 
necessarily a common tax rate.    
Secondly, subsidiarity calls for the highest possible level of member state fiscal 
autonomy. The setting of tax rates is probably the strongest symbol of fiscal 
sovereignty, one which countries are reluctant to give up. This is an important 
argument, but the question of fiscal sovereignty in a common market is a 
subtle issue: on the one hand, this national freedom has to be compatible with 
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an efficient functioning of the internal market, so that a trade-off between the 
two conflicting objectives of autonomy and efficiency must be chosen; on the 
other hand, it must be recognised that in a tax competition setting tax 
autonomy may easily turn out to be an illusion, since the tax rate will be 
determined as a reaction to other countries’ tax policies rather than based on 
autonomous decisions on the level and composition of the total tax burden.  
A third reason for which tax rate coordination is controversial, and at 
present not supported by the EU Commission, lies in the difficulty to precisely 
estimate the quantitative effects of diverging tax rates on FDI and, more 
general, on national and Community welfare. The 2001 Commission study 
does not try to quantify the impact s of different statutory and average tax rates 
on location decision. In briefly reviewing the literature, it concludes that it is 
“difficult to have ‘the’ quantitative measure of this impact even if the existence 
of such a relation is generally undisputed” (p. 152). Since the Report was 
written, further evidence has been provided on this effect and its quantitative 
importance, as section 3 demonstrated. However, still much work has to be 
done, above all for the enlarged EU. With regard to the more general issue of 
the welfare losses that may be due to tax differentials, and potential welfare 
gains from harmonisation, empirical evidence is even more fragile, given the 
complexity of the issue.  The most comprehensive simulations undertaken in 
the literature, provided by Sorensen with an applied general equilibrium model 
for 24 OECD countries (including the 15 EU member states) show a small 
welfare gain from corporate tax rate harmonisation (around 0.1-0.2 per cent of 
GDP). Moreover, some countries would gain and others would loose from 
harmonisation. Overall, the small simulated welfare gain due to tax rate 
harmonisation does not seem sufficient to balance the loss of national tax 
autonomy nor the need to compensate the losing countries (Sorensen, 2004a). 
However, as the same author outlines, this conclusion should be better 
qualified.  
For example, when taking into account the “social welfare gains which 
would arise if corporate tax harmonisation enabled governments with 
egalitarian preferences to implement more redistributive policies than would be 
possible by unfettered tax competition, tax harmonisation in the EU would 
raise social welfare by about 0.1-0.4 percent of GDP, (depending on the 
assumed degree of capital mobility between the EU and the rest of the 
world).”(Sorensen, 2004a, p.111-112). More recently, further insights have 
been provided by examining the quantitative predictions of capital income tax 
competition in a two-country dynamic, neoclassical general equilibrium model 
with perfect capital mobility (Mendoza and Tesar, 2005). The results depend 
on whether labour or consumption taxes are used to compensate for the 
decline in capital taxation, but in general they indicate tiny welfare gains from 
tax coordination. 
A fourth reason of controversy with regard to the benefits and costs of tax 
rate harmonisation lies in the uncertainty of the existence and effects of tax 
competition. As we have seen in section 3.2, the empirical evidence is mixed: 
there is fairly clear evidence that there is competition over statutory and 
effective average tax rates, but there has not been the “race to the bottom” 
predicted by the basic tax competition model, nor a long-term decreasing trend 
in tax revenue. On the basis of this evidence, it is frequently argued that tax 
competition to decrease effective and mainly statutory tax rates is not a 
problem; on the contrary, it might also be beneficial to the extent that the same 
tax revenue is obtained with lower rates, since this would tend to increase 
efficiency. However, as discussed again in section 3.2, several factors explain 
the stability and, for some countries, the increase in corporate tax revenue over 
GDP, and what has happened in the past might not be a good guide for what 
we might expect in the future. On the one hand, there are reasons, briefly 
discussed in the next section, for which one could expect tax competition for 
statutory rates to become even fiercer in the future; on the other hand, some 
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countervailing factors that in the past have prevented the decline in tax rates to 
be reflected in lower tax revenue (e.g. cyclical factors, an increasing degree o 
incorporation of the enterprise sector, or reforms aimed at broadening the tax 
base) may not be at work in the future. The decline in the corporate tax ratio 
since the beginning of the new millennium might be a first signal in this 
direction.   
 
What can be expected  for tax competition in the future? 
The application of the Code of Conduct and of state aid rules, by limiting 
the possibility by member states to adopt preferential or discriminatory 
regimes, may exacerbate tax competition over regular tax rates and regular tax 
systems, respectively. According to some authors (e.g. Keen, 2001), restrictions 
on preferential tax regimes might even render tax competition more severe in 
terms of negative spillovers. Ireland is often cited as an example of EU action 
against preferential regimes leading to a reduction of the general taxation level. 
More recently, also NMS have reacted in a similar way to the prospect of 
having to abolish most of their incentives because of the Code of Conduct and 
state aid restrictions.  
Another example of competition via the general tax system, as a response 
of having to abolish preferential regimes, is the progressive extension of the 
participation exemption, according to which both inter-company dividend and 
capital gains are fully exempt from tax. The evolution of tax systems towards 
full exemption of capital gains and dividends, and the consequent abolition of 
the tax credit on dividends, is increasingly characterising the corporation tax as 
a source tax. In turn, this might contribute to enhancing competition over tax 
rates. 
Further alignment of the EU tax bases towards tax base harmonisation, as 
discussed in section 3.4.1, would create an additional stimulus to engage in 
statutory tax rate competition, since this would be the only competition 
instrument left in the corporate tax field.19
Enlargement, as we observed, may be another explanation for increasing tax 
competition, since NMS have very low and still decreasing tax rates. 
More generally, one can expect that a deeper integration will induce a 
downward tendency of rates. As integration increases, agglomeration forces 
tend to weaken and with them also the possibility of countries to tax these 
rents will vanish. At the same time, however, increased integration implies an 
increase in foreign ownership of capital and might induce countries, above all 
small ones, with a higher share of foreign ownership, to apply higher taxes in 
the desire to export the tax burden (Huizinga and Nicodème, 2005). The 
balance of these countervailing effects is uncertain.  
Finally, as mentioned above, past and future ECJ decisions might 
increasingly restrict the ability of member states to devise unilaterally their own 
preferred policy and to introduce anti-avoidance measures to preserve their 
setting of tax rates from tax rate competition. By removing obstacles to the 
four fundamental freedom of the Treaty, the ECJ judgments will also increase 
integration, potentially intensifying tax competition.  
The fear of increasing tax rate competition has led some EU countries, 
most prominently France and Germany, to raise the issue of corporate tax rate 
coordination. Whether or not one agrees on the position of these Member 
States, the issue of tax rate coordination should be a matter of debate and 
careful study, in order to evaluate the pros and cons of different solutions.  
 
 
19 It is controversial however whether the passage from separate accounting to formula 
apportionment will increase tax competition or reduce it (Weiner, 2005). 
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Different degrees of tax rate coordination 
As for tax base coordination, also in the case of tax rates, there are different 
degrees of possible coordination, each of them meriting their own advantages 
and disadvantages that should be carefully evaluated. 
From both the theoretical and empirical literature one might conclude that 
a unique, common tax rate is not only politically unfeasible, but also 
economically unnecessary, and even mistaken, despite its effectiveness in 
definitely removing the incentive for tax planning and profit shifting in the EU. 
The costs of such a strong limitation of fiscal autonomy is not clearly 
compensated by gains in terms of increased efficiency. For example, as 
mentioned in section 2, higher tax rates do not affect efficiency if there are 
location specific rents (Keen, 1993, 1999; Genser and Haufler, 1996, Haufler, 
1999), including the advantages of agglomeration forces (Baldwin and 
Krugman, 2004). Moreover, larger countries can sustain higher rates with less 
detrimental effects than smaller countries (Bukovetsky, 1991, Wilson, 1991). 
Under these circumstances, a common (intermediate) tax rate might reduce, 
rather than increase welfare in high-tax as well as low-tax countries. 
More interesting is the proposal to introduce a minimum tax rate (or a 
lower and upper bound). Detractors of this proposal underline that also under 
a minimum corporate tax rate smaller countries, with lower rates, might loose. 
To be feasible, any proposal in this direction should consider the legitimate 
need of small peripheral countries to compensate for their location 
disadvantages. Forcing these countries to increase their tax rate might 
contradict the EU subsidy policy in favour of these countries and slow down 
or even arrest their catching up process. To avoid this, the minimum tax rate 
set at the Community level should be very low, e.g. 15%. This tax rate would 
be competitive with other countries’ tax rates and highly favourable to 
investment and growth in the EU, in accordance with the Lisbon strategy. Its 
main scope would be to prevent extreme tax competition up to the vanishing 
of the corporate tax rate. Another suggested policy is a two-tier approach 
(Sterdyniak, 2005, Schratzenstaller, 2005), with a higher minimum tax rate for 
old and a lower minimum tax rate for new member states, with the latter 
progressively increasing as countries converge. A different solution could be to 
compensate for the losses that a tax rate coordination policy would impose on 
small and peripheral member states, by allowing “peripheral countries meeting 
certain objective criteria to grant special investment tax credits for a limited 
time period, subject to approval by the European Commission” (Sorensen, 
2004a, p. 107). This would be a means of recognizing that corporate taxation is 
not an appropriate tool to attract firms to locate in less developed countries or 
deprived areas, due to risks of profit shifting (companies may benefit from low 
tax rates in a country while producing mainly elsewhere). This strategy would 
amount to trading off corporate taxation convergence against greater leeway 
given to Member States to subsidize their companies. Company subsidies 
could also be allowed more easily for regions or economic sectors in difficulty, 
and for state aid for innovation and research. 
Further investigations are necessary for a proper appraisal of these 
proposals. Hence, in what follows, attention is limited on the most convincing 
arguments put forward in the literature to support a minimum tax rate. 20
First, a minimum tax rate would be particularly useful in extracting the 
economic rents of foreign investment in the EU (Haufler, 1998, 1999). 
International economic studies show that foreign investment is mainly driven 
by non-tax factors, such as the benefits of agglomeration and the extent of the 
 
20 Also an upper bound could be set, to reassure investors that the government will not increase 
the tax rate (not beyond a certain limit) once the investment has been undertaken. Another 
argument in favour of an upper bound is that formula apportionment could lead to inefficiently 
high rates of corporate income tax (Sorensen, 2004a).  
  
   ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 75 
 
market. Foreign investment in the Internal Market, principally made in order to 
take advantage of the benefits of this market, would not be discouraged by this 
minimum tax provided it were internationally competitive and withdrew only 
part of the rents that could not be produced elsewhere. At the same time, it 
could guarantee a higher overall tax revenue than the one achieved by the EU 
as a whole if the various member states were totally free to compete for that 
investment. In turn this revenue may be used to improve infrastructures and 
other expenditures that might contribute to attract investment. 
Second, with a minimum tax rate, all countries would be put on a similar 
footing, but they would still be free to apply higher rates. The latter would be 
sustainable as long as they reflect better services or infrastructures offered by 
the host country, or the presence of location rents that are not wiped out by 
formula apportionment.  
Third, given the desire to leave some autonomy to Member States with 
regard to taxation of corporate income, the introduction of a floor for 
corporate taxation, like the minimum VAT rate could be the most feasible 
solution to leave wide autonomy to member states and prevent excessive 
competition. The federal corporate tax rate in the United States and Canada 
works in fact as a sort of minimum tax rate. A minimum tax rate would set a 
limit to tax competition towards increasingly lower rates. De Mooij (2004) 
draws an interesting lesson from diesel excises, in support for a minimum 
corporate tax rate as a way to cushion extreme tax competition forces. Despite 
tax revenue has been fairly stable, this is no guarantee that this will continue in 
the future. Since 2000 there are in fact signs of a decline. The possibility that 
the corporation tax will disappear is not so remote. Estonia already limits 
taxation to profit distribution; in fact it does not have a proper corporation tax. 
Other countries might follow and a “race to the bottom” cannot be excluded. 
This possibility opens a very complex question, which we can only mention 
here. The disappearance of the corporation tax would be welcome for many, 
since it is well known that this tax is very complex, induces distortions, and it is 
not clear who really carries the tax burden. However, its disappearance would 
also create problems. It is questionable, from the point of view of a proper tax 
design, whether a personal income tax can exist without a corporate income 
tax. It is true that corporations may be considered as a “veil” behind which 
individuals are ultimately found who can be taxed based on the profits they 
receive. But it is also true that without a corporation tax the taxation of 
undistributed profits could be deferred for a very long time (for ever, at one 
extreme), thus creating distortions in favour of incorporation. In addition to be 
a backstop for personal income tax, corporation tax can also be considered a 
useful, though imperfect, way to tax the benefits deriving from public 
expenditure on infrastructure and the use of public resources. It must be 
recognised, however, that under many basic principles (efficiency, simplicity, 
enforceability, etc.) the traditional definition of corporate profits (revenue from 
sales less interest payments and depreciation) is not the best way to tax 
companies. Alternative solutions, like the neutral Cash Flow Tax or the 
Allowance for Corporate Equity scheme, or a sort of Dual Income Tax, as 
adopted in the Nordic countries, would be preferable tax systems. In an 
international context with capital mobility other tax designs are attracting 
attention, for example, the X-tax suggested by Bradford (2001, 2004), that is a 
consumption-type tax suitable in an international context.  
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Other suggestions could be to tax company on the “net operating surplus 
by moving in the direction of the Italian Irap” (Mintz, 2004; Sterdyniak, 
2005).21 All these alternative tax designs would require a careful consideration 
of the interaction and coherence between corporate and individual taxation, as 
well as between the tax burden on labour and capital. Opening the debate on 
these issues, and on the general principles of taxation would be welcome, since 
the increasing difficulties of taxing profits where they accrue would maybe call 
for innovative solutions in the future.  
 
 
As we have seen in this section, the arguments in favour of corporate tax 
coordination mainly rest on the need to decrease compliance costs and other 
obstacles to the internal market, to reduce the incentive towards profit shifting 
and to promote an efficient location of capital within the EU. Tax competition 
might also be able to progressively attain these objectives: at the extreme, they 
all would be solved if the “race to the bottom” would lead to a vanishing of the 
corporation tax. However, this solution entails high costs, not only in terms of 
revenue loss, but also from the point of view of equity, since also capital 
owners should pay taxes, and for the application of the benefit principle, since 
firms benefiting from good infrastructure should directly or indirectly be 
charged for it.  
3.4.3 Conclusion 
If the costs of tax competition are considered higher than the benefits, 
coordination policies can take different forms, depending on the precise 
objectives that one wants to pursue. 
The proposal suggested by the Commission of a Common consolidated 
corporate tax base with formula apportionment would be able to remove some 
important obstacles to internal market integration: common rules to determine 
the tax base would reduce compliance costs for companies operating in the 
EU, and the possibility of tax consolidation would solve the problem of cross-
border loss offset within the EU.  However, this solution raises complex issues 
and would not be able to completely remove the incentives to manipulate 
transfer prices.   
In addition, in the presence of different tax rates, formula apportionment 
would not guarantee an efficient allocation of capital.  
To fully solve the problem of profit shifting, tax base coordination should 
be accompanied by some degree of tax rate harmonisation. To prevent 
misallocation of capital, a common rate is not necessary and could even be 
harmful, as long as higher rates are accompanied by location specific rents 
(such as those induced by agglomeration forces, or efficient public services or 
infrastructure), and the common tax rate will force small, peripheral countries 
to increase their rates. That is why a minimum tax rate tends to have a greater 
support in the literature. Otherwise, other solutions should be devised in order 
to compensate countries losing from tax rate coordination. 
 
 
21 The Italian IRAP is at present under scrutiny at the ECJ, since the question has been raised of 
its compatibility with the European VAT system. However, the features of the two taxes are 
very different, since IRAP is in fact an origin tax on the factors of production (labour and 
capital) and does not interfere with the VAT, which is on consumption, and levied at 
destination. Before its introduction, the Commission’s TAXUD services, in response to a 
specific question of the Italian government introducing the reform, did not raise any question 
concerning the compatibility of this tax with the Community Treaty and legislation.   
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APPENDIX 1. COMPLEMENTARY TABLES 
AND GRAPHS 
 
 
Table 3.1: Statutory Company Tax Rates in OMS in %, 1982 to 1994 
 
 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1982-
1994 
Belgium 45 45 45 45 45 43 43 43 41 39 39 39 40 -5
Denmark 40 40 40 40 50 50 50 50 40 38 38 34 34 -6
Finland 60 60 60 60 60 50 50 50 40 40 36 25 25 -35
Germany 62 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 58 59 59 58 54 -8
Greece 43 43 44 44 44 44 44 40 40 40 40 40 40 -3
Spain 33 33 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 2
France 50 50 50 50 45 45 42 39 37 34 34 33 33 -17
Ireland 45 50 50 50 50 50 50 47 43 43 40 40 40 -5
Italy 39 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 48 48 52 52 13
Netherlands 48 48 43 43 42 42 42 35 35 35 35 35 35 -13
Austria 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 39 39 39 39 39 34 -27
Portugal 55 55 55 55 55 46 46 40 40 40 40 40 40 -15
Sweden 60 60 60 60 52 52 52 57 45 30 30 30 28 -32
Un. Kingd. 52 50 45 40 35 35 35 35 34 33 33 33 33 -19
Average 49.5 50.3 49.8 49.4 48.8 47.3 47.1 44.2 40.9 39.5 39.0 38.1 37.4 -12.1
Median 49 50 48 48 48 46 46 41.5 40 39 38.5 37 35 -14
Stand. dev. 8.9 8.4 8.4 8.7 8.5 7.8 7.9 8.2 5.8 6.9 6.9 8.1 7.7 -1.2
Var. coeff. 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0
Spread 29 30 28 28 28 28 28 28 24 29 29 33 29 0
 
Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies; Office of Tax Policy Research, University of Michigan; own 
calculations. 
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Table 3.2: Statutory Company Tax Rates in the EU-23 in %, 1995 to 2006 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1995-
2006 
Belgium 40,2 40,2 40,2 40,2 40,2 40,2 40,2 40,2 34 34 34 34,0 -6,2 
Denmark 34 34 34 34 32 32 30 30 30 30 28 28,0 -6,0 
Finland 25 28 28 28 28 29 29 29 29 29 26 26,0 1,0 
Germany 56,8 56,7 56,7 56 51,6 51,6 38,3 38,3 39,6 38,3 38,9 38,9 -17,9 
Greece 40 40 40 40 40 40 37,5 35 35 35 32 29,0 -11,0 
Spain 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35,0 0,0 
France 36,7 36,7 36,7 41,7 40 36,7 36,4 35,4 35,4 35,4 35 35,0 -1,7 
Ireland 40 38 36 32 28 24 20 16 12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 -27,5 
Italy 52,2 53,2 53,2 41,3 41,3 41,3 40,3 40,3 38,3 37,3 38,3 38,3 -13,9 
Luxembourg 40,9 40,9 39,3 37,5 37,5 37,5 37,5 30,4 30,4 30,4 30,4 30,4 -10,5 
Netherlands 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 34,5 34,5 34,5 31,5 30,5 -4,5 
Austria 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 25 25,0 -9,0 
Portugal 39,6 39,6 39,6 37,4 37,4 35,2 35,2 33 33 27,5 27,5 22,5 -17,1 
Sweden 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28,0 0,0 
United Kingdom 33 33 31 31 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30,0 -3,0 
Average OMS 38,0 38,2 37,8 36,7 35,9 35,3 33,8 32,6 31,9 31,4 30,1 29,5 -8,5 
Median 36,7 36,7 36 35 35 35 35 34 34 34 30,4 30 -6,7 
SD OMS 7,9 7,6 7,7 6,7 6,2 6,4 5,3 5,8 6,1 6,0 6,2 6,4 -1,4 
VC 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,0 
Spread OMS 31,8 28,7 28,7 28 23,6 27,6 20,3 24,3 27,1 25,8 26,4 26,4 -5,4 
Czech Republic 41 39 39 35 35 31 31 31 31 28 26 24,0 -17,0 
Estonia 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 24 22,0 -4,0 
Latvia 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 22 19 15 15 15,0 -10,0 
Lithuania 29 29 29 29 29 24 24 15 15 15 15 15,0 -14,0 
Hungary 19,6 19,6 19,6 19,6 19,6 19,6 19,6 19,6 19,6 17,7 16 16,0 -3,6 
Slovenia 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25,0 0,0 
Slovak Republic 40 40 40 40 40 29 29 25 25 19 19 19,0 -21,0 
Poland 40 40 38 36 34 30 28 28 27 19 19 19,0 -21,0 
Average NMS 30,7 30,5 30,2 29,5 29,2 26,2 26,0 24,0 23,5 20,6 19,9 19,4 -11,3 
Median 27,5 27,5 27,5 27,5 27,5 25,5 25,5 25 25 19 19 19,0 -8,5 
SD NMS 7,8 7,5 7,2 6,5 6,2 3,5 3,3 4,7 4,8 4,7 4,3 3,7 -4,1 
VC 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 -0,1 
Spread NMS 21,4 20,4 20,4 20,4 20,4 11,4 11,4 16,0 16,0 13,0 11,0 10,0 -11,4 
Average EU25 35,5 35,5 35,1 34,2 33,5 32,1 31,0 29,6 29,0 27,6 26,6 26,0 -9,5 
Spread OMS NMS 7,3 7,7 7,6 7,3 6,7 9,1 7,8 8,7 8,5 10,8 10,3 10,2 2,8 
 
 
Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies; Office of Tax Policy Research, University of Michigan; 
national tax laws; own calculations. 
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Table 3.3: Effective Company Tax Rates OMS and NMS, 1995 to 20031) 
 
 Statutory Tax Rates Implicit Corporate 
Tax Rates2
Corporate Tax 
Ratios3
OMS 35.6 
(5.9) 
13.6 
(3.2) 
3.3 
(0.5) 
NMS4 27.7 
(5.3) 
10.9 
(5.3) 
2.3 
(1.1) 
1 Averages across countries; standard deviations in parentheses. 2 1995 to 2002. 3 1995 to 2001; 
corporate tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. 4 Excluding Hungary. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Table 3.4: Effective Company Tax Rates by Country Size OMS, 1982 to 20031 
 
 Statutory 
Tax Rates1
EMTR2 EATR2 Implicit 
Corporate 
Tax Rates3
Corporate 
Tax Ratios4
Large 
countries 
42.4 
(8.0) 
24.2 
(7.0) 
35.2 
(7.5) 
11.5 
(3.2) 
2.7 
(0.8) 
Small 
countries 
40.1 
(2.0) 
23.3 
(7.6) 
31.3 
(9.0) 
14.8 
(2.6) 
2.9 
(1.5) 
1 Excluding Luxembourg. 2 Excluding Denmark, Luxembourg. 3 1995 to 2002; excluding 
Ireland, Luxembourg. 4 Excluding Portugal; 1982 to 2002. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table 3.5: Effective Company Tax Rates by Country Size NMS, 1995 to 2003 
 
 Statutory Tax 
Rates 
Implicit 
Corporate Tax 
Rates1
Corporate Tax 
Ratios2
Large countries 29.3 
(6.9) 
16.7 
(1.9) 
3.3 
(0.6) 
Small countries 26.8 
(3.8) 
8.0 
(3.9) 
1.9 
(1.1) 
1 1995 to 2002; excluding Hungary, Slovenia. 2 1995 to 2001; excluding Hungary. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table 3.6: Effective Company Tax Rates by Country Size & Degree of 
Openness OMS, 1982 to 20031) 
 
 Statutory tax 
rates1)
EMTR2) EATR2) Implicit corporate 
tax rates3)
Corporate tax 
ratios4)
 open closed open closed open closed open closed open closed 
Large 
countries 
45.6 
(10.6) 
40.2
(4.5) 
28.7
(9.4) 
21.2
(1.0) 
39 
(10.1) 
32.7
(2.9) 
10.1 
(4.6) 
12.5
(0.8) 
2.6
(1.0) 
2.7
(0.6) 
Small 
countries 
39.2 
(1.5) 
40.6
(2.0) 
19.8
(10.7) 
25.5
(3.3) 
25.4
(12.6) 
34.9
(1.2) 
15.1 
(1.4) 
14.8
(2.9) 
4.0
(1.9) 
2.1
(0.2) 
1 Excluding Luxembourg. 2 Excluding Denmark, Luxembourg. 3 1995 to 2002; excluding 
Ireland, Luxembourg. 4 Excluding Portugal; 1982 to 2002.
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Table 3.7: Effective Company Tax Rates by Country Size & Degree of 
Openness NMS, 1995 to 2003 
 
 Statutory tax rates Implicit corporate 
tax rates1
Corporate tax 
ratios2
 open closed open closed open closed 
Large 
countries 
27.2
(7.6) 
33.4 
(-) 
14.8 
 
(-) 
18.5 
 
(-) 
3.8 
(-) 
2.7 
(-) 
Small 
countries 
30.1
(4.9) 
24.6 
(0.4) 
10.1 
(4.3) 
5.9 
(2.0) 
2.8 
(1.1) 
1.4 
(0.4) 
1 1995 to 2002; excluding Hungary, Slovenia. 2 1995 to 2001; excluding Hungary. 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table 3.8: Taxes on Corporate Income in Relation to GDP in Selected 
Countries in %, 1980 to 2003 
 
 1980 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Austria 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.0 3.1 2.3 2.0
Belgium 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.4
Czech Republic . . 4.9 3.8 4.4 4.6 4.8
Denmark 1.4 1.5 2.0 2.4 3.1 2.9 2.8
Finland 1.2 2.0 2.3 6.0 4.3 4.3 3.5
France 2.1 2.3 2.1 3.1 3.4 2.9 2.6
Germany 2.0 1.7 1.1 1.8 0.6 1.0 1.3
Greece 0.9 1.6 2.0 4.6 3.8 3.8 .
Hungary . . 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.4 .
Ireland 1.4 1.7 2.8 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.9
Italy 2.4 3.9 3.6 2.9 3.6 3.2 2.8
Luxemburg 6.6 6.5 7.5 7.2 7.5 8.6 7.9
Netherlands 2.9 3.2 3.1 4.2 4.1 3.5 3.0
Poland . . 2.8 2.5 1.9 2.0 .
Portugal . 2.3 2.5 4.1 3.6 . .
Slovak Republic . . . 2.8 2.2 2.7 .
Spain 1.2 2.9 1.8 3.0 2.8 3.2 3.1
Sweden 1.2 1.7 2.8 4.0 2.9 2.4 2.0
United Kingdom 2.9 3.6 2.8 3.6 3.5 2.9 2.8
EU 15 
2.1 2.6 2.7 3.8 3.6 3.4 .
EU 19 
2.1 2.6 2.7 3.8 3.6 3.4 .
Japan 
5.5 6.5 4.2 3.6 3.5 3.1 .
United States 
2.8 2.4 2.9 2.6 1.9 1.8 2.0
Source: OECD (2004: 73; 2005b); own calculations.  
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Figure 3.1: Taxes on Corporate Income (percent of GDP) and Output Gap 
(percent), 1990–2003 
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Source: OECD (2004, 2005a, 2005b). 
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Figure 3.2: Taxes on Corporate Income (percent of GDP) and Output Gap 
(percent), 1990–2003 
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Source: OECD (2004, 2005a, 2005b). 
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Figure 3.3: Taxes on Corporate Income (percent of GDP) and Output Gap 
(percent), 1990–2003 
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Figure 3.4: Taxes on Corporate Income (percent of GDP) and Output Gap 
(percent), 1990–2003 
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